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 Botts, Tina Fernandes.  Ph.D.  The University of Memphis.  May 2011.  The 
Hermeneutics of Equal Protection Analysis.  Major Professor:  Thomas J. Nenon. 
 
 The meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution is a hotly contested issue in contemporary constitutional 
theory.  Contemporary interpretations generally fall into one of two categories, 
understood to be theoretically opposed:  those derived through originalism and those 
derived through non-originalism.  From the perspective of an approach to constitutional 
interpretation based in philosophical hermeneutics, however, there is a third alternative 
available for thinking about what the Equal Protection Clause means known as legal 
hermeneutics.  Legal hermeneutics acknowledges the importance of the text, as 
originalism does, in the determination of credible meaning, but also acknowledges the 
roles of history, socio-historical context, and the identity of the interpreter, as non-
originalism does.  In this way, legal hermeneutics acts as a sort of middle road between 
originalist and non-originalist approaches.  However, the strength of legal hermeneutics 
is not that it takes this middle road, but that it, unlike the other approaches, is grounded in 
and faithful to the necessary structures of the interpretive process itself.  The following 
work uses legal hermeneutics to develop a more hermeneutically credible meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause than either originalist or non-originalist approaches are capable 
of providing.  The result is a meaning of the Equal Protection Clause according to which 
(1) the Clause operates as a remedial measure to protect the equality rights of members of 
marginalized, oppressed, and subjugated groups only, and (2) strict scrutiny is the 
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“[H]ermeneutics has the task of revealing a totality of meaning in all its 




Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 The subject of this work is the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
2
  The customary, traditional or 
mainstream way of determining the meaning of a given law – i.e., the way that is taught 
in law schools – is to examine the text of the law itself, and perhaps the legislative history 
of the law, together with a careful examination of the various court cases that have 
applied the law and made judgments as to its meaning.  For lawyers, this means 
examining the most recent cases that have applied the law and prioritizing the decisions 
of those cases that have the most precedential value.  Determination of the precedential 
value of a given case, on this method, means starting with the highest court in the land 
that has made a decision about the what the law “means,” prioritizing that court‟s most 
recent judgment, and then moving down through the lower court decisions from there.  
The “meaning” of the law is understood to be the most recent decision as to its meaning 
by the highest court to have addressed the issue.  If the Supreme Court of the United 
States has made a decision as to the “meaning” of a given law, then that decision is 
authoritative.  That the Supreme Court of the United States has this authority is known as 
its power of “judicial review.”
3
   The case that contains the most recent decision as to a 
                                                          
1
 Gadamer (1975, 1989: 467). 
 
2
 The Equal Protection Clause can be found in Section 1 of the Amendment, and states: 
“No State shall …deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
3
 Nowhere in the Constitution is the Supreme Court given this authority.  But, ever  since 






given law‟s meaning by the highest court to have addressed this issue is known as 
“binding precedent,” a phrase meant to capture the idea that the determination made in 
that case about the meaning of a given law is the current state of the meaning of the law 
such that future courts are obligated to use that meaning as well.
4
  Sometimes the highest 
court to have determined what a given law “means” changes its assessment of the 
meaning of the law in question.  When such a change happens, the court in question is 
said to have “overturned binding precedent.”  The overturning of binding precedent is 
usually accomplished by what lawyers call “distinguishing” the formerly binding 
precedent.  “Distinguishing” the decision of formerly binding precedent usually involves 
distinguishing the facts of the case.  Doing so creates the illusion that the meaning of the 
law itself has not changed, just the facts, which in turn creates the illusion that the 
“meaning” of the law is something that is timeless, value-free, and unchanging. 
 But, occasionally, it is not sensibly possible to explain the overturning of binding 
precedent by distinguishing the facts of the previous case.  In those cases, among others, 
the court deciding to overturn the previously binding precedent simply says its prior 
assessment as to the meaning of the law was incorrect. “At one time we thought this is 
what the law meant,” the court in effect holds, “but we now understand that we were 
wrong.”  The philosophical question that is at the center of the study that follows is, On 
what basis does a given court justifiably make a decision as to the definitive meaning of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, that authority has become a part of standard 
American law.  
4
 A process called “Shepardizing” is the final step in this process.  Shepardizing means 
determining if the top case found as a result of this process has been overturned, reaffirmed, 





any law? The case I have used to highlight some of the problems inherent in answering 
that philosophical question is the case of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. 
 The meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is something that has always been 
contentious.  From the very first Supreme Court cases to decide the meaning of the 
Clause, The Slaughterhouse Cases in 1873, to the Supreme Court‟s most recent decisions 
as to the meaning of the Clause, i.e., Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, both 
decided in 2003 and together known as “the Michigan cases,” the Supreme Court has 
changed its assessment of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause many, many times.  
Not only that, and what I think is particularly problematic about the way the court has 
determined the meaning of the Clause, the Court has repeatedly held that the Clause 
means different things for different groups of people, with no jurisprudentially sound 
reason(s) guiding the differences.  Specifically, and for the purposes of the following 
work, according to the way the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause has (d)evolved 
and changed over the years since its ratification in 1868 (i.e., according to current 
interpretation of the meaning of the Clause, i.e., that which obtains under what I will call 
Suspect Classification Doctrine),
5
 the Equal Protection Clause means different things for 
the equality rights of the three groups of persons known as African Americans, women, 
and homosexuals.  And even more problematic than that, in my view, is the fact that the 
rationales offered by the Supreme Court in recent years for their various interpretations of 
                                                          
5
 In this work, I make a distinction between Suspect Classification Doctrine and Suspect 
Class Doctrine.  Suspect Classification Doctrine, on this view, prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of certain traits while Suspect Class Doctrine prohibits discrimination against certain 
groups.  In both equal protection case law and equal protection scholarship, Suspect 
Classification Doctrine and Suspect Class Doctrine are often used interchangeably, but it is one of 
the purposes of this project to highlight the theoretical and practical differences between these 





the Clause are very much out of touch with both the spirit of the Clause and some very 
compelling facts about the nature of the interpretive process itself revealed to us through 
philosophical hermeneutics (also known as the philosophy of interpretation), most 
notably, the historicity of meaning. 
 The following work was motivated by two objectives.  The first was a desire on 
my part to find a way of determining meaning in the law that somehow acknowledged the 
historicity of meaning but also attempted to locate something on the order of objectivity 
in legal interpretation.  I sought a way of determining meaning in the law that stepped 
outside of the theoretical stand-off between the analytic and continental traditions in the 
philosophy of law in an attempt to find real answers to real legal problems rather than 
getting lost in theoretical abstraction.  As is the case with most, if not all, stand-offs 
between the two traditions, the stand-off in philosophy of law can be characterized as a 
deep and abiding difference in perspective regarding the possibility of metaphysical and 
epistemological foundations.  Generally speaking, this stand-off plays itself out as a 
marked polarization between the two traditions on answers to the fundamental questions 
in philosophy of law such as  What is the law? and What is the basis for a given 
interpretation of a law? and What provides a given law with its authority or legitimacy? 
For years prior to the instant project, I thought that this polarization in philosophy of law 
implicated dire consequences for the prospect of anything on the order of definitive 
answers in the law.   
 Each tradition had its attractive features.  The analytic tradition‟s search for 
objective meaning in the law satisfied both my intuition that such a thing existed but also 





real guidance in answering the question of what a given law means for a given client in a 
particular set of circumstances.  The continental tradition‟s appreciation for the extent to 
which meaning in the law is affected by factors such as context, language, history, time, 
power, and particularity comported with my experience of how the same law is very 
regularly understood to mean different things to different people in different times, 
places, and circumstances.  One need only look at how the two sides of any court case are 
construed and presented by opposing counsel based on the exact same set of “facts” to 
appreciate the veridical content of this perspective.   
 In an approach to meaning in the law known as legal hermeneutics (which is 
heavily based in philosophical hermeneutics), both the analytic and continental traditions 
in philosophy of law are acknowledged as valuable and taken into account.  Even more 
compelling about legal hermeneutics for me, however, is that on  its own terms legal 
hermeneutics is not merely adopting a sort of practical compromise position between 
these two standpoints in the way that, say, legal pragmatism does, or legal interpretivism.  
Instead, the approach to meaning in the law taken by legal hermeneutics is grounded in 
philosophical insights going back to Aristotle about the nature of what it means to 
understand any text (not just legal texts)  (Aristotle‟s On Interpretation).   
Specifically, legal hermeneutics shows (based on profound epistemological and 
metaphysical insights discovered and developed within philosophical hermeneutics) that 
whenever one sets out to understand a text, one is engaged in the process of 
interpretation.  The meaning of the words on the page, in other words, the “black letter 
law,” in no case jumps up and directly applies itself to our minds or brains in a manner 





is comprised apply themselves directly to our sense organs (Locke 1690).  Rather, the 
subjectivity and facticity (colloquially, the reality, worldview, or schema of 
intelligibility) of the interpreter(s), together with the socio-historical context in which the 
interpretation takes place (the two central components of what I will call a given 
“interpretive moment”) together dramatically effect what is taken by the interpreter to be 
the meaning of a given text/law.”
6
 
 The second objective motivating this work was a long-time desire on my part to 
protect, defend, and uphold the constitutional rights of the marginalized, oppressed, and 
the subjugated.
7
  These two objectives came together and began a dialogue with each 
other that lasted many years and that ultimately produced the question that is the subject 
                                                          
6
 This hermeneutic insight is arguably similar to Nobel prize-winning physicist Werner 
Heisenberg‟s discovery in the early twentieth century that an experimenter‟s attempt to measure 
the momentum of a subatomic particle affects the value of the position of the particle.  Similarly, 
an experimenter‟s attempt to measure the position of a subatomic particle affects the value of the 
momentum of the particle (Heisenberg 1927).  This discovery  i.e., the discovery that human 
involvement in a given scientific experiment affects the values of the things to be measured by 
the experiment, has generated what is arguably the central epistemological question in the 
philosophy of science, i.e., Is it possible for humans to obtain objective scientific knowledge? 
Notably, Heisenberg‟s 1927 paper is in German and originally referred to the phenomenon at 
issue as Unbestimmtheit, which is German for  "indeterminacy.”  The 1927 paper uses the word 
Unsicherheit or "uncertainty" only in an endnote.  It was the English-language translation of 
Heisenberg's textbook, The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory, published in 1930, that 
translated Unbestimmtheit as "uncertainty" throughout the text and popularized Heisenberg‟s 
discovery in the English-speaking world as his “Uncertainty Principle” (Cassidy 2009). 
7
 In this work, reference to marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated groups is meant to 
refer to groups whose rights to equality in America is dramatically lower than the equality rights 
of others.  It is conceded that the question of whether a given group qualifies as marginalized, 
oppressed, or subjugated is an empirical matter and one that is not dealt with directly here.  
However, it is understood that certain markers are at least indicators of a group‟s qualifying for 
this status.  Things like level of income, levels of education, quality of healthcare, net worth, 
healthy representation in the mainstream media, statistics on violence against the group, 
representation in echelons of power and privilege, and testimony from the group members 
themselves are understood to be helpful markers.  Additionally, it is sufficient to qualify for the 
requisite status if a given group is any one of the three descriptors:  marginalized, oppressed, or 
subjugated, such that if any of these descriptors is appropriate, the equality status of the group in 





of this study, i.e., What is the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of  the Fourteenth 
Amendment?  The answer to this question has dire consequences for those meant to be 
protected by the Clause, as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
the primary text upon which the right to equality in American constitutional law is based 
(Schwarzschild 1996, 1999).  It is my considered view that Suspect Classification 
Doctrine, the present method used by the Supreme Court for determining the meaning of 
the Equal Protection Clause, simply does not work for the marginalized, oppressed, or 
subjugated.  Specifically, the way the Doctrine ties the level of judicial review used to 
assess the constitutionality of a given law or policy to particular traits of human beings 
(e.g., race, sex, sexual orientation) not only makes no sense in the abstract but operates to 
undermine the rights to equality of those the Equal Protection Clause was arguably 
designed to protect.  I see the Supreme Court‟s usage of Suspect Classification Doctrine 
as based on archaic notions of what it means to be racialized in America, what it means to 
be a woman in America, and what it means to be a member of a sexual minority group in 
America.  It is my goal to find a way to clean-up and update the Court‟s thinking on these 
topics so that the rights of oppressed groups can be better protected, and I intuitively 
believe that the way to do that is to find and offer a better method of understanding just 
exactly what the Equal  Protection Clause “means.”   
 In Chapter 2, I will lay out the problem, which is the way in which Suspect 
Classification Doctrine (the present method used by the Supreme Court of the United 
States to determine the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause) has developed since the 
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.  The reader will note that my approach 





approach, but rather through an historical approach.  Rather than simply laying out the 
current state of binding precedent on the issue at hand, then, I have chosen to instead lay 
out the historical development of the case law in chronological order as it pertains to 
three specific groups (African Americans, women, and gay people) to highlight the way 
in which the law has changed through time.  I have also chosen this method to highlight 
the way in which the law has changed in time for each of the three groups.  While I 
recognize the value of precedent and concede that if what we want to know is the 
contemporary state of the law (a practicing lawyer‟s objective), the best way to discover 
this is by determining what the current binding precedent is on the topic; as one who 
understands the historicity of  reason and the socio-cultural situatedness of meaning, it 
was important to me to trace the historical development of  the relevant case law, noting 
any socio-historical or juridico-discursive forces which arguably helped form and shape 
the law at any given point in time.  I have thus presented in Chapter 2 the state of the law 
on the topic of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause through an explication of the 
historical development of that meaning.  Through walking through that historical 
progression with me in Chapter 2, the reader is meant to come to appreciate the degree to 
which the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause as presented by the Supreme Court is 
to a large extent completely arbitrary, and what is of more grave importance, the degree 
to which the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause as presented by the Supreme Court 
has been influenced by politics, non-self-reflexive intentionality, and outdated 
misconceptions and stereotypes about what it means, particularly in America, to be black, 
what it means to be a woman, and what it means to be gay.
8
 
                                                          
8






 Then, in Chapter 3, I will lay out in detail the theoretical basis for my approach to 
legal interpretation, a fairly recent way of thinking about meaning in the law known as 
legal hermeneutics.  Legal hermeneutics has its origins in philosophical hermeneutics, or 
an approach to meaning in general that is grounded in an investigation into the theoretical 
structures supporting the phenomenon of interpretation itself.  For the thinkers who have 
played a role in the development of philosophical hermeneutics, there are necessary 
structures to the way meaning is always ascertained, necessary structures to the process 
of interpretation.  Central to these structures is what is known as the hermeneutical circle, 
or a perpetual moving from the part to the whole and back to the part again and so on.  
Understanding, then, on this view, is always cyclical.  One enters the circle of 
understanding already from a certain vantage point.  This vantage point affects how one 
sees the part or the whole, depending upon which is attempted to be understood first.  
One then moves from the part (or the whole) to the whole (or the part), back and forth, 
with all of this always takes place in context.  The socio-historical and cultural contexts 
in which a given interpretation (or a given attempt at understanding, taken to be 
synonymous with interpretation) takes place are understood to affect what is taken to be 
understood as well, as does the identity of the interpreter (including the degree to which 
this identity includes self-understanding).  The identity of the interpreter will always 
affect what is taken to be understood, on this view.  Cartesian distance between mind and 
body, between the observer (or interpreter) and the observed (or interpreted) is a fantasy.  
In this sense, the hermeneutic circle of understanding includes not just parts and whole, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Equal Protection Clause means or should mean for three specific groups (racialized 
minorities, women, and gay people), this choice of groups is not meant to imply that Suspect 
Classification Doctrine is any more effective for any other marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated 





but also self, history, culture, and tradition.  According to legal hermeneutics, what is true 
of meaning in general is also true of meaning in the law.  Chapter 3 will conclude with a 
quote from Professor Gregory Leyh, who has edited an outstanding text on legal 
hermeneutics.  Paraphrasing, Leyh points out that if legal hermeneutics gets legal 
interpretation right, then the received views and legal orthodoxies of mainstream legal 
jurisprudence are stood on their lofty heads.  
 The reader should note that while traditional legal analysis of what the Equal 
Protection Clause means  is concerned with the descriptive question of predicting how 
the Supreme Court will decide future cases based on its “binding” precedents, my legal 
hermeneutical analysis is more concerned with the normative question of determining 
how the Supreme Court should decide future cases based on an assessment of the 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause grounded in the necessary structures of the 
interpretive process itself.  My claim is that the way the Supreme Court presently 
determines what the Equal Protection Clause means  – Suspect Classification Doctrine – 
has resulted in Supreme Court decisions that are wholly out of step with the spirit of the 
Clause and which are very often more reflective of the illegitimate prejudices of the 
various Supreme Court justices that have interpreted the Clause over the years than 
anything resembling a hermeneutically credible interpretation.   
The reader should also note that it is not my claim, however, that legal 
hermeneutics reveals one, clear, objective, timeless interpretation of the Equal Protection 







  Instead, my claim is that legal hermeneutics provides us with tools to be able to 
responsibly prioritize various interpretations of what the Supreme Court has said the 
Clause means, primarily by taking sober account of the degree to which existing 
interpretations of the Clause have been affected by the prejudices of previous  interpreters 
of the Clause, and by also taking into account what seems to be a blindness on the part of 
the Supreme Court to the spirit of the Clause in recent years.
10
  Moreover, it is my further 
claim that the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause together with the contemporary 
context of can together generate an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that is an 
improvement upon existing interpretations.  The idea is that a legal hermeneutical reading 
of what the Equal Protection Clause means reveals a spirit of the text that, if taken 
seriously and used as a guide to future interpretations (Supreme Court Decisions), will 
help the Supreme Court to use the Equal Protection Clause to achieve the ideal of 
equality for marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated groups.
11
   
                                                          
9
 The fact that legal hermeneutics rejects even the possibility of one, clear, objective, timeless 
interpretation of any law is one of the key ways in which legal hermeneutics can be distinguished 
from Ronald Dworkin‟s legal interpretivism (described in Chapter 3), which explicitly states that 
there is only one right way to decide any legal case, or to interpret any law.  For Dworkin, if there 
were a judge who possessed infinite powers of reason and insight, and who had access to every 
law at all times --  a judge he famously called Judge Hercules -- such a judge could find the one 
true correct decision in a case, or identify the one true meaning of a given law.  
 
10
 It is conceded that it is impossible to take a full and complete account of the prejudices of 
previous interpreters of the clause.  However, the claim being made is that the higher the level of 
self-reflexivity of the interpreter at any given interpretive moment, the more likely the resultant 
interpretation is credible or legitimate.  
 
11 Moreover, the reader should be aware that owing to the nature of hermeneutical legal 
interpretation, the question of who is protected by the Equal Protection Clause in theory has the 
same answer as the related question of how the Supreme Court should interpret the Equal 
Protection Clause in a given interpretive moment in practice.  This should not be understood as a 
flaw in the hermeneutical approach to legal interpretation but as a function of what philosophical 





 Toward that end, in Chapter 4 I have generated two dialogues meant to 
hermeneutically derive or generate a meaning of the Equal Protection Clause that is more 
in keeping with the spirit of the Clause than Suspect Classification Doctrine.  These 
dialogues reveal that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is that it is there as a 
remedial measure to protect the marginalized, the oppressed, and/or the subjugated.  
Specifically, the Equal Protection Clause is meant to provide a constitutional basis upon 
which to provide a federal remedy for those who find that their right to equal protection 
under the law has been infringed by the government in virtue of their membership in a 
group that has a history of having been subjected to unequal treatment under the law.  It 
is a clause that was added to the constitution for the specific purpose of ensuring equality 
rights to those who are members of groups who are clearly excluded from the political 
process by the government and who are simultaneously and as a direct and traceable 
result of said state action subjected to widespread prejudice and discrimination.   
  In Chapter 5, I will discuss the findings in Chapter 4, draw some tentative 
conclusions about what the findings mean and outline some recommendations for future 





“What I have come to understand is that the usual price of opposing 
oppression is engendering further oppression, and yet, failing to oppose 
oppression is even more unacceptable, even more costly.”  




Chapter 2: The Problem: Suspect Classification Doctrine in Equal Protection 
Analysis 
 
What is Suspect Classification Doctrine?  
 Equal Protection Analysis is that body of jurisprudence according to which the 
Supreme Court of the United States assesses the legitimacy of laws, governmental 
policies, or other state actions which are alleged to be unconstitutionally discriminatory 
and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  Suspect Classification Doctrine is the 
method of Equal Protection Analysis currently in place and used by the Supreme Court of 
the United States.
2
  Specifically, the doctrine is an approach to effectuating the meaning 
of the Equal Protection Clause that has developed over the years through the process of 
Supreme Court decisions on the issue of what the Clause means and how it should be 
applied in particular factual circumstances and particular socio-historical contexts at 
specific points in time.  But, as the following summary of the historical development of 
the case law on Suspect Classification Doctrine demonstrates, the doctrine is internally 
inconsistent, circular and does not provide a clear guide for those seeking redress under 
the Equal Protection Clause.  Specifically, while the Equal Protection Clause was meant 
to protect marginalized, oppressed, and subjugated persons from unequal treatment under 
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 (Westley 1993: i).   
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 Kenji Yoshino, Chief Justice Earl Warren Professor of Constitutional Law, New York 
University School of Law, has recently called the present approach to Equal Protection Analysis 
the  “New Equal Protection” and defines this as a jurisprudence that “systematically denie[s] 
constitutional protection to new groups, curtail[s] it for already covered groups, and limits 





the law, Suspect Classification Doctrine fails to do this.  Specifically, Suspect 
Classification Doctrine fails to protect the ideal of equal treatment under the law for all 
contained in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  I will use the 
examples of African Americans, women, and sexual minorities to demonstrate the 
ineffectiveness of the doctrine.
3
  
According to Suspect Classification Doctrine, when a given law or governmental 
policy that contains distinctions or classifications between groups of persons is before the 
Court, before making an assessment on whether the law or policy violates the Equal 
Protection Clause and is therefore unconstitutional, the Court must first decide which one 
of three levels of judicial review should be used in the case.  At present, there are three 
levels of judicial review available:  strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the rational 
basis test (Tribe 1988;  Stephens & Scheb 2007). 
Strict scrutiny is the highest and most intense level of judicial review and is 
triggered when the law or policy in question contains what the Supreme Court calls a 
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 In this work, I will use the terms “people of color,” “African Americans,” “blacks,” and 
“Negroes” interchangeably.  This group includes everyone who self-identifies as racially black, 
everyone who is phenotypically black, and everyone who would be categorized as, or whose 
ancestors would have been categorized as, black by the one-drop rule of the Jim Crow era.  By 
“women” I mean everyone who is understood to be female either by society at large or by law.   
By “sexual minorities” I mean everyone who self-identifies as gay, homosexual, lesbian, 
bisexual, pansexual, transgender, or queer and everyone whose sexuality is understood to be non-
heterosexual by society at large or by law.  In addition, although it is recognized that distinctions 
can be made between the following terms for other purposes, for purposes of the project at hand, 
the terms “homosexuals,” “gay people,” and “sexual minorities” will be used interchangeably.  









 defined generally as a constitutionally impermissible distinction 
between one group of persons and another, and defined specifically as a classification 
based on a trait which itself seems to contravene established constitutional principles so 
that any purposeful use of the classification may be deemed “suspect.”
5
  
Intermediate scrutiny is a less intense level of judicial review and is triggered 
when the law or policy in question contains what is known as a “quasi-suspect 
classification”.  Identification of the specific conceptual framework for the creation and 
usage of the concept of a quasi-suspect classification, or for the creation and usage of 
intermediate scrutiny, is a difficult task owing to the lack of consistency or conceptual 
clarity in the development of these concepts (Kirp, Yudof, and Franks 1986: 90).  It is 
clear that intermediate scrutiny is used for those cases in which a suspect classification is 
not involved, but in which the Supreme Court nevertheless wishes to review the case a 
little more closely than it might otherwise do; but the exact process for determining when 
this state of affairs is at hand is almost universally understood as unclear, other than by 
the sort of classification involved.
6
  One suggestion is that decisions employing 
intermediate scrutiny simply rely upon each justice‟s intuitive sense of whether the 
classification in question is “benign” or “invidious” (Stephens & Scheb 2008: 473).   
Another suggestion is that intermediate scrutiny was created to give titular 
acknowledgment of the disadvantaged status of the group in question while 
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 Strict scrutiny is also the level of judicial review used when a “fundamental right” is at 
stake.  Fundamental rights have been defined as those privileges and immunities “which are, in 
their nature, fundamental.” Corfield v. Coryell  6 Fed. Cas. 546, no. 3,230 C.C.E.D.Pa. (1823). 
 
5 Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 938 (1984). 
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simultaneously retaining judicial discretion to uphold legal classifications affecting the 
group if doing so furthers some socio-political purpose deemed sufficiently “important” 
(McKinnon 1991a).  
The rational basis test is the lowest or least intense level of judicial review and is 
used where neither a suspect classification nor a quasi-suspect classification is implicated 
by the law.  The rational basis test is the baseline approach to equal protection and is 
marked by extreme judicial self-restraint and a concern for restricting the judicial role in 
deference to the legislative branch (Barron & Dienes 2003).  The rational basis test is the 
default test for determining whether a given legal classification is constitutional and is 
used where a legal classification is understood to be legally benign or constitutionally 
harmless. Classical benign classifications are those impinging upon economic interests, 
certain age restrictions like those applied to driving an automobile, and laws that restrict 
professional practice to those who are qualified (Stephens & Scheb 2008: 454).  
If the Court decides that the law in question involves a “suspect classification” 
and if the court has therefore made the concomitant decision that strict scrutiny is the 
appropriate level of judicial review, the Court has also decided that (1) the law or policy 
in question is presumptively unconstitutional, that (2) the burden is on the government to 
prove that the law is constitutional, and (3) in order to pass constitutional muster the law 
must be shown to be “narrowly tailored” to meet a “compelling” state interest (Tribe 
1988). This is a very difficult test for the government to meet.  In practice, if a law, 
policy, or other state action is assessed according to strict scrutiny, that law, policy, or 
other state action most likely will be held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 





If the Court decides that a the law in question involves a quasi-suspect 
classification and has therefore made the concomitant decision that intermediate scrutiny 
is the appropriate level of judicial review, the Court has also decided that  (1) the law or 
policy in question is presumptively unconstitutional, and (2) the burden of proof is still 
on the government; but, unlike under strict scrutiny, (3) in order to pass constitutional 
muster the law must be shown to be “substantially related” to an “important” state 
interest in order to stand, which is understood to be a less stringent test than strict 
scrutiny, and, most importantly, (4) the government is often understood to have met its 
burden of proof (Tribe 1988).  In practice, if a law or policy is assessed under 
intermediate scrutiny, that law sometimes will be held constitutional and sometimes held 
unconstitutional.  Employment of the intermediate scrutiny level of judicial review 
signals that a more fact-sensitive, case-by-case approach to the law in question will be 
used, with no particular likely outcome one way or another (Stephens & Scheb 2008). 
If the Court decides that the rational basis test is the appropriate level of judicial 
review, it has decided that (1) the law or policy in question is presumptively 
constitutional, (2) the burden of proof is not on the government, as was the case with 
strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny, but on the person challenging the law to prove 
the law‟s unconstitutionality (Tribe 1988).  In practice, this means that if the government 
is able to articulate any “legitimate” state interest, and also explain how the law or policy 
in question is “rationally related” to that interest, the law in question will be upheld.  Also 
in practice, the government is almost always able to articulate a state interest that satisfies 
this test and laws assessed according to the rational basis test are almost always upheld 





The choice by the Supreme Court of which of these levels of judicial review 
should be applied to a given law, governmental policy, or other state action, then, is 
dramatically outcome determinative for the fate of the law.   At present, only race and 
ethnicity are suspect classifications (Tribe 1988; Stephens & Scheb 2008; Barron & 
Dienes 2003), gender is understood as a quasi-suspect classification (Ibid.), and sexuality 
or sexual orientation is not recognized as a constitutionally redressable classification at 
all (Ibid.).  What this means in practice is that, according to Suspect Classification 
Doctrine, laws that discriminate amongst persons on the basis of race or ethnicity are 
virtually always held unconstitutional, laws which discriminate on the basis of gender are 
sometimes held unconstitutional and sometimes upheld depending upon whether the 
Supreme Court finds the articulated governmental purpose for the law “important” or not 
and/or whether the Court thinks the law in question is “substantially” related to the 
achievement of that governmental interest, and laws that discriminate on the basis of 
sexuality are presumed constitutional such that, in equal protection cases involving sexual 
orientation, the burden of proof is always on the person challenging the law to prove that 
the purpose offered by the government for the discriminatory law is illegitimate and/or 
that there is no rational relationship between the purpose offered by the government and 
the law or policy in question.  
Race as a Suspect Classification 
In the years since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the meaning of 
the Equal Protection Clause as regards racial discrimination has changed from the 





contemporary era that the Clause protects everyone (all “individuals”) from laws which 
contain racial classifications.   
Early Cases:  Protecting Former Slaves 
The very first cases to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment were a 
conglomeration of cases decided in 1873 known as The Slaughterhouse Cases.  These 
cases stand for the proposition that the earliest interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause was that it was designed to protect former slaves only, and no one else.  In 1869, 
the Louisiana legislature had enacted a statute which gave a monopoly for the city of 
New Orleans to a slaughterhouse.  Several independent butchers filed suit in state courts 
seeking injunctions against the monopoly.    The butchers were unable to obtain the 
injunctions in state courts so they turned to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Among other 
things, they claimed that the Louisiana law denied them equal protection of the laws.  
The Supreme Court held that the butchers had not been denied equal protection of the 
laws.  The Fourteenth Amendment, it held, was intended to protect former slaves and 
could not be broadly applied.  
The very next case to decide the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment was the 
1880 case of Strauder v. West Virginia.  There, too, the Court made clear that the Equal 
Protection Clause was designed as a protection for former slaves.  The Equal Protection 
Clause, the Court stated, was there to protect what it called “the colored race” from legal 
discrimination against them as colored persons.  Strauder was an African American man 





Virginia at the time precluded non-whites from serving on juries.
7
  Strauder‟s contention 
was that the West Virginia law violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause. The 
Supreme Court agreed.  The Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said, was intended to 
secure to the recently emancipated race all of the civil rights enjoyed by others and 
confers a positive immunity or right to exemption from legislation directed against them 
as colored persons.  This immunity, the Court said, implied an exemption for members of 
the colored race from all discrimination (i.e., classification) that implied legal inferiority, 
that lessened the security of their rights, or that amounted to an attempt to reduce them to 
a condition of a subject race.  The West Virginia law in question violated the Equal 
Protection Clause, said the Court, because it discriminated against “the colored race” in 
these ways. 
Public v. Private Discrimination: the Rise of Separate But Equal Doctrine 
But with the decision in The Civil Rights Cases, decided three years later in 1883, 
the Court began to distinguish between racial discrimination on the part of the 
government and private racial discrimination, and this distinction became one of the 
bases upon which legalized racial discrimination in places of public accommodation was 
established a few years later, in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, discussed below.  The 
issue in The Civil Rights Cases was the constitutionality of a section of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875 that criminalized discrimination on the basis of any “previous condition of 
servitude” in places of public accommodation.  The Supreme Court said that this section 
of the Civil Rights Act was unconstitutional because, among other things, the Fourteenth 
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 The West Virginia statute stated:  “All white male persons who are twenty-one year of age 
and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors, except as herein provided.”  





Amendment was a prohibition against government (or “state”) action only, not acts by 
private citizens, such that a federal law that criminalized private racial discrimination 
could not be sustained.
8
  In effect, the Supreme Court claimed, in The Civil Rights Cases, 
that private discrimination against blacks did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and 
was not unconstitutional.  Much would be made of this public/private distinction as the 
question of the constitutional rights of blacks in public accommodations and public 
schools became an increasingly pressing one in the twentieth century. 
The distinction the Court made in The Civil Rights Cases between public and 
private racial discrimination was made again in the landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 
decided in 1896.   As mentioned above, this distinction formed the basis of what became 
known as Separate But Equal Doctrine emerging from Plessy, or the view that the 
dictates of the Equal Protection Clause could be satisfied by providing “equal” 
accommodations for blacks and for whites, even if those accommodations were kept 
“separate.”  
At issue in Plessy was a  Louisiana law known as the Separate Car Act which 
required “equal, but separate” railway car accommodations for the “white and colored 
races.”  Violation of this law was a misdemeanor.  Homer Plessy, a black man of mixed 
racial ancestry, deliberately violated the law by sitting in a railway car designated for 
“whites” only and was convicted of the misdemeanor.  He appealed to the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, who upheld the Louisiana law.  Plessy appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  The Court agreed with the state supreme court and upheld the Louisiana law.  
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 The doctrine of state action is an integral part of equal protection analysis, but is not directly 
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Citing, among other things, The Civil Rights Cases, the Court reasoned that the private 
owner of a railway car cannot be regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude; 
and for this reason, there was no equal protection violation in the Louisiana law.  While 
the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish legal distinctions between “whites” 
and “coloreds,” the Court reasoned, the Amendment certainly could not have been 
designed to abolish social distinctions.
9
 
In addition, where public accommodations for “coloreds” were “equal” to the 
accommodations provided for “whites,” the Court stated, there was no equal protection 
violation, since the mere fact of social separation did not impose any badge of slavery.  
Inherent in this conclusion are at least four sub-conclusions.   First, taking the lead from 
The Civil Rights Cases, the owner of a railway car is not a state actor, not acting on 
behalf of the government, and only a state actor can impose the badges of slavery.  
Second, even if the owner of a railway car were a state actor, and could impose the 
badges of slavery, a constitutionally significant bright line can be drawn between “legal” 
racial distinctions and “social” ones.  Third, the owner of a private business is 
constitutionally at liberty to make “social” racial distinctions. 
The Separate But Equal Doctrine officially created by Plessy v. Ferguson had a 
long reign.  The doctrine was in place from 1896 to 1954 and had many distinctive 
features, chief among them the official legal distinction between “white” Americans and 
“black” Americans on the federal level by the Supreme Court of the United States.  
Although what are known as Jim Crow laws or Black Codes had been appearing in state 
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 In the twentieth century, however, this legal/social distinction would come to be challenged 
as a pretense for attempts on the part of the government to perpetuate the unequal status of blacks 





statutory systems all over the south ever since the Emancipation Proclamation of 1862,
 10
 
Plessy provided federal sanction for those laws and paved the way for more rigorous 
enactment and enforcement of them (Tribe 1988; Stephens & Scheb 2008).  Segregation 
in public accommodations such as trains, buses, hotels, swimming pools, and other places 
of public amusement became a way of life all over America, a legal and social fact that 
became a part of the fabric and identity of the American culture.  Some recent scholarship 
has called this phenomenon the development in America of a “racial consciousness” that 
has become a permanent feature of American life (Bell 1992; Banton 1988; Lawson 
2008, Feagin 2006).
11
  These scholars argue that the idea that “the races” could or should 
be socially segregated became regarded by many Americans, particularly subconsciously, 
as a self-evident truth.  
Separate But Equal Doctrine, then, was an early method of interpreting the Equal 
Protection Clause that was established by the landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson in 
1896.  Distinctive features of Separate But Equal Doctrine were (1) that it incorporated 
into the official Supreme Court interpretation of the meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause an explicit, federal endorsement of a legal differentiation between “black” 
Americans and “white,” (2) that it made a constitutionally significant distinction between 
“legal” racial discrimination and “social” racial discrimination, with “social” racial 
discrimination considered constitutionally permissible, (3) that distinction between 
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 Jim Crow laws or Black Codes were bodies of legislation enacted after the Civil War 
by the southern states to maintain the socially and legally inferior position of former slaves after 
the abolition of slavery.  (Du Bois 1935; Kull 1994; Woodward 2002)  
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 Ronald Dworkin has written, for example, that “American society is… a racially 
conscious society;  this is the inevitable and evident consequence of a history of slavery, 





“whites” and “blacks” on the part of the owner of railway cars and other public 
conveyances or public accommodation was considered a “social” distinction rather than a 
“legal” one, and that (4) the concept of equality contemplated by the Equal Protection 
Clause was thought to be achieved in public accommodations if “separate but equal” 
facilities were provided for each of “the two races.” 
The Meaning of “Equal” 
In 1938, the court began to reconsider Separate But Equal Doctrine. In the case 
of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, petitioner Lloyd Gaines, an African American, was 
denied admission to the law school at the University of Missouri.  The state of Missouri 
admitted that Gaines was qualified in terms of his previous work and college credits to be 
admitted into the law school, but asserted that it was contrary to the constitution, laws 
and public policy of the State to admit a “negro” as a student at the University of 
Missouri.  There was provision made in the state statutes, however, for funding to be 
provided for “negro” students to attend law schools out of state rather than attend law 
school at the University of Missouri.  Gaines considered the state‟s action in this case to 
be an equal protection violation and appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.  The 
Court concluded that because the state of Missouri did not provide a separate but equal 
law school for “negro” students, the decision of the state court not to admit Gaines had to 
be overturned.  In Gaines, then, while the Supreme Court did not repeal Separate But 
Equal Doctrine, it did acknowledge the difficulties of providing separate but equal 
facilities for every so-called negro student.
12
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Group Rights: Strict Scrutiny Begins  
Then in 1944, the Court decided Korematsu v. United States.  In that case, 
Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal district 
court of remaining in San Leandro, California contrary to a law which directed that, after 
May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area.  
Korematsu appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the order violated his rights 
under the Equal Protection Clause.  Although the Court concluded that the order did not 
violate Korematsu‟s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, it also 
held that all legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect and should be subjected to “the most rigid scrutiny.”  In other 
words, the Korematsu  Court suggested that the Equal Protection Clause should be 
understood or interpreted to provide special protection for a racial group when a given 
law negatively implicates the rights of that group qua group.
13
  Note that this is a 
different interpretation from the interpretation that the Equal Protection Clause was 
meant to protect blacks only (à la The Slaughterhouse Cases), and a different 
interpretation from the interpretation of the Clause that attempted to provide 
constitutional support for legalized “social” or private discrimination (i.e., Separate But 
Equal Doctrine). This new interpretation was that the Equal Protection Clause should be 
understood to protect racial groups from laws specifically designed to deny them their 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to blacks violated the Equal Protection Clause where there was no other way in the state for the 
petitioner to obtain the legal education that her qualifications warranted.   
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 The Korematsu Court did not find racial classifications problematic per se, such that racial 





civil rights. In other words, Korematsu set the precedent for strict scrutiny across the 
board for what later became known as “suspect classes.” 
Social v. Legal Equality 
Six years later in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (1950), the Court picked 
up on and reinforced its emerging view that public and private discrimination may not be 
as separable as it had held in The Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson.  In 
McLaurin, officials at the University of Oklahoma had attempted to segregate a black 
graduate student admitted as a candidate for a doctorate in education at the University of 
Oklahoma from his white colleagues after he was admitted by a court order.  In class, the 
student was required to sit in a row of desks restricted to blacks.  He was required to eat 
at a designated table in the cafeteria and was even prohibited from visiting his professors 
during their regular office hours in order to minimize his interactions with white students.  
The Court held that these restrictions significantly detracted from the student‟s 
educational experience and thus could not be justified.  Instead, once the student was 
admitted to the school, the school had an obligation to treat McLaurin the same as the 
other students, as this was the only way the constitutional requirement that he receive an 
“equal” education could be accomplished.  Significant here is that the segregation to 
which McLaurin was subjected was largely social, and that the Court found in this case a 
relationship between the constitutional requirement of legal equality and the social 
classification to which McLaurin was subject. 
Separate = Inferior  
Then, in Sweatt v. Painter (1950), the Court had an opportunity to assess the 





school created solely for “Negro” students.  Petitioner Sweatt, had been refused 
admission to the University of Texas law school solely because he was a “Negro.”  The 
University of Texas law school was restricted to “white” students in accordance with 
state law.
14
 “White” law students went to the University of Texas but “black” ones were 
to be sent to the “Texas College for Negroes.”  The Court found that the law school for 
“negroes” was substantially inferior, in terms of both measurable and intangible factors, 
to the whites-only law school and held that the Fourteenth Amendment therefore required 
the University of Texas to admit Sweatt to the University of Texas law school.  After 
Sweatt, it seemed unlikely that the Supreme Court would continue to employ Separate 
But Equal doctrine in the realm of publically funded education since the educational 
services provided for blacks under that doctrine were in fact not “equal” but inferior.  
 Separate But Equal Overturned 
 Then, in 1954, the court explicitly overturned Separate But Equal Doctrine in 
public education in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education (also known as 
Brown I).    There, a unanimous Court held that separate educational facilities for black 
children were inherently unequal, and that there was no place in publically funded 
education for Separate But Equal Doctrine.   The Court was unsure, however, as to how 
desegregation of public education should be accomplished and did not make its first 
decision on that issue until 1955 in a case known as Brown II.    In Brown II,  faced with 
widespread resistance, often violent, to its decision in Brown I  in the South, the Court 
decided to leave the decision as to how to accomplish desegregation of public education 
                                                          
14
  See Tex.Const., Art. VII, §§ 7, 14; Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. (Vernon, 1925), Arts. 2643b 





to the federal district judges in the various states.  The Court ordered that the states 
proceed with “all deliberate speed”, a phrase that came to be associated with delaying 
tactics on the part of the Southern states  (Stephens & Scheb 2008: 459) .  This decision 
resulted in the usage of various delaying tactics for the next ten years or so by state and 
local officials and the establishment of no clear guidelines regarding how to accomplish 
equal educational facilities for all children (Ibid.).  But, after Brown I and II, it was clear 
that the Court considered Separate But Equal Doctrine to be unconstitutional and 
ineffective at accomplishing the Fourteenth Amendment ideal of equality for blacks, at 
least in the realm of public education.  Then, in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of 
Education (1969), the Court stated that desegregation of public schools should occur “at 
once”, signaling that it would no longer tolerate the South‟s delaying tactics (Ibid.). 
 Racial Classifications and Marriage 
 The usage of strict scrutiny for racial classifications was extended from the realm 
of public education to the realm of marriage in Loving v. Virginia (1967).   In that case, 
Mildred Jeter, a “Negro” woman, and Richard Loving, a “white” man – both residents of 
Virginia -- were legally married in the District of Columbia in 1958.  Shortly after their 
marriage, the Lovings returned home to Virginia where they were soon charged with the 
crime of violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages.  The Lovings pleaded guilty to 
the charge, and were sentenced to one year in jail.  Their sentences were suspended on 
the condition that they leave Virginia and not return to the state together for 25 years.  
The Lovings appealed their convictions and sentences on the ground that Virginia‟s anti-
miscegenation laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  The state of Virginia responded 





equal protection violation.  The Supreme Court disagreed.   The court stated that criminal 
penalties for interracial marriage arose as an incident to slavery, and that the anti-
miscegenation law in question was a development of Virginia‟s white supremacy laws,
15
  
the central feature of which was the absolute prohibition of a “white” person marrying 
anyone other than another “white” person.  Using the emerging strict scrutiny standard of 
judicial review, the Court held that there was patently no legitimate overriding purpose 
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justified the racial classification at 
issue in the case. The fact that Virginia prohibited only interracial marriages involving 
white persons, the Court said, demonstrated that the racial classifications were designed 
to maintain white supremacy.  The implication of the Court‟s decision was that a law 
which is designed to maintain white supremacy is a law that violates equal protection and 
that where this is the case, invidious racial discrimination has occurred and the 
constitution has been violated.   
The Loving  case contains an unusually large amount of social analysis of the 
problem of racism in America.   The Court wrote, for example, at page 6: 
Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on 
the basis of racial classifications. Penalties for miscegenation arose as an 
incident to slavery, and have been common in Virginia since the colonial 
period. The present statutory scheme dates from the adoption of the Racial 
Integrity Act of 1924, passed during the period of extreme nativism which 
followed the end of the First World War. The central features of this Act, 
and current Virginia law, are the absolute prohibition of a "white person" 
marrying other than another "white person," a prohibition against issuing 
marriage licenses until the issuing official is satisfied that the applicants' 
statements as to their race are correct, certificates of "racial composition" 
to be kept by both local and state registrars, and the carrying forward of 
earlier prohibitions against racial intermarriage. 
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In other words, notable about Loving is that while its holding is that racial classifications 
in marriage laws violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court‟s explanation 
for why the particular racial classification at issue in Loving is unconstitutional is the 
history of racial discrimination against blacks in Virginia.  Virginia‟s anti-miscegenation 
law could not be benign, the Court argued, because the social context indicated that anti-
miscegenation laws in Virginia had always been designed to perpetuate white supremacy, 
and not because  racial classifications per se (i.e., outside of the social context of the 
history of racial discrimination against blacks in Virginia) were constitutionally 
problematic.   
Discriminatory Intent v. Disparate Impact  
The case of Washington v. Davis (1976) added the new concept of “disparate 
impact” to Equal Protection Analysis and is a key component of Suspect Classification 
Doctrine.  In this case,, Harley and Sellers, two “Negroes” whose applications to become 
police officers in Washington, D.C. were rejected, filed suit against the District of 
Columbia claiming that the D.C. Police Department‟s recruiting procedures, which 
included a written personnel test known as “Test 21”, were racially discriminatory in 
violation of the constitution.
16
   The police department claimed that the test was designed 
to test verbal ability, vocabulary, reading and comprehension.  Harley and Seller claimed 
that the test bore no relationship to job performance, excluded a disproportionately high 
number of “Negro” applicants, and for these reasons was unconstitutional.  The Court 
upheld Test 21.  The test was racially neutral on its face, said the Court, and since no one, 
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not even Harley or Sellers, was claiming that the test involved a racially discriminatory 
intent, it was constitutional.  The fact that the test had, or may have had, a discriminatory 
impact was inapposite, said the Court.  The test for the constitutionality of a law charged 
with being racially discriminatory in violation of the constitution was whether the law 
involved a racially discriminatory intent.   The Court concluded that a law or policy 
having merely a disparate impact will be upheld unless plaintiffs can show that it was 
adopted to serve a racially discriminatory purpose.  Washington v. Davis, then, adds to 
Suspect Classification Doctrine the idea that where there is no discriminatory intent, 
more probing judicial review (a higher level of scrutiny) is not in order.   But, the 
problem with this interpretation is that state action that is neutral on its face but operates 
to discriminate against blacks is understood as constitutionally sound.  For this reason, an 
equal protection jurisprudence that turns formalistically on facial discrimination will, as 
Kenji Yoshino points out, “get it exactly backward” (Yoshino 2011: 767), ignoring the 
fact that the history of legalized racial discrimination in America is a history of dressing 
racism up in racially-neutral clothes.
17
  Using this distinction between discriminatory 
intent and disparate impact, the Court has over the years shifted from providing redress to 
African Americans for laws that on the surface appear race-neutral but in practice operate 
to disenfranchise blacks, to not providing Equal Protection redress to African Americans 
at all unless the law in question is on its face discriminatory against blacks.  This has had 
a dramatic chilling effect on the historical protection provided for African Americans 
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under the Equal Protection Clause (Yoshino 2011: 767).  Arguably, however, the most 
damaging  interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to the equality rights of African 
Americans was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), discussed next. 
 Bakke:  The Seminal Case of Suspect Classification Doctrine 
 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), the Supreme Court 
applied strict scrutiny to a racial classification that not only had no disparate impact on 
blacks, it had no discriminatory intent against blacks either.  Rather, the policy in 
question was actually designed to help blacks.  In Bakke, a 37-year-old white male who 
was twice denied admission to the University of California at Davis medical school 
challenged the school‟s affirmative action policy, claiming that the policy violated his 
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Strangely, the Court held that 
laws which entail racial and ethnic classifications were subject to strict judicial scrutiny 
across the board and without regard to whether the group discriminated against was in the 
numerical minority or had suffered a history of political disenfranchisement. 
 The details of Bakke are important since Bakke  marks the beginning of the 
application of strict scrutiny to laws which discriminate against all racial classifications 
across the board, the hallmark aspect of Suspect Classification Doctrine.  The affirmative 
action policy at issue in Bakke involved what has come to be known as a “quota system.”  
The Cal-Davis medical school had two tracks for admission:  the “regular” track and the 
“special” track.  The regular track required automatic rejection of anyone with a grade 
point average below 2.5.  Then, about one out of six of those remaining were 
interviewed.  After the interview, each candidate was rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by each 





The benchmark score was calculated in terms of the interviewers' summaries, the 
candidate‟s grade point average, the candidate‟s science course grade point average, the 
candidate‟s Medical College Admissions Test scores, letters of recommendation, 
extracurricular activities, and other biographical data.   Based on the benchmark score, 
offers of admission were made.  The committee also had a waiting list.  The chair of the 
committee had the power to place people with “special skills” on the waiting list. 
 There were sixteen spaces available for “special” applicants.  The special track 
was run by a separate committee comprised primarily of members of minority groups.  
The application forms at issue asked candidates whether they wished to be considered as 
"economically and/or educationally disadvantaged" applicants or members of a "minority 
group" (blacks, Chicanos, Asians, American Indians). If an applicant identified himself or 
herself to be "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged", he or she would be 
rated in a manner similar to the one employed by the general admissions committee. If a 
candidate identified himself or herself as a member of a “minority group” (blacks, 
Chicanos, Asians, and Native Americans), the candidate did not have to meet the 2.5 
grade point cutoff.  The special candidates were given benchmark scores and the top 
choices were given to the general admissions committee.  The special committee 
continued to recommend candidates until 16 special admission selections had been made.  
 Bakke was twice considered and rejected under the regular admissions program.   
In both years, special applicants were admitted with significantly lower scores than his. 
After his second rejection, Bakke filed suit in state court asking the court to compel his 
admission to the medical school, alleging that the special admissions program violated 





school cross-claimed for a declaration that its special admissions program was lawful.  
The Supreme Court invalidated the school‟s special admissions program on the ground 
that quota systems like the one used by the medical school operated so as to discriminate 
against applicants like Bakke, i.e., white applicants, on the basis of race in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court ordered Bakke‟s admission to the medical school. 
 As will be demonstrated by an examination of the cases that have followed Bakke, 
below, after Bakke Equal Protection Analysis has never been the same.  While the pre-
Bakke interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause was that it was intended to protect 
blacks in virtue of the observable reality that the equality status of blacks was far below 
that of whites in American society, the post-Bakke interpretation of the Clause is that it is 
there to protect everyone from laws which contain racial classifications.  Since Bakke,  
although the Court has not been entirely averse to upholding affirmative action programs 
for blacks, the Court‟s tendency to uphold such programs has dramatically diminished.    
 Post-Bakke Fall-Out  
 From 1980 to 1989, the Court continued to apply strict scrutiny to racial 
classifications regardless of the race of persons affected by the law at issue.  There were 
cases in this period in which affirmative action programs were explicitly upheld,
18
  cases 
where affirmative action was limited in scope,
19
 and cases of the explicit protection of 
“whites”.
20
   Then, in  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company (1989), the Court dealt 
a serious blow to affirmative action for blacks when it struck down a Richmond set-aside 
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plan requiring that construction companies who were awarded city contracts to award at 
least thirty percent of their subcontract to minority-owned businesses.  The Court 
reasoned that the set-aside plan denied certain citizens – in this case “white” citizens – 
the opportunity to compete for a certain percentage of public contracts based solely on 
their race.   
 Then, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña (1995), the Court affirmed its view 
that all racial classifications must be analyzed under strict scrutiny.   At issue in the case 
was a policy of the U.S. Department of Transportation under which general contractors 
were given a financial incentive to hire subcontractors run by individuals who were 
members of socially and economically disadvantaged groups.  It was part of the policy 
that general contractors should presume that socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian 
Pacific Americans, and other minorities.   Accordingly, although Adarand Constructors 
had submitted a lower bid, it was passed over as a subcontractor on a federal highway 
project in favor of a company that had preferred status under the affirmative action 
policy.  The Court held that since the policy involved a racial classification, it had to be 
held to strict scrutiny, meaning, of course, that it should and did fail. 
 Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, both decided in 2003 and together 
known as “the Michigan cases,” represent the state of the law today on the topic of the 
extent to which race and ethnicity can constitutionally be included in higher education 
admissions decisions; and simultaneously represent the present state of Suspect 
Classification Doctrine in equal protection analysis.    At issue in Gratz was an 





Literature, Science, and the Arts.  According to the policy, each applicant was assigned a 
number of points based on several criteria including high school grades, strength of high 
school curriculum, standardized test scores, leadership, an essay, and membership in an 
underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group.  The total number of points available 
was 150 points.  Under the policy, 20 points were automatically awarded to any applicant 
who was a member of a racial or ethnic minority group.   At issue in Grutter was a law 
school admissions policy used by the University of Michigan Law School according to 
which all of the information in an applicant‟s file was reviewed by admissions officials 
individually. Each file included the applicant‟s undergraduate G.P.A., LSAT score, letters 
of recommendation, a personal statement, and an essay describing how the applicant 
would contribute to life at the law school, including a consideration of diversity.  Strict 
scrutiny was used by the Supreme Court to examine both policies.  The Gratz admissions 
policy failed but the Grutter admissions policy was upheld.  The Court reasoned that 
automatic assignment of 20 points for diversity in the Gratz case was not a policy that 
was sufficiently “narrowly tailored” to meet the interest in educational diversity that the 
University “claim[ed] justified their program.”  The Grutter policy, by contrast, passed 
strict scrutiny since it considered each applicant on an individual basis and did not make 
an applicant‟s “race” or ethnicity “the defining feature of his or her application.” 
 Together Gratz and Grutter do not add clarity to the contemporary “meaning” of 
the Equal Protection Clause, as developed by the Supreme Court.  Why is it the case,  
Gratz and Grutter together call us to ask, that adding twenty points to an applicant‟s file 
for purposes of balancing the scales between applicants who are members of groups who 





tailored” to meet the state‟s conceded interest in educational diversity?  Why is it the case 
that looking at each applicant‟s entire file is sufficiently “narrowly tailored”?  What does 
“narrowly tailored” mean in this context other than “least restrictive to white applicants”?  
If “least restrictive to white applicants” is what “narrowly tailored” means, then, 
arguably, Suspect Classification Doctrine operates less as a means for allowing access to 
the ideal of equality for historically subjugated and marginalized groups, than as an 
empty and vacuous shell of a doctrine, operating no less in service to the interests of the 
white majority than did Separate But Equal Doctrine, or the institution of slavery before 
it, for that matter. 
 From Race to Gender and Sexual Orientation 
 Under Suspect Classification Doctrine, then, strict scrutiny is the standard of 
review applicable in cases where a law or governmental policy classifies persons on the 
basis of race, and this is true regardless of the race of the person challenging the law.  In 
other words, race is a “suspect classification.”  What this means is that while the early 
interpretations of the Equal Protection gave special consideration to laws which 
discriminated against blacks, under Suspect Classification Doctrine -- prevalent since 
Bakke --  whites are equally as protected by the Equal Protection Clause as blacks.  On its 
face, this may appear to be a sort of evolution in Equal Protection Analysis.  It is 
certainly a popular view, particularly here in what many call the “post-racial” era, that the 
constitutional protections available to some must be available to all and that there is little, 
if any, need in the contemporary era to provide special constitutional protection for 
African Americans.  Many also argue that all constitutional provisions should necessarily 





understand to be at the heart of the American political system, political liberalism.  But, 
as I hope the rest of this chapter will demonstrate, Suspect Classification Doctrine has 
developed not as a consequence of the directed,  intentional, and considered application 
of the (so-called) American ideals of universality and objectivity to the realm of Equal 
Protection Analysis, but instead as a consequence of a fundamental misunderstanding on 
the part of the Supreme Court about how the interpretive process actually takes place, as 
well as a fundamental misunderstanding on the part of the Supreme Court about how it 
should.   
As has been done above for the group of people known as blacks, in the sections 
of this chapter that follow, the development of Suspect Classification Doctrine for 
women and the development of Suspect Classification Doctrine for gay people will be 
outlined in detail, with the intention of demonstrating just how internally inconsistent, 
value-laden, and deeply context-dependent (i.e., non-universal and non-objective) has 
been the Supreme Court‟s application (or in some cases non-application) of the Equal 
Protection Clause to the equality rights of blacks, women and gay people over the years.  
This exposition will be followed by a detailed analysis of two concepts that have 
developed alongside Suspect Classification Doctrine and that have helped to shape and 
misshape the doctrine along the way.  These are the concepts of  “discrete and insular 









Gender as a Quasi-Suspect Classification  
Historically, laws affecting women as a group have been of two kinds:  laws 
excluding women from the political process
21
 and laws regarding women as in need of 
special protection.
22
  In fact, while the Supreme Court‟s characterization of laws which 
discriminate between persons on the basis of race as highly suspect is “firmly rooted in 
the most orthodox interpretations of constitutional history” (Tribe, 2008:1585), the same 
cannot be said for laws which discriminate on the basis of gender.  Instead, the Supreme 
Court‟s historical, as well as contemporary, position is that legalized distinctions between 
men and women are often required for “important” governmental interests  (Bradwell v. 
Illinois (1873); Minor v. Happersett (1875); Goeseart v. Cleary (1948); Kahn v. Shevin 
(1974)).  
Regarding gender discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause states, in pertinent 
part, “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall….deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws” (U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, 
emphasis added.)  While this language was originally designed to provide a constitutional 
basis for the protection of the citizenship rights of former slaves after the Civil War, 
women began to take advantage of the broad language of the Clause (“any person”) very 
soon after enactment by bringing federal law suits challenging the constitutionality of 
laws which provided one set of legal standards for men and another set for women.  
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And as is the case with racial classifications, judicial review of such laws takes 
place according to Suspect Classification Doctrine.  According to Suspect Classification 
Doctrine, the appropriate level of judicial review for cases of laws which make legal 
classifications on the basis of gender is intermediate scrutiny.  In practice, where 
intermediate scrutiny has been deemed the appropriate level of judicial review, 
sometimes the law subject to review is upheld and sometimes it is struck down.  There 
are no real guidelines available to anyone contesting the law as to the criteria for the 
constitutionality of such laws.  In the parlance of Suspect Classification Doctrine, legal 
classifications between persons on the basis of sex or gender are not suspect 
classifications but quasi-suspect classifications. What this means in practice is that, 
generally, when there is understood to be some sort of biologically relevant or socially 
salient difference between men and women that is thought to necessitate the classification 
in order to achieve some sort of “important” governmental interest, classifications on the 
basis of gender are upheld. 
Early Cases:  Exclusion from the Political Process and the Law of the “Creator” 
 
The very first cases of gender discrimination brought before the Supreme Court in 
the early years after enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment involved laws which were 
routinely upheld.  For example, the first case of alleged gender discrimination under the 
Fourteenth Amendment came before the Supreme Court approximately 137 years ago 
with the case of Bradwell v. Illinois (1873).   The facts of the case are as follows.  An 
Illinois statute provided that any adult “person” of good character and having the 
requisite training, was eligible to practice law in the state of Illinois.  Myra Bradwell 





possess the requisite qualifications.  Her application was refused, however, on the 
grounds that she was a woman.  Bradwell appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme 
Court claiming that the denial of her application was a Fourteenth Amendment violation.  
The Court upheld the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court on the grounds that the 
practice of law was not a federal right, and that states were therefore free to enact laws 
regulating the practice of law.  But Justice Bradley‟s concurring opinion summarized the 
spirit of the decision, at 141, where he wrote, “The harmony… of interests and views 
which belong or should belong to the family institution, is repugnant to the idea of a 
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband….The 
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of 
wife and mother.  This is the law of the Creator.”  
Early “Similarly Situated” Rhetoric 
Then, two years later, in Minor v. Happersett (1875), Virginia Minor, president of 
the Missouri Woman Suffrage Association, was prevented from registering to vote in the 
state of Missouri on the grounds that she was not a “male citizen of the United States”, as 
the laws of the state of Missouri required, but a woman for whom no right to vote existed 
under the laws and the constitution of the state of Missouri.  Minor appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court, arguing that Missouri‟s laws violated her right to vote in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Supreme Court disagreed.  While women 
were citizens, and even “persons” in accordance with the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court said, the constitution conferred on women no right to vote.  





preventing women from voting or registering to vote.
23
  The Court concluded,  “[We are] 
unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the United States does not confer the 
right of suffrage upon any one, and that the constitutions and laws of the several States 
which commit that important trust to men alone are not [therefore] necessarily void….”  
Notable about Minor is that, boiled down to its base elements, the Supreme Court at the 
time would rather have held that national citizenship did not in itself confer on anyone 
the right to vote, than concede that if women were citizens, women had the right to 
vote.
24
    
Then, in Muller v. Oregon (1908), the Court upheld a state law limiting the hours 
that women could work.  There, the Court held that woman was “properly placed in a 
class by herself” owing to her “physical structure and the performance of her maternal 
functions.”  Accordingly, the Court said, laws designed for the protection of women 
would be upheld, even where similar legislation for men could not be constitutionally 
upheld.  
The reasoning used in Minor and Muller together set the stage for what would 
later become oft-repeated rhetoric in equal protection analysis on the topic of gender, i.e., 
language to the effect that where men and women are “similarly situated”, legal 
classification between the genders is constitutional but where men are women are not 
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 It would take a constitutional amendment, the 19
th
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“similarly situated,” legal classification between the genders violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Mid-Twentieth Century Developments: Court as Protector Continues 
The next significant gender discrimination case did not occur until the mid-
twentieth century.  In Goesaert v. Cleary (1948), the court continued its role of the 
protector of women.  In Goesaert, several female bartenders in Michigan challenged a 
law which banned women from obtaining licenses to tend bar in the state unless they 
were the wives or daughters of a male bar owner.
25
  Finding that the Michigan law did 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court wrote, among other things, 
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not have authority to “tear history up by the 
roots.”  The fact that women “may now have achieved the virtues that men have long 
claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced,” did 
not preclude the states from drawing a sharp line between the sexes.  The state of 
Michigan had the power to forbid all women from working behind a bar, the Court said, 
“since bartending by women may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise to 
moral and social problems.”  The paternalism in Goesaert permeates every sentence of 
the decision.  It was reasonable at the time for the legislature to believe that “the 
oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a barmaid‟s husband or father 
minimize[d] hazards that confront a barmaid without such protecting oversight.”   
 In the early cases of gender discrimination brought before the Supreme Court, 
then, i.e., Bradwell, Minor, Muller, and Goesaert, laws which discriminated on the basis 
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of gender were upheld and the rationales offered in support of each decision was a 
judgment call about the proper role of women in society.  In Bradwell, while the Court 
claimed that the basis for its decision was the fact that there was simply no federal right 
to practice law which the Court was bound to protect; in the rationale for its decision the 
Court explicitly prioritized the “harmonious” family over a woman‟s right to her own 
career.  In Minor, while the Court claimed that the basis for its decision was that there 
was simply no federal right to vote available for women, the Court‟s rationale for that 
conclusion, i.e., women are citizens but citizenship does not necessarily involve voting 
privileges, is so irrational as to lead the casual reader to surmise that there might be some 
other, less benign, reason for the conclusion.  In Muller, the Court was explicitly 
protecting the sanctity of motherhood.  In Goesaert, the Court focuses on mysterious 
“moral and social problems” that are sure to crop up if women unrelated to the bar owner 
(presumed to be male) were allowed to be bartenders, in order to deny women the right to 
make a living through a means of their own choosing.  The social role of women implied 
and which is being legislated in Goesaert is that women need to be both protected and 
contained, presumably from some sort of behavior (such as drinking alcohol or engaging 
in sexual relations or both) the Court considered immoral.  These three cases represent 
the early history of equal protection analysis for women, a history that has been 
characterized by Justice Brennan in the following way:  “[O]ur Nation has had a long and 
unfortunate history of sex discrimination…rationalized by an attitude of „romantic 
paternalism‟ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.” 






Early 1970s:  Equal Rights for Women Begin, Rational Basis Test Used 
 The first case to find in favor of equal rights for women under the Fourteenth 
Amendment was Reed v. Reed (1971).  The case involved an Idaho probate statute that 
gave preference to male over female applicants for the position of estate administrator.
26
  
A minor, Richard Lynn Reed, had died without a will and both of his adoptive parents, 
recently separated, had applied to be the administrator of the child‟s estate.  The probate 
court had recognized the equality of entitlement of the two applicants under the relevant 
law, but found that the father, being a male, was to be preferred as an administrator 
pursuant to the Idaho law.  The Supreme Court found the Idaho law unconstitutional, and 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The court held 
that to give a mandatory preference to members of one sex over the other is to make the 
very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Applying the rational basis test, the Court stated that arbitrary, 
legalized differentiation between the sexes violated the Equal Protection Clause, and that 
in order to pass constitutional muster, there must be some sort of relevant reason for the 
distinction.  The Court found no relevant reason in the Idaho probate statute and the 
statute was therefore held to be unconstitutional.    
 Notably, however, the Court did not apply the strict scrutiny standard of judicial 
review to this case.  It applied the rational basis test, or the standard of review applied to 
all cases of alleged discriminatory laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, except those 
involving race (or ethnicity).  In other words, although the Court struck down the 
discriminatory law, the court did not hold that cases involving classifications on the basis 
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of “sex” or gender were “suspect classifications.”  Instead, even after Reed, there was no 
presumption of unconstitutionality available for laws which discriminated on the basis of 
gender.  Instead, although the decision went in claimant‟s favor, the burden of proof had 
been on the claimant to show that the rationalization offered by the state for the gender 
classification was unjustified. 
 Frontiero:  Immutable Characteristics 
 The case of Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) is a landmark case because a plurality 
of Justices came to the conclusion that strict scrutiny was the applicable standard of 
judicial review in gender discrimination cases, i.e., that gender, like race, was a “suspect 
classification.”  But, the rationale for the plurality‟s decision on this is rather bizarre.  As 
will be discussed a bit further, below, the reason gender is a suspect classification, held 
the plurality, is that gender is an “immutable characteristic” on the basis of which legal 
burdens should not be imposed. 
 The case involved Sharon Frontiero, a married female lieutenant in the United 
States Air Force, who applied for benefits for her husband as a dependent under statutes 
designed to provide fringe benefits to members of the uniformed services on a 
competitive basis with business and industry.  Under the statute, a member of the 
uniformed services with dependents was entitled to an increased "basic allowance for 
quarters" and a member's dependents were provided comprehensive medical and dental 
care.  The statutes also provided however, that spouses of male members of the 
uniformed services were dependents for purposes of obtaining the benefits, but that 





over one-half of their support on the female member.
27
  The Supreme Court held the laws 
in question violated the Equal Protection Clause.  As mentioned above, a plurality of the 
Court (i.e., four justices) also held that any law which makes classifications on the basis 
of gender should be held to strict scrutiny and considered presumptively invalid. 
 The plurality explained, “Classifications based upon sex, like 
classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently 
suspect, and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny,” adding,  
 
“[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic 
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities 
upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate 
the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship 
to individual responsibility.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
What differentiated sex from non-suspect statuses and aligned it with the suspect status of 
race, said the plurality, is that “the sex characteristic” often bears no relation to ability to 
perform or contribute to society.  It is important to notice three things about this decision.  
First, the Court assumes that there is something called a “sex characteristic.”  Second, the 
Court articulates that the salient point for purposes of deciding whether a given 
“characteristic” is a constitutional basis upon which to make legal distinctions is whether 
this “characteristic” bears a relation to one‟s ability to perform or contribute to society.  
And third, this test of whether a given “immutable” characteristic is a constitutional basis 
upon which to make legally permissible distinctions amongst persons seems to be 
invented by the Court out of whole cloth; or, more to the point, seems to have been 
invented retroactively after the Court‟s first having decided that discrimination on the 
basis of gender was unconstitutional.  At no discernible point prior to Frontiero had the 
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Court used this type of language with regard to cases of discrimination against black 
people, i.e., the only suspect class then in existence.  At no point prior to Frontiero had 
the Court stated that the “immutable characteristic” of blackness (or even the more 
general concept of the “immutable characteristic” of race) was a constitutionally 
impermissible basis upon which to legally discriminate amongst persons.  Instead, the 
Court spoke of the issue of whether a given law was discriminatory against black people, 
or against “Negros” or against “the colored race,”  all terms which imply that it is a 
group of persons (a “suspect class”) against which it is constitutionally impermissible to 
make legal distinctions under the Equal Protection Clause, rather than a particular 
“characteristic.”  In other words, this “immutable characteristic” language or criterion 




 Backlash:  A Return to the Rational Basis Test 
 In two cases decided the following year, 1974, Kahn v. Shevin and Geduldig v. 
Aiello, the court applied the rational basis rather than the strict scrutiny developed by the 
plurality in Frontiero to gender discrimination cases.  In Kahn, the Court upheld a Florida 
statute which provided an annual $500 property tax exemption to widows but not to 
widowers.  The Court stated, among other things, that tax laws were permitted to 
discriminate in favor of a certain class if the discrimination was founded upon a 
“reasonable” distinction or difference in state policy that was not in conflict with the 
United States Constitution.  The distinction between widows and widowers was 
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reasonable, the Court held, since gender has never been held to be an impermissible 
classification in all instances,
29
 and since the state's different treatment of widows and 
widowers rested upon a ground of difference that had a fair and substantial relation to 
the object of the statute.  Specifically, the statute was reasonably designed to further the 
state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon “the sex for whom 
that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden,” i.e., women.  Similarly, in 
Geduldig v. Aiello (1974), the Court used the rational basis standard to uphold a law 
excluding pregnancy from a list of compensable disabilities, arguing that the 
classification of pregnancy as non-compensable was not a sex-based classification. 
 So, while the Court in Kahn used the rational basis test to carry out its traditional 
role of upholding legalized discrimination against women in order to “protect” women, 
the Court in Geduldig used the rational basis test to deny the compensability of a medical 
condition that is unique to women.  In both cases, the discriminatory law in question was 
upheld and in neither case was consideration given to the equality rights of women qua 
women.  
 Intermediate Scrutiny:  The Un-standard of Judicial Review 
 Then, in Craig v. Boren (1976), the Court officially inaugurated the so-called 
intermediate scrutiny standard for all cases of alleged gender discrimination, a standard 
that is still in force today.   Craig  involved an Oklahoma law that had a higher age 
requirement for the sale of a certain type of beer to males than to females.  While males 
had to be 21 to purchase the beer, females only had to be 18.  A male between the ages of 
18 and 21 challenged the law on the ground that there was no rational basis for the 
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distinction being made between the women and men, as required by Reed v. Reed (1971).  
The Supreme Court agreed and struck down the law.  The test for legalized distinctions 
between men and women, the Court said, is as follows:  When a given law, policy, or 
other state action makes distinctions between men and women or males and females, the 
Supreme Court will ask whether the law bears a “substantial” relationship to an 
“important” governmental interest, and if so, the law will be upheld.  If not, the law will 
be struck down.
30
  In practice this means little more than that there is no way to tell how 
the Supreme Court will come out in a gender discrimination case.  Over the years, the 
Court has invalidated a number of gender-based laws and policies using intermediate 
scrutiny, but it has also upheld a number of them.   
 In Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), using the intermediate scrutiny standard the Court 
struck down a Social Security requirement that widowers had to demonstrate financial 
dependence on their deceased spouses as a condition for obtaining survivors‟ benefits, 
but widows did not have to make such a demonstration; and in Orr v. Orr (1979), the 
Court struck down an Alabama law which required men, under certain circumstances, to 
make alimony payments to their ex-wives while women similarly situated were exempted 
from making alimony payments.   And in Kirchberg v. Feenstra (1981), the Court struck 
down a Louisiana law giving a husband, as “head and master”  of property owned jointly 
with his wife, exclusive control over the disposition of community property.
31
  The 
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 Note that Justice Stevens calls gender an “accident of birth” in his concurring opinion, 
citing Frontiero v. Richardson, but also notes a long history of discrimination against males in the 
age bracket of 18-20 to support his view that the law was unconstitutional. 
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Louisiana law at issue, the Court said, “embodie[d] the type of express gender-based 
discrimination [it had] found unconstitutional absent a showing that the classification 
[was] tailored to further an important governmental interest.”  The Court added to the 
standard understanding of intermediate scrutiny that where there is facial classification on 
the basis of gender, the burden of proof is on the party seeking to uphold the facially 
discriminatory law to advance an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the law.
32
   
The Court has also upheld gender-based classifications under intermediate 
scrutiny.  In Rostker v. Goldberg (1981), for example, the Court upheld the male-only 
draft registration law, stating that the exclusion of women from the draft “was not an 
„accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about women.‟”  Instead, men and 
women were “simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a 
draft,” the Court wrote.  After Orr, Kirchberg, and Rostker, then, it seemed that usage of 
the intermediate scrutiny standard in cases of gender-based classifications or policies at 
least meant that a preliminary determination would be made as to whether men and 
women were “similarly situated” with regard to the social good at issue and if not, the 
gender-based classification would be upheld; if so, the gender-based classification would 
be struck down.    
 Then, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982), the Court was asked 
to decide whether the admissions policy of the nursing school of the Mississippi 
                                                                                                                                                                             
revenues which they produce, and may alienate them by an onerous title, without the consent and 
permission of his wife." 
32
 Interestingly, many successful gender discrimination cases using the intermediate 
scrutiny standard of judicial review have been cases brought by men. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren 
(1976), Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982).   Arguably, these cases do not so 
much advance the cause of equal rights for women as much as they allow male infiltration into 





University for Women that excluded males violated the Equal Protection Clause.  
Employing the intermediate scrutiny standard of review, the Supreme Court said that it 
did.  The Court reasoned that there was no evidence to support the state‟s justification for 
excluding men from the nursing school, i.e., the need to provide a haven for women from 
the male-dominated world of higher education.  Instead, the school‟s policy of allowing 
men to enroll in its continuing education courses, together with evidence that the 
presence of men in the classroom did not adversely affect female classroom performance, 
refuted the state‟s rationale for the discrimination.  Additionally, the Court held that the 
policy of discriminating men from the nursing profession actually perpetuated stereotypes 
about nursing as a “woman‟s job,” leading to lower wages for nurses.  But, while the 
Hogan decision addressed the issue of whether publically-operated professional schools 
could limit admission to one sex or gender, it did not address the issue of whether 
publically operated educational schools in general could limit admission to one sex or 
gender.   
 In United States v. Virginia (1996), the Court decided this issue.  Using 
intermediate scrutiny enhanced by a requirement that the state provide an “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” for its sex-based admission policy excluding women, rather than 
just an “important” one, Virginia Military Institute‟s (VMI‟s) male-only admissions 
policy was struck down. 
 What is Quasi-Suspect Classification Status?   
 In summary, intermediate scrutiny seems to have been developed as a 
compromise position between the reasoning offered in Frontiero to the effect that gender 





hand; and the reasoning offered in all of the early cases and the cases decided between 
Frontiero and Craig to the effect that gender classifications are not suspect classifications 
such that the rational basis standard should be used in such cases.  The question is why 
the Court shied away from its plurality holding in Frontiero that classifications based on 
gender were inherently suspect owing to the fact that gender was an “immutable 
characteristic” and moved instead to the position that gender had only quasi-suspect 
classification status.  The Court has not been explicit about what the features of suspect 
classification status are that the Frontiero plurality thought existed in cases of gender 
discrimination but the Court in all subsequent cases has not found in such cases.  For 
example, is gender now thought to be less “immutable” than it was in 1973 (Frontiero)?  
Is there another reason for the shift?  Is there no reason for the shift?  In any event, under 
the early cases, women are not protected at all under the Equal Protection Clause but 
under Suspect Classification Doctrine, although “gender” is a quasi-suspect classification 
subject to intermediate scrutiny in name (i.e., laws making classifications based on 
gender are more closely scrutinized than laws making other classifications amongst 
persons – except on the basis of race) at least in theory, in practice this plays out as a 
standard of judicial review for gender discrimination cases which is inconsistent, unclear, 
and dependent upon a great deal of judicial discretion regarding what is an important 
state interest and what is not, and what is a law that is substantially related to that 






Sexuality as a Non-Suspect Classification  
 William Eskridge claims that there are more laws today designed to adversely 
affect sexual minorities as a group  than ever before.  These laws, he says, take three 
forms: those which explicitly discriminate on the basis of sexuality, those which facially 
discriminate on the basis of sex but have the overwhelming effect of having an adverse 
effect on sexual minorities, and those which, while not facially discriminatory on the 
basis of sexuality or sex, have a discriminatory effect on sexual minorities in practice.  
Eskridge suggests that all of these laws might be said to violate the principle of equality 
behind the Equal Protection Clause (Eskridge 1999: 205) . 
But claims of unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of sexuality have been 
made more often under the doctrine of the right to privacy than under the Equal 
Protection Clause.
 33
  And when claims of unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of 
sexuality are made under the Equal Protection Clause, such laws are not strictly 
scrutinized.  Instead, they are assessed according to the rational basis test, or the lowest 
level of judicial review.  In Suspect Classification Doctrine terms, this means that 
legalized classifications based on sexuality are not suspect classifications like race or 
ethnicity, nor are they quasi-suspect classifications like classifications based on gender.  
Instead, as stated earlier in this chapter, usage of the rational basis test augurs that judicial 
restraint will be employed and that the classification in question will likely be upheld.  In 
other words, as has been discussed, as long as the government is able to articulate a state 
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 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick  (1986), Lawrence v. Texas (2003).  The primary issue 
decided in these cases is whether intimate sexual activity is a fundamental right, rather than 
whether legal classifications based on sexuality violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Bowers held 
that there was no right to homosexual activity.  Lawrence overturned Bowers, finding that sexual 





interest that can be sensibly characterized as “legitimate” and as long as the classificatory 
law can be shown to be “rationally related” to that interest, the law most likely will be 
upheld.  
But in Romer v. Evans (1996), the first time an equal protection claim was 
brought before the Supreme Court that challenged a law classifying persons on the basis 
of sexuality, the court applied the rational basis test, but struck down the discriminatory 
law.  The case involved an amendment to the Colorado state constitution known as 
“Amendment 2”  (Colo. Const. art. II, § 30b).  Amendment 2 precluded all legislative, 
executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect 
the status of persons based on their “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, 
conduct, practices or relationships.”  The Court applied the rational basis test to 
Amendment 2 and held that it did not bear a rational relationship to any legitimate 
governmental purpose. 
 However, while Romer v. Evans signifies the Court‟s willingness to strike down 
laws which overtly attempt to deny sexual minorities the same rights as everyone else, it 
is unclear whether Romer commits the Court to full equality for sexual minorities across 
the board  (Eskridge 1999: 206).  This is because sexuality is not at present a suspect 
classification requiring strict scrutiny, sexuality is not a quasi-suspect classification 
requiring intermediate scrutiny, and the applicable level of judicial review in such cases 
is the rational basis test, the lowest level of judicial review.  
 Interestingly, however, in 2010, the rational basis test was used by a federal 
district court in a case challenging a law classifying persons on the basis of sexuality.  In 





Perry v. Schwarzenegger, not the U.S. Supreme Court but a federal court nonetheless 
(i.e., the United States District Court for the Northern District of California) held that the 
governmental interests offered by the state of California for the California Marriage 
Protection Act, also known as Proposition 8  (which banned marriages between people of 
the same sex) were not even rational, much less important.
34
  Proposition 8 was 
accordingly struck down .  But, the court in Perry stated that the Equal Protection Clause 
rendered  Proposition 8 unconstitutional under any standard of review and, citing 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976) where a “history of purposeful 
unequal treatment” was identified as triggering strict scrutiny,  stated that the evidence 
presented at trial showed that sexual minorities were the type of minority strict scrutiny 
was designed to protect.  The district court stopped short, however, of identifying 
sexuality as a suspect classification, or of identifying gay people as a suspect class, or of 
actually applying the highest level of judicial review to cases of discrimination against 
sexual minorities.
35
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 Governmental interests offered by the state of California in support of Proposition 8 
were (1) preserving the definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman for its own 
sake, (2) decreasing the probability of the potential adverse consequences that could result from 
weakening the institution of marriage, (3) promoting opposite-sex parenting over same-sex 
parenting, (4) protecting the First Amendment rights of individuals and institutions that oppose 
same-sex marriage on religious or moral grounds, (5) treating same-sex couples differently from 
opposite-sex couples to preserve the usage of “different names for different things,” (6) any other 
rational basis Proposition 8 could conceivably advance.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 
2d 921, 998-102 (2010). 
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 In a recent and very surprising turn of events, however, President Barack Obama 
declared the Defense of Marriage Act -- the 1996 law that bars federal recognition of same-sex 
marriage --  unconstitutional.  Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., announced the decision in a 
letter to members of Congress dated February 23, 2011:  “The president and I have concluded 
that classifications based on sexual orientation” wrote Holder, “should be subjected to a strict 
legal test intended to block unfair discrimination.” As a result, he said, the Defense of Marriage 
Act “is unconstitutional” (Savage  and Sheryl Stolberg, February 23, 2011).  In the letter, Holder 






 The state of Equal Protection for sexual minorities, then, is as follows.  The 
Supreme Court presently has even more license than it does in cases of legal 
classifications based on gender to use its own discretion to uphold or strike down those 
laws.  In two recent cases, however, where laws discriminating on the basis of sexuality 
were challenged, the rational basis test was applied (once by the United States Supreme 
Court and once by a United States District Court) but the law in question was struck 
down.  
But,  although precedent has now been set in federal court for the proposition that 
gay people are very likely a suspect class of persons in the way that black people have 
been historically owing to a “history of purposeful unequal treatment” (Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger),  it is also the case that the Supreme Court in recent years, i.e., under 
Suspect Classification Doctrine, has switched from a focus on which group is and which 
group is not a “suspect class” (e.g., African Americans, women, gay people, the poor, the 
disabled) to a focus on whether the legal classification in question (e.g., race, gender, or 
sexual orientation) amounts to a suspect classification. 
 As we shall see below, the switch in Equal Protection Analysis from a focus on 
“suspect classes” to “suspect classifications” took place at around the same time as the 
infusion into Equal Protection Analysis of the phrase “immutable characteristics” into 
gender discrimination cases.  With this switch, the Court‟s decisions began to drift away 
from considerations of the history of the Equal Protection Clause, or from considerations 
of the history of oppression experienced by people of color and women in America that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
scrutiny as the standard of review.   The Supreme Court has not yet had an opportunity to support 






necessitated the enactment of the Equal Protection Clause, and inexplicably began instead 
to focus on the degree of relationship between the classification in a given law (e.g., race, 
gender, sexual orientation) and the purpose of the law, the core idea behind Suspect 
Classification Doctrine. 
Suspect Classifications and Suspect Classes 
 Under Suspect Classification Doctrine, then, Equal Protection Analysis as it 
stands today takes place pursuant to a three-tiered system in which one of three levels of 
judicial review will be applied to laws which make classifications amongst persons, 
depending upon the type of classification involved.  Classifications based on race are 
“suspect classifications” and are analyzed according to what is known as strict scrutiny; 
classifications based on gender are quasi-suspect classifications analyzed according to 
what is known as intermediate scrutiny; and classifications based on sexuality are not 
suspect classifications, nor are they classifications which warrant intermediate scrutiny, 
but instead are judged by the rational basis test, according to which the classification is 
considered constitutionally benign, and will be upheld absent affirmative proof on the 
part of a petitioner that the state has no rational basis whatsoever for the classification. 
According to Suspect Classification Doctrine, then, the level of judicial review applicable 
to a given law is a function of the degree to which a given group trait qualifies as a 
suspect classification. 
But the question of the degree to which a given group trait amounts to a suspect 
classification is answered not in terms of an explicitly given or even consistent set of 
clearly outlined criteria, but rather according to the holdings in a series of cases decided 





different political climates.  Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, in the course of 
these decisions the Court at some point switched its focus from using the Equal 
Protection Clause to remedy harm done to the equality status of persons who, as a group, 
had been historically denied equal protection under law; to a focus on using the Clause to 
find that certain human traits were impermissible grounds upon which to make legal 
classifications among persons.  While the early Court interpreted the Equal Protection 
Clause as there to protect African Americans, owing to their need for special protection 
after the end of slavery, for example, Suspect Classification Doctrine now interprets the 
Equal Protection Clause as there to strike down any law that contains a distinction 
between persons on the basis of race.  Similarly, while the entire point of bringing cases 
of gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause was to successfully argue that 
the equality rights of women were no less valuable than the equality rights of men 
(MacKinnon 2007), Suspect Classification Doctrine not only does not protect the equality 
rights of women, the doctrine actually operates quite a bit more frequently to protect the 
“equality” rights of men!  Finally, although it is fair to say that there is no evidence that 
the Equal Protection Clause was ever specifically designed to protect the rights of gay 
people qua gay people, it is certainly a reasonable inference that to the extent that gay 
people are a group whose rights to equality are infringed upon by the government or by 
the law, gay people are as entitled under the Equal Protection Clause to protection from 
legalized unequal treatment as anyone else. 
Suspect Classification Doctrine, then, is problematic for the same reason that 
many constitutional doctrines are problematic, i.e., it has developed as a function of 





awareness on the part of the Court as to how the interpretive process actually takes place; 
and without a consistent vision on the part of the Supreme Court as to how it should.  
Without this understanding, this self-awareness, Suspect Classification Doctrine is at best 
piecemeal, disjointed, and irresponsible, and at worst deeply in violation of the ideals 
contained in the text itself, as well as in the companion founding documents like the 
Declaration of Independence.  Moreover, Suspect Classification Doctrine‟s lack of 
interpretive integrity, its lack of a consistent vision as to what the Equal Protection 
Clause means or should mean vis-à-vis the rights of marginalized, oppressed, or 
subjugated groups has resulted in a doctrine that actually fails to protect those whose 
status in society is unequal. 
 Additionally, the terms “suspect class” and “suspect classification” are often used 
interchangeably in Suspect Classification Doctrine and when this happens, a profound 
misunderstanding – or perhaps simple ignorance -- of the backstory behind the 
development of Equal Protection Analysis is evident.  A quick look at the case of Plyler 
v. Doe (1981) is a good example.  In Plyler, the issue was whether a state of Texas law 
denying the usage of state funds for the education of children of illegal immigrants 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.  The state of Texas had claimed at trial that 
undocumented aliens were not protected by the Equal Protection Clause.  The trial 
(District) court disagreed, reasoning that state exclusion of undocumented children from 
its schools was just the kind of “invidiously motivated” law the Equal Protection Clause 
was there to address.   The Supreme Court, however, took both of these positions at the 







  and that “undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect 
class” (Ibid.: 223), concluding -- without explaining how both of these things could be 
true at the same time – that the Texas law was unconstitutional and should be struck 
down. 
To help explain how the concepts of suspect classes and suspect classifications 
became confused in Equal Protection Analysis, it is necessary to trace the evolution of 
two concepts that developed alongside of Equal Protection Analysis.  These are the 
concepts of “discrete and insular minorities” and “immutable characteristics.” The 
development of these concepts will now be outlined below to add nuance and depth to the 
story of how Suspect Classification Doctrine – with all of its strange aspects and internal 
inconsistencies – came into existence. 
Discrete and Insular Minorities 
The Carolene Products Footnote 
The Court in 1938 decided the landmark case of United States v. Carolene 
Products Company, where we find first mention in Equal Protection Analysis of the 
concept of “discrete and insular minorities.”  In a famous footnote 4, Justice Stone wrote, 
“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which 
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied 
upon to protect minorities, and may call for a more searching judicial scrutiny.”  The 
view that certain groups – those qualifying as “discrete and insular minorities” – are 
entitled to a greater degree of judicial concern than other groups as a consequence of 
having been excluded from ordinary political processes owing to prejudice, became 
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 “The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of 





adopted and integrated into Equal Protection Analysis, according to one theory of judicial 
review (Tribe 1988 1465).  On this view, laws that involve certain groups of people are 
“inherently suspect” and should be subjected to a higher level of judicial scrutiny than 
laws that do not involve these groups.  Note that Carolene Products was decided just six 
years prior to Korematsu v. United States in 1944, discussed above, which held that laws 
adversely affecting the rights of a targeted racial group were unconstitutional. 
The details of Carolene Products are as follows.  The issue in the case was the 
constitutionality of the Filled Milk Act of Congress of March 4, 1923.  Under the Act, 
interstate shipment of skim milk compounded with fat or oil was prohibited.  Carolene 
Products Company was charged with violating the Act, leading ultimately to an appeal 
before the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the Act.   Among other things, the 
company argued that the Filled Milk Act violated the Equal Protection Clause since it did 
not prohibit interstate shipment of oleomargarine or other butter substitutes.   According 
to the company, the Act contained an unconstitutional classification between the 
manufacturers of filled milk and the manufacturers of butter substitutes.  The Supreme 
Court held that this was not a classification that violated the Equal Protection Clause, but 
Justice Stone‟s footnote four indicated that had a discrete and insular minority group been 
involved, like religions, national, or racial minorities, closer judicial scrutiny would likely 
be in order.  
Carolene Products set the stage for strict scrutiny of laws which burdened 
specific groups, i.e., for those it called “discrete and insular minorities,” a concept which, 





1938-1977:  Aliens and No One Else 
Over the next thirty-nine years, between 1938 and 1977, the Supreme Court used 
the phrase “discrete and insular minority” in many cases, but no clear outline of the 
concept emerged.  The first usage of the phrase took place in a case where the conflict 
was between a religious group and a state law which allegedly infringed upon religious 
freedom.  In Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis (1940), the majority opinion held that a 
law which required students to salute the flag even where their religious beliefs 
prohibited it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment; but Justice Stone‟s dissent 
stated, among other things, that in his opinion religious groups were “discrete and insular 
minorities” in the Carolene Products sense, such that a higher level of judicial scrutiny 
was in order. 
The phrase was also used in the 1970 of Oregon v. Mitchell.  The laws at issue in 
that case were certain amendments to the federal Voting Rights Act, which had lowered 
the minimum age of voters from 21 to 18 and, based on a finding by Congress that 
literacy tests discriminated against African Americans on the basis of race,  temporarily 
prohibited the use of literary tests.  State governments challenged the constitutionality of 
the amendments on the basis of federalism concerns.  States had the power to regulate 
their own elections, the state governments claimed, and Congress had no authority to 
enact these amendments.  The Supreme Court held, among other things, that age 
qualifications for voting are not aimed at any discrete and insular minority, and that as 
long as an age qualification is reasonable (e.g., age 21), it does not violate the Equal 





discrete and insular minorities, sufficient justification would have existed for a higher 
level of judicial scrutiny.  
The following year in Gordon v. Lance (1971), the Court held that West 
Virginia's constitutional and statutory requirement that political subdivisions may not 
incur bonded indebtedness or increase tax rates beyond those established by the State 
Constitution without the approval of 60% of the voters singled out no discrete and insular 
minority for special treatment and therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.   
That same year, the Court held that aliens were a discrete and insular minority.  In 
Graham v. Richardson (1971), the Court stated that heightened scrutiny should be used 
for laws which impinge upon the rights of aliens since “[a]liens as a class are a prime 
example of a „discrete and insular minority,‟ for whom…heightened judicial solicitude is 
appropriate,”  the Court said, citing Carolene Products. 
37
  
That aliens do qualify as a discrete and insular minority group was upheld in three 
additional cases of the time period.
38
   In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong (1976), the Court 
added definition to the concept of a “discrete and insular minority” by describing aliens 
as a “discrete class of persons” which it defined as “an identifiable class of persons who, 
entirely apart from the rule itself, are already subject to disadvantages not shared by the 
remainder of the community.” 
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 The court in Graham cited Oyama v. California (1948); Korematsu v. United States 
(1944); and Hirabayashi v. United States  (1943) as cases where the Court has held that 
classifications based on nationality are inherently suspect;  and McLaughlin v. Florida, 
(1964); Loving v. Virginia (1967); Bolling v. Sharpe  (1954) as cases where the Court has held 
that classifications based on race are inherently suspect. 
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 All of the above cases use the phrase “discrete and insular minority” in the same 
sense as does the Carolene Products footnote, i.e., as a term used to denote a group or 
class of disenfranchised persons who have been and still are subject to widespread social 
prejudice such that their access to the regular channels for protecting their own rights to 
equality is limited.  A group thus described is virtually identical to what the Supreme 
Court in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and progeny have traditionally called and 
call a “suspect class.” 
In San Antonio Indep. School District v. Rodriguez (1973), the concept of 
“discrete and insular minority” was brought up in the context of a discussion of whether 
the poor were entitled to heightened judicial scrutiny of laws which discriminated against 
them.  The Court held that the poor were not a class of persons entitled to heightened or 
extra protection from discriminatory laws, the poor were not a discrete and insular 
minority, the poor were not a “suspect class.”  But, while the Court in San Antonio held 
that the poor were not a suspect class for equal protection purposes, Justice Stewart‟s 
concurring opinion also noted in dicta that if a suspect class had been involved, strict 
scrutiny would have been in order.  The Court in San Antonio also articulated what it 
called the “traditional indicia of suspectness,” i.e., that the class is 
 “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process.” 
39
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 Notably, the language used by the Court in San Antonio describing the “traditional 
indicia of suspectness” bears a very close relationship to the language used by the Court in U.S. v. 
Carolene   Products in 1938 to describe “discrete and insular minorities.”  Note also that in 
Milliken v. Bradley (1974), the Supreme Court upheld its earlier holding that busing should be 
restricted to intra-district travel, finding that busing of students across school district lines was 






 In Johnson v. Robison (1974), the Court was called upon to assess the constitutionality 
of the denial of benefits under the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966
40
 to a 
conscientious objector who had performed alternative service.  The Court applied the 
rational basis test and found that the classification at issue was reasonable, i.e., 
constitutional, given that no discrete and insular minority group was involved.  So, in 
Johnson we see the Court tying the availability of heightened or strict judicial scrutiny to 
the question of whether the group in question is a discrete and insular minority.  In this 
way, the concept of discrete and insular minority operates effectively in the same way as 
the more commonly used concept of “suspect class.” 
 What we see, then, between 1939 and 1977 is the Supreme Court defining the 
contours of what it means for a group to be a “discrete and insular minority” and 
simultaneously defining the contours of what it means for a group to be a “suspect class,” 
i.e., a class of persons entitled to a higher level of protection than other people under the 
Equal Protection Clause.  In this period, the Court consistently associates the availability 
of the strict scrutiny level of judicial review with laws affecting groups that have been 
marginalized, disenfranchised, excluded from the political process, subjected to prejudice 
and discrimination, and whose equality rights have otherwise been systematically 
violated or ignored by the law.   
But, in 1978, the Court suddenly, dramatically, and almost-but-not-quite 
inexplicably (as we shall see) altered that long-held approach to Equal Protection 
Analysis in race cases and decided instead to make the availability of redress under the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Interesting for purposes of the present study is that in Millikin, the Court linked the availability of  
redress with a history of discriminatory practices. 
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Equal Protection Clause turn on whether the law in question simply mentioned or used 
the concept race at all.  This new approach would operate completely irrespective of 
whether the group affected by the law was disenfranchised, marginalized, or oppressed at 
all, and irrespective of whether the law in question operated to adversely affect blacks or 
whether it actually operated to benefit blacks.  This dramatic alteration of the Supreme 
Court‟s approach to Equal Protection Analysis took place in a case called Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke (1978). 
Bakke:  The Anti-Carolene Products Case 
 As mentioned above, in 1978, the Court decided Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke.  Recall from the discussion above that the judgment of the Court in 
Bakke was that laws which entail racial and ethnic classifications are subject to strict 
judicial scrutiny without regard to whether the group discriminated against satisfies the 
criteria of a discrete and insular minority (as required by Carolene Products).  Bakke 
represents, then, Suspect Classification Doctrine retaining from the history of Equal 
Protection Analysis the concept that racial classifications in law are facially suspect, 
while leaving behind the reason why racial classifications in law have historically been 
considered facially suspect, i.e., because racial classifications have historically adversely 
affect groups of people who have been excluded from the political process and who have 
been denied equal protection of the laws as a result of racial prejudice.   Bakke signifies, 
then, among other things, a clear departure from the Carolene Products line of cases 
which grounded the strict scrutiny level of judicial review for suspect classes (“discrete 
ad insular minorities”) in the alienation from the political process experienced by 





its historical position that strict scrutiny was in order for laws that affected “suspect 
classes” to a new position holding that strict scrutiny was in order for laws which 
contained “suspect classifications.” But, what is the origin of this switch?  The answer 
appears to be found in the emergence in 1973, about five years before the decision in 
Bakke, of the concept of “immutable characteristics” in Equal Protection Analysis.  The 
emergency of the concept of “immutable characteristics” took place within the 
development of Equal Protection Analysis surrounding the rights of women. 
Immutable Characteristics 
Origin of the Concept:  Gender as Immutable  
The concept of “immutable characteristics” in Equal Protection Analysis began in 
the context of gender discrimination.   As stated above, a plurality of the Court at one 
time identified gender as a suspect classification, using the argument that sex, like race, 
was an “immutable characteristic” such that legal burdens could not be constitutionally 
imposed on the basis of it.  Frontiero v. Richardson (1973).   But, there were four justices 
in Frontiero who were not prepared to characterize sex or gender in this way,
41
 and in 
subsequent cases, judicial usage of  “immutable characteristics” as measures for the 
applicability of strict scrutiny in gender discrimination cases has been inconsistent and 
selective.  The concept has been mentioned also in select race discrimination cases and in 
cases involving discrimination on the basis of sexuality. But, again, that usage has been 
inconsistent and selective. 
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 For example, Justice Powell wrote that there would be “far-reaching implications” of 
characterizing sex or gender as a suspect classification, justifying his lack of concurrence with the 





One year after Frontiero  was decided, in the 1974 case of Johnson v. Robison, 
for example, the Court employed “immutable characteristic” rhetoric to deny 
conscientious objectors the status of a suspect class.  Among other things, conscientious 
objectors do not count as a group in possession of an immutable characteristic, the Court 
reasoned.  But, that same year, in Kahn v. Shevin (1974), the Court held that a law that 
granted widows but  not widowers a property tax exemption (obviously a legal 
classification based on gender) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and was 
indeed constitutional for the reason that the differing treatment for different genders in 
that case bore a substantial relation to the goal of the law, i.e., to cushion the financial 
impact of spousal loss “upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately 
heavy burden.” (355).  In its reasoning process, however, and in complete disregard of 
the plurality in Frontiero, the majority opinion made no mention of the immutability of 
gender that the Court in Frontiero had found so pivotal.
42
 Then, two years later in the 
next gender discrimination case, the landmark case of Craig v. Boren (1976), the Court 
flipped again:  suddenly, talk of “immutable characteristics” resurfaced.   In Craig,  the 
Court relied on language in Frontiero to the effect that sex was an immutable 
characteristic to establish the intermediate level of judicial review mentioned above for 
cases of sex discrimination. 
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 Notably, the dissent in Kahn did mention both Frontiero and immutable characteristics.  
Justices Brennan and Marshall noted, “[A] legislative classification that distinguishes potential 
beneficiaries solely by reference to their gender-based status as widows or widowers…must be 
subjected to close judicial scrutiny, because it focuses upon generally immutable characteristics 
over which individuals have little or no control, and also because gender-based classifications too 
often have been inexcusably utilized to stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless segments 






Bakke:  Race Discussed as Immutable 
When Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke came along in 1978, the concept of 
immutability had been employed in gender discrimination cases only.  But, in Bakke, the 
Supreme Court used the concept of immutability to support its position that all racial 
classifications, even classifications against “whites”, could be used for invidious 
purposes.  Whiteness is just as immutable as blackness, the Court reasoned
43
, such that a 
classification which disadvantages whites is no more unconstitutional than a 
classification which disadvantages blacks.  Under what is known as “the argument from 
immutability,” then, which developed inside Suspect Classification Doctrine, Bakke 
stands for two very strange propositions:  First, it stands for the proposition that the 
Fourteenth
 
Amendment‟s Equal Protection Clause is there to protect whites just as much 
as blacks, owing to the fact that “race”, in the abstract, is immutable, in complete 
disregard for this history of the Clause; and second, it stands for the proposition that, 
although there may be some judicial disagreement about whether gender is sufficiently 
immutable to justify suspect class status for women, whiteness is certainly sufficiently 
immutable to justify suspect class status for whites. 
Immutability and “Similarly Situated” Rhetoric 
Caban v. Mohammed (1979) is another gender discrimination case in which 
immutable characteristic language was employed, this time to protect the equality 
“rights” of men.  The majority opinion held unconstitutional a New York statute which 
denied to unmarried men the authority to block the adoption of their children, but granted 
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race] are contrary to our deep belief that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual 





that right to unmarried women.  The majority opinion did not employ immutable 
characteristic language but Justice Stewart‟s dissent did.  Stewart conceded that gender, 
like race, was immutable, but stated, without explanation, that even so, gender was 
different from race in that gender classifications “are not invariably invalid” (311).  When 
men and women are not in fact “similarly situated” in the area covered by the legislation 
in question,” Justice Stewart reasoned, “the Equal Protection Clause is not violated”  
(Ibid.).  With Caban, then, we see the Court -- even if only in a dissent -- beginning to 
infuse gender discrimination cases with talk of whether men are women are “similarly 
situated” and simultaneously backing away from using the concept of the so-called 
“immutable characteristic” of sex for the purpose of allowing women to use the Equal 
Protection Clause to protect their rights to equality.  Predictably, then, and as we shall 
discover below, the same “similarly situated” rhetoric will be used by the Court in a 
majority opinion later on (i.e., in Michael M. v. Superior Court (1980)) for the purpose of 
providing a rationalization for the Court‟s view under Suspect Classification Doctrine 
that it is permissible to make legal distinctions (or classifications) between men and 
women vis-à-vis the right to equal treatment under the law.   
Race Becomes Officially “Immutable”: United Steelworkers 
The usage of the concept of immutability was taken up by the Court again in 
United Steelworkers v. Weber (1979).  There, Justice Rehnquist‟s dissent expressed a 
similar sentiment regarding the immutability of race as was expressed in Bakke.  Without 
feeling compelled to explain the precedential origin of this view, Justice Rehnquist stated, 
“The evil inherent in discrimination against Negroes is that it is based on an immutable 





less immutable and irrelevant, and discrimination based thereon becomes no less evil, 
simply because the person excluded is a member of one race rather than another,” he 
wrote.  In other words, for Justice Rehnquist, one‟s race is immutable and therefore 
legally irrelevant, regardless of what one‟s race is, such that discrimination based upon 
race is unconstitutional per se and without regard to the race of the petitioner. 
Accordingly, in racial discrimination cases after Bakke, then, the concept of immutability 
begins to infiltrate the language of Equal Protection Cases involving race in ways that 
understand “race” itself as a suspect classification rather than understanding black 
Americans or African Americans as a suspect class.  The focus on immutability, rather 
than on a history of prejudice and exclusion from the political process, will facilitate the 
Court‟s transition from using Suspect Classification Doctrine to protect African 
Americans or black people, to using Suspect Classification Doctrine to protect anyone 




In Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980), Justice Powell‟s concurring opinion used 
immutable characteristic language to support the majority‟s opinion that a minority-
owned business set-aside section of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 was 
constitutional.  While racial classifications should be assessed under the most stringent 
level of review because immutable characteristics that bear no relation to individual merit 
or need are irrelevant to almost every governmental decision, Justice Powell wrote, the 
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 From another perspective, this includes no one, or certainly no one in particular who is 
a member of a group that is disenfranchised or that has experienced a history of being 
disenfranchised.  Through this line of reasoning, the concept of  “suspect  class” loses all of its 






minority-owned business set-aside in question was justified as a remedy that served the 
compelling governmental interest of eradicating the continuing effects of past 
discrimination. The court noted that the set-aside program in question was remedial in 
nature, and that, as such, there was no need for Congress to act in a “color-blind” fashion.  
As long as the law was “properly tailored” to cure the effects of past discrimination 
against certain minority groups, the law should be upheld.  Moreover, the Fullilove Court 
also explicitly stated that the sharing of the burden of curing the effects of past 
discrimination by innocent parties was “not impermissible.”  There were only two 
Justices – Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist – who dissented, adopting the view that 
“the government may never act to the detriment of a person solely because of a person‟s 
race,” meaning the white contractors who challenged of the set-aside program.  “The 
color of a person‟s skin and the country of his origin are immutable facts that bear no 
relation to ability, disadvantage, moral culpability or any other characteristics of 
constitutionally permissible interest to government.  In short, racial discrimination is by 
definition invidious discrimination,” Justices Stewart and Rehnquist wrote in their 
dissenting opinion at 525. 
Fullilove, then, evidences the tension within the Court at the start of the 1980s 
between those Justices who interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as it had been 
interpreted since the beginning – i.e., as a vehicle for the remedial protection of the right 
to equality for the historically disenfranchised – and those Justices who were now coming 
to interpret the Equal Protection Clause as standing for the proposition that “immutable 
characteristics” like race and gender (considered without regard to what race or what 





from the political process) were constitutionally impermissible bases for legal 
classifications among persons.  As is evidenced in the next several Supreme Court cases 
discussing “immutable characteristics,” as the tension between these two opposing 
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause began to fester and grow, the Court‟s 
analysis of just exactly what sorts of traits qualified as “immutable” became increasingly 
confused and nonsensical. 
Is Mental Illness Immutable? 
The case of Schweiker v. Wilson (1980) evidences this confusion.  In Schweiker, a 
group of mentally ill persons challenged  a portion of the Social Security Act that 
excluded mentally ill persons from supplemental benefits.  Their claim was that this 
denial of benefits amounted to an equal protection violation in virtue of the fact that the 
mentally ill were a protected class.  The Supreme Court upheld the law, but its reasoning 
for doing so is confusing and self-contradictory  The Court wrote, :  (1) Unless a 
classification is “inherently invidious,” the Court should defer to the legislature, i.e., the 
Court should use the rational basis test to assess the constitutionality of a law. i.e., the law 
should be upheld.  (2) It was unnecessary for the Court to decide whether the 
characteristic of mental illness was inherently invidious because the law in question did 
not make a classification amongst persons on the basis of mental health.  (3) At the most, 
this legislation incidentally denies a small monthly comfort benefit to a certain number of 
persons suffering from mental illness” (Schweiker at 231).   
The Court‟s reasoning in Schweiker, then, amounts to the argument that although 
strict judicial review is appropriate when a classification is made on the basis of an 





benefits to the mentally ill is not a classification amongst persons on the basis of mental  
health.  So, although the Court‟s explicit claim is that it is not making a judgment about 
whether mental illness is a suspect (or “inherently invidious”) classification, the fact that 
it upholds the law amounts to the Court‟s implicitly making that very judgment.  That the 
Supreme Court was indeed claiming implicitly that mental illness was not an “immutable 
characteristic” (i.e., not a suspect classification for equal protection purposes) is 
supported by the Court‟s citation of certain language used by the lower (District) court 
stating that “"[it] is debatable whether and to what extent the mental illness is an 
immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth‟” (Schweiker, 
footnote 11). 
But, the important point about Schweiker is that although the Court arguably 
makes the judgment that mental illness is not “immutable,” since that judgment is 
implicit rather than explicit the Court does not provide any rationale for that judgment.  
There are no scientific or sociological studies cited for the proposition that mental illness 
is not immutable, for example.  There are no arguments offered in support of that 
proposition.  In other words, the judgment call on the part of the Supreme Court that 
mental illness is not sufficiently immutable so as to amount to a constitutionally salient 
characteristic triggering special protection under the Equal Protection Clause amounts to 
nothing other than the reality that the Court will uphold discrimination against them.  In 
this way, the concept of “immutable characteristic” becomes little more than a vehicle for 





 “Similarly Situated” Rhetoric Continues 
In Michael M. v. Superior Court (1980), the Court revived the connection it found 
in Caban v. Mohammed (1979), above, between whether men and women are “similarly 
situated” and whether a given law distinguishing between genders is unconstitutional, this 
time in a majority opinion.  Michael M.  involved a statutory rape law which criminalized 
males for having sexual intercourse with minors but did not criminalize females for doing 
so.  Michael M. was 17 ½ years old when he had sexual intercourse with a female under 
the age of 18.  He was charged with statutory rape.  He challenged the law on the grounds 
that it violated the Equal Protection Clause in that it criminalized males but not females 
for the same behavior.  The Supreme Court disagreed.  Applying the intermediate 
scrutiny test, the Court found that the law in question was constitutional.  Men and 
women are not “similarly situated” with regard to the ability to become pregnant as a 
result of sexual intercourse, the Court reasoned.  The law in question, the Court held, 
served the important state interest of preventing illegitimate teenage pregnancies and the 
law in question was therefore substantially related to achieving that interest.  The Court 
wrote, “The Constitution is violated when government, state or federal, invidiously 
classifies similarly situated people on the basis of the immutable characteristics with 
which they were born”  (Emphasis added).  People of different races, the Court 
continued, are always similarly situated, but people of different genders need not be.   
Leaving aside for the moment the obvious irrationality (or at least testability) of 
the implicit claim that there is a link between statutory rape laws and teenage 
pregnancies, let us first observe that Michael M. seems to stand for the proposition that 





characteristics do not violate the constitution unless the people in the groups of people 
being compared (blacks and whites or men and women) are “similarly situated.” 
Michael M. also stands for the proposition that people of different races are always 
“similarly situated,” but people of different genders need not be vis-à-vis the right to 
equal treatment under the law.  In other words, the Court in Michael M. (and the dissent 
in Caban v. Mohammed before it) interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to mean that it 
takes a facial classification amongst persons based on an “immutable characteristic” plus 
a finding that the two groups of people being compared are “similarly situated” for Equal 
Protection to kick in under Suspect Classification Doctrine.  
But what is in need of further explication is why the Court understands people of 
different races to be at all times “similarly situated” but not people of different genders 
vis-à-vis the right to equal treatment under the law.  Even if it were fair to say that there 
are some clearly identifiable (“immutable” or not) ways to distinguish meaningfully 
between men and women that cannot be found to distinguish between people of different 
races (e.g., that women can become pregnant but men cannot), the Court has still not 
answered the question of why these ways are constitutionally salient with regard the right 
to equal treatment under the law.  The test of similarly situatedness, then,  seems to 
operate merely as a way to allow the Court to continue to use a great deal of discretion 
(as it always has traditionally) regarding decisions as to when and if legal classifications 
between men and women are constitutionally permissible under the Equal Protection 
Clause, a level of discretion that the Equal Protection Clause would seem, at least on the 





Of course, the constitution would only seem to forbid this very high level of 
discretion regarding equal rights for women if the unequal status of women in American 
society is taken seriously, and if the Court‟s traditional role of “protector” of women (for 
their own good) is exposed, named, and identified as constitutionally problematic.  It is 
difficult to see how this exposure could occur, however, under Suspect Classification 
Doctrine.  This is because Suspect Classification Doctrine finds any history of 
oppression, subjugation, or disenfranchisement of a given group irrelevant to Equal 
Protection Analysis, operating instead as if gender (and race an sexual orientation) exists 
in a vacuum, independent of the societies in which  distinctions amongst persons arise in 
the first place and independent of whatever stereotypes and social hierarchies are 
contained within those distinctions. 
Immutability Linked to “Social and Cultural Isolation” 
The 1985 case of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. contains some very 
revealing reasoning on the topic of what qualifies as an “immutable characteristic” and 
what does not.  Cleburne Living Ctr.  revisited the issue (first raised five years earlier in 
Schweiker v. Wilson) of whether the mentally challenged (in this case the mentally 
retarded) could be considered a suspect class or a quasi-suspect class.  The Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc. sought a city permit to lease a building as a home for the mentally 
retarded.  The permit was denied under a city zoning ordinance which required a “special 
use” permit for hospitals “of the feebleminded.”  The living center then filed suit against 
the city on the basis that the zoning ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause on its 
face by unconstitutionally discriminating against the mentally retarded.  The Supreme 





suspect classification.   The rational basis test level of judicial review was therefore 
applied to the city ordinance, but, interestingly, the zoning ordinance was nevertheless 
struck down.   The Court‟s reasoning was that the immutability of the defining trait of a 
given group (along with the group‟s political powerlessness) was only relevant insofar as 
it pointed to a “social and cultural isolation that gives the majority little reason to respect 
or be concerned with that group‟s interests and needs.” 
45
  This would appear to be a clear 
departure from the Court‟s reasoning in Bakke, for example, that the real issue in Equal 
Protection Analysis is the  immutability of the trait that is the basis of the legal 
classification rather than any sort of socio-cultural considerations attendant to that trait.  
But, rather than stating this outright, the Court – still clinging to the concept of 
immutability per se – opts instead to state both  that mental retardation is not a suspect 
classification and  that the classification at issue was constitutionally impermissible under 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
Whiteness Not Immutable but Gender Is 
Immutable characteristic language was used in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of 
Education (1986), but this time in the dissenting opinion.  In that case, the Court affirmed 
its view, first stated in Bakke, that all racial classifications, of whatever sort, should be 
subject to strict scrutiny, and on this basis struck down a Jackson, Michigan school board 
layoff policy according to which, when layoffs became necessary, minority teachers with 
less seniority were retained while nonminority teachers with more seniority were laid off.  
The school board policy had been adopted to remedy societal discrimination by providing 
role models for minority school children.  The dissent argued that the layoff policy 
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satisfied the constitution in that the stated purpose was diversity and the layoff policy was 
designed to achieve that purpose.    “[W]hites have none of the immutable characteristics 
of a suspect class,” Justice Marshall wrote in his dissenting opinion, reasoning that strict 
scrutiny was therefore not applicable to laws designed to further affirmative action goals.  
Of note is the way in which Justice Marshall links the concept of “suspect class” and the 
concept of “immutability” as if this link were obvious and as if Justice Rehnquist had 
never formally divorced these two  concepts in his majority opinion in Bakke.   
In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic (1993), several Washington, D.C. 
area abortion clinics sued anti-abortion demonstrators, claiming that their demonstrations  
violated the equal protection rights of women seeking abortions.
46
  The Supreme Court 
held, among other things, that opposition to abortion did not qualify as invidious 
discrimination against women as a class.  Justice Stevens, in his dissent, disagreed.  
Writing that the actions of the anti-abortion demonstrators amounted to “a striking 
contemporary example of the kind of zealous, politically motivated, lawless conduct that 
led to the enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,” Justice Stevens reasoned that 
since only women can get pregnant, women, as a class, were the target of the 
demonstrators‟ lawless actions.  The capacity to become pregnant is “the inherited and 
immutable characteristic that primarily differentiates the female from the male,” he 
wrote.  The thing to note in Bray is the way in which the majority opinion purports to see 
no connection between abortions and the only people biologically capable of having 
them, i.e., women.  Owing to this lack of connection, the majority reasons, the rights of 
women as a class are not implicated by this case.  It is only in the dissent that we find a 
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call to context, a recognition that only women get abortions and that only women as a 
class are implicated by anti-abortion demonstrators.  That the majority opinion (operating 
according to Suspect Classification Doctrine) fails to acknowledge what would appear to 
be such an obvious fact seems to indicate that something other than strict application of 
the “black letter law” of the Equal Protection Clause might be at work in its decision.  If 
nothing else, the majority certainly seems confused on the biological differences between 
women and men, and if the majority cannot see any biological difference between 
women and men, on what basis is gender “immutable” for either sex? 
Is Sexuality Immutable? 
 Those advocating full citizenship rights for sexual minorities have often tried to 
use what is known as “the argument from immutability” to make Equal Protection claims 
on behalf of gay people.  For these advocates, the argument is that sexuality is 
immutable, like race and gender, and is therefore an unconstitutional basis upon which to 
make classifications between Americans.
47
  On this view, sexual orientation is a suspect 
classification like race, or at least a quasi-suspect classification like gender, and strict 
scrutiny, or at least intermediate scrutiny, is therefore the applicable level of judicial 
review for laws or policies which make discriminate against persons on the basis of 
sexuality or sexual orientation.  These arguments have never succeeded.  Suspect 
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Classification Doctrine does not now grant, nor has it ever considered sexuality 
immutable or sexual orientation a suspect classification.
48
 
Others advocating full equality rights for sexual minorities have suggested that 
the argument from immutability is wrong-headed, that since the scientific community is 
divided on the issue of whether sexuality is immutable, and since the real issue is that gay 
people have a very long history of having been disenfranchised, marginalized, and 
subjected to widespread social stigmatization and marginalization in our society, the 
argument from immutability should be abandoned in favor of arguments which challenge 
us to imagine beyond  the standard categories of homo- and  heterosexual, or even 
bisexual, and to think of sexuality more in terms of a means a societal ordering. (Halley 
1993).  On this view, Suspect Classification Doctrine, rather than a method for 
ascertaining the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause for an identifiable group known 
as “homosexuals,”  “asks whether the resources of the state are being used to enforce, 
confirm, and validate social hierarchies” (Ibid. 567).  In other words, for those advocates 
of full equality rights for gay people who think the argument from immutability is wrong-
headed, the real issue in cases involving whether gay people are specially protected by 
the Equal Protection Clause is whether gay people are a suspect class, a discrete and 
insular minority in the Carolene Products sense; not the issue of whether sexual 
orientation is “immutable” or not. 
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In summary “immutable characteristic” language was first employed by a 
plurality of Justices in Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) for the purpose of identifying 
gender as a suspect classification.  The Court has since been inconsistent in its 
deployment of the phrase.  For example, in Craig v. Boren (1976),  the court used 
“immutable characteristic” language to replace the strict scrutiny standard of review for 
gender discrimination cases articulated in Frontiero with the intermediate level of 
judicial review for cases of discrimination on the basis of gender .  Curiously, today 
gender is still an immutable characteristic, but laws which make classifications on the 
basis of gender are subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.  Race is also 
understood to be an immutable characteristic today, but legal classifications on the basis 
of race are thought to generate the higher, strict level of judicial scrutiny rather than 
intermediate review.  Additionally, the immutability of “race” per se has replaced the 
history of systemic and legalized racial discrimination against racialized minorities in the 
United States as the main criterion justifying strict scrutiny in cases of race 
discrimination and a lack of agreement in the scientific community on the “immutability” 
of sexual orientation is arguably responsible for persistent resistance on the part of the 
Court to identifying gay people as a suspect class or sexual orientation as a suspect 
classification. 
One question raised by the development of the concept of “immutable 
characteristics” in Equal Protection Analysis is why the immutability of “race” has 
reached such heights of constitutional significance, while the immutability of “gender” 





protection analysis is highlighted in the case of the question of how to protect full 
citizenship rights of sexual minorities.  Whether sexuality is immutable or not, the key 
issue in equal protection analysis, arguably, is not whether the law should be blind to 
differences that are “immutable,” but whether a given group has been subject to the kind 
of disenfranchisement, marginalization, stigmatization, and oppression that arguably 
motivated the inclusion of the Equal Protection Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment in 
the first place.  
Summary of the Problem and One Possible Solution 
Suspect Classification Doctrine, then, associates the level of judicial review to be 
applied to a given law (which in almost all cases also determines the fate of a given law) 
to the specific trait used to make legal distinctions between persons.  Where the trait is 
“race,” the highest level of judicial review is applied to the law.  This is true regardless of 
the race of the petitioner.  Where the trait is “gender,” a so-called intermediate level of 
judicial review is applied to the law, and this is true regardless of the gender of the 
petitioner.  Where the trait is “sexual orientation,” the lowest level of judicial review is 
applied to the law, which means that gay people as gay people are presently unable to 
successfully use the Equal Protection Clause at all to protect their rights to equal 
treatment under the law.   What this all means is that neither African Americans, nor 
women, nor gay people are specifically protected under the Equal Protection Clause 
under Suspect Classification Doctrine. 
Suspect Classification Doctrine, however, is not the only available way to 
interpret the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.  As the history of the development 





interpretations of the Clause over the 143 years since the enactment of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Although there are others, the primary meaning of the Clause historically, 
other than Suspect Classification Doctrine, was the view that the Clause was designed to 
protect groups with a history of having been disenfranchised, marginalized, subjugated, 
or oppressed in America.  On this view, it is a radical misinterpretation of what the 
Clause means to hold that it was designed to invalidate laws that mention specific traits.  
There have been other interpretations of the Clause as well over the years.  The question 
is which of these interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause carries the most weight.   
Legal hermeneutics is an approach to legal interpretation which lays bare the 
details of exactly how legal interpretation actually takes place.  It explains the roles of 
history, time, socio-historical context, interpreter(s), prior interpretations, and the legal 
text itself in any attempt at ascertaining the meaning of a legal text, any attempt at 
“understanding” a given legal text at any given point in time. Legal hermeneutics 
explains why various interpretations of a given legal text can and do conflict, and 
attempts to provide a well-grounded philosophical basis upon which to prioritize 
conflicting interpretations in terms of faithfulness to the interpretive process. Legal 
hermeneutics attempts to untangle interpretive conflicts in a way that is illuminating and 
productive for all attempts at “understanding” a given legal text by clarifying what takes 
place within what I will call a given “interpretive moment.”   
In Chapter 3, I will explain the theoretical foundations of legal hermeneutics in 
philosophical hermeneutics (to give the reader a fuller picture of why legal hermeneutics 
is not just another theory or method of interpretation but an entirely different project), 





way of demystifying existing interpretive methods than as an interpretive method itself), 
familiarize the reader with various contemporary approaches to legal hermeneutics, and 
generate an approach to legal hermeneutics that I think addresses some important 
interpretive considerations that Suspect Classification  Doctrine ignores.  Then, in 
Chapter 4, I will use the approach to legal hermeneutics generated in Chapter 3 to 
untangle the morass of contradictions that is the present method of interpreting the Equal 
Protection Clause in the hope of revealing a better understanding of the meaning of the 









Chapter 3:  Theory: Legal Hermeneutics: Anti-Method and Constitutional Theory  
 
Introduction 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, Suspect Classification Doctrine fails as a vehicle 
through which protect the equal protection rights of three identifiable groups: African 
Americans, women, and gay people.
2
  The doctrine is circular, inconsistent, has 
developed without an awareness on the part of the Supreme Court as to how the 
interpretive process takes place.  Accordingly, rather than a sensible basis upon which to 
consistently and fairly protect equality rights under the Equal Protection Clause, Suspect 
Classification Doctrine instead operates to undermine the right to equality for those it was 
arguably designed to protect.  Rather than a vehicle through which the equality rights of 
the oppressed and the marginalized are vindicated, Suspect Classification Doctrine is a 
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2
 The fact that these three groups have been chosen to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of 
Suspect Classification Doctrine is not meant to imply that Suspect Classification Doctrine is any 
more effective for any other marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated group, such as the poor, the 
disabled, or other ethnic minorities.  Instead, these three representative groups have been chosen 
to illustrate that the ineffectiveness of the doctrine‟s existing three-tiered approach is a function of 
the way Suspect Classification Doctrine ties suspect class status to a given group trait rather than 
containing a set of criteria for assessing suspect class status applicable across the board such that 
the possibility of protection for other groups can be assessed in a fair and consistent fashion.  A 
related problem is the fact that Suspect Classification Doctrine presumes that membership in a 
given group is exclusive of membership in any other group.  In other words, the doctrine provides 
no way of addressing the extent to which membership in more than one class might affect the 
availability of redress for unconstitutional discrimination.   This type of failure is sometimes 
referred to as the problem of intersectionality.  Another related problem is the problem of quasi-
membership in a class.  For example, Nancy Leong has recently suggested that Suspect 
Classification Doctrine is not effective at addressing the discrimination faced by people of so-
called “mixed” racial ancestry (Leong 2010).  Elsewhere, I have agreed with Leong‟s conclusion 
while disagreeing with how she gets there.  (See “Antidiscrimination Law and the Multiracial 
Experience:  A Reply to Nancy Leong,” presented at the first annual Critical Mixed Race Studies 





hodgepodge of conflicting themes and standards that fails to provide those in need the 
equal protection of the laws to which they are entitled under the constitution. 
The failure of Suspect Classification Doctrine to effectuate the meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause is arguably rooted, in part, in a failure on the part of the Supreme 
Court to understand what actually takes place when it, as an institution, decides a case; 
that is, a failure on the part of the Supreme Court to understand that every decision it 
makes as to what the Equal Protection Clause means is necessarily an act interpretation. 
The emerging area of philosophy of law known as legal hermeneutics not only openly 
acknowledges this fact, but provides a theoretical explanation for why this is the case.  In 
addition, legal hermeneutics explains why acknowledging that every Supreme Court 
decision is an act of interpretation is the first step toward better understandings or 
interpretations of laws, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 Legal hermeneutics is an approach to philosophy of law that operates between the 
analytic and continental traditions.  Like the analytic tradition, legal hermeneutics pays 
homage to the human need for a certain sense of certainty and stability in the law, while 
at the same time acknowledging the observation of various continental legal theorists that 
there is radical indeterminacy in the law.   In addition, legal hermeneutics disrupts what 
some identify as the analytic tradition‟s overly formalistic view of law by rejecting the 
notion that human affairs can be finally formalized into explicit rules or even principles; 
while at the same time avoiding the classic charge against various continental approaches 
that they leave us without a way to decide important legal issues.  Moreover, legal 





legal issues and practices does not inevitably lead to nihilism and relativism, as some in 
the analytic tradition claim.  On the contrary, the insights of Martin Heidegger, Hans-
George Gadamer and others who developed in the 20
th
 century a theory of interpretation 
which has come to be known as philosophical hermeneutics, provide the theoretical 
groundwork upon which to investigate, clarify and solve what appear from other 
jurisprudential perspectives to be insoluble legal problems. 
 In Chapter 3, I will situate legal hermeneutics within the landscape of mainstream 
philosophy of law, explain the theoretical foundations of legal hermeneutics in 
philosophical hermeneutics (to give the reader a fuller picture of why legal hermeneutics 
is not just another theory or method of interpretation but is instead an illuminating 
analysis of the interpretive process itself), outline the main goals and processes of legal 
hermeneutics (i.e., legal hermeneutics is more a way of demystifying existing interpretive 
methods than an interpretive method itself, en route to interpretations that more closely 
approximate what might be called “objective” than the products of any interpretive 
“method”), familiarize the reader with various contemporary approaches to legal 
hermeneutics, and identify those aspects of legal hermeneutics that I think will be helpful 
in ascertaining a fuller, truer meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than is generated by Suspect Classification Doctrine. 
 The primary goal of Chapter 3 is to uncover certain useful themes and approaches 
to understanding the law (in this case the Equal Protection Clause) that legal 
hermeneutics reveals and that can help us get a better handle on what is actually going on 
when we say we have found the “meaning” of the Equal Protection Clause or any law.  





untangling the morass of contradictions that is Suspect Classification Doctrine, to explain 
why legal hermeneutics might be a better of way of understanding the meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause than Suspect Classification Doctrine, and to outline those aspects 
of legal hermeneutics that will be used to attempt to do that in the project at hand. 
Situating Legal Hermeneutics in Traditional Philosophy of Law 
 Introduction 
 One of the core issues in philosophy of law is determining the best method of 
interpreting or understanding what the law means.  A threshold issue in answering this 
question is an inquiry into the ontology of law, or the question of just what the law is in 
the first instance.  Arguably, one primary idea driving traditional philosophy of law is 
that if an answer can be found to the question of what the law is, that answer will help 
shape and determine ways to assess the legitimacy and authority of the law.  A related 
idea is that determination of the sources of legitimacy and authority in the law will, in 
turn, help us decide which laws to keep and which to discard, as well as help us help us 
determine the best way to understand or interpret laws.  En route to answering these 
questions, philosophy of law can be understood to be approached, generally speaking, 
from two distinct and opposing perspectives, i.e., through the lens of analytic 
jurisprudence and through the lens of continental jurisprudence.  
Analytic Jurisprudence 
The analytic tradition in jurisprudence is multifaceted
3
 but has traditionally 
consisted of two main approaches:  legal positivism and natural law theory, which are 
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 Some of the many approaches to analytic jurisprudence include legal positivism, natural 
law theory, legal interpretivism, legal realism, legal formalism, legal pragmatism, legal process 





generally understood to be theoretically opposed.
4
  Legal positivism is the view that there 
is no necessary connection between law and morality; that law owes neither its 
legitimacy nor its authority to moral considerations.  The validity of law is determined 
not by its moral content but by certain social facts.   Early forms of legal positivism held 
that the relevant social fact was the command of a sovereign backed by force  (Austin).  It 
also held that law was simply a matter of contract between rational, free, and equal 
persons  (Hobbes 2008).  This view was taken up by Jeremy Bentham who insisted that 
laws, even if morally outrageous, were still laws  (Bentham).  In the contemporary era, 
H.L.A. Hart famously held that the law is simply a system of rules and nothing more 
(Hart 1958).  For the legal positivist, to determine meaning in the law is merely to look at 
the text of the laws themselves, the so-called “black letter law.”   
Natural law theory, by contrast, is the view that there is a necessary connection 
between law and morality.  Natural law theory has its roots in ancient Greek Stoicism 
which held that there were eternal laws that come from nature which direct the actions of 
all rational beings (Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius).  In the first century B.C.E., the Roman 
philosopher and lawyer Cicero developed natural law theory a bit further in the course of 
which three central tenets emerged:  the idea that law remains unchanged through time 
and does not vary with culture, the idea that law is accessible through reason, and the idea 
that only a just law is a legitimate law (Cicero  1988).  Similar claims became a part of 
Christian natural law theory, most famously in the thirteenth century views of Thomas 
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 In recent years, the analytic tradition has taken what is known as the “interpretive turn,” 
according to which there is understood by many theorists to have been invented a third main 
analytic theory of law  -- legal interpretivism – which is said to exist as a hybrid between legal 






Aquinas.  For Aquinas, a citizen has no obligation to obey an unjust law (Aquinas).  
Liberal political theorists Thomas Hobbes and John Locke based much of their political 
philosophy on natural law theory.  Largely influenced by Locke, Thomas Jefferson 
included in the Declaration of Independence language about “inalienable” or natural 
rights, which for him included “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Contemporary 
natural law theory in analytic jurisprudence is grounded in the work of two main thinkers:  
John Finnis and Lon Fuller.  For Finnis, as was the case with Aquinas, an unjust law has 
no authority (Finnis)  and for Fuller, an immoral law is no law at all.  Instead, a law has 
to have what Fuller calls an “internal morality” to be legitimate.
5
   
While the two main approaches to analytic jurisprudence are theoretically 
opposed on the question of whether there is a necessary connection between law and 
morality, however, it is also the case that both theories are foundationalist in the sense 
that both assume that the answer to the question of what the law is, and ultimately to the 
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 The “interpretive turn” in analytic jurisprudence, mentioned above in the previous 
footnote, can be understood to be exemplified by the work of Ronald Dworkin.  Originally 
considered a critique of positivism, Dworkin‟s early work explicitly attacked H.L.A. Hart‟s 
ontology of law which proclaimed that law was simply a matter of rules and nothing more. For 
Dworkin, such a view fails to account for the role of principles in the law [Citation]. Yes, law 
begins with rules but for Dworkin law and political morality are connected at the deepest levels of 
moral and political justification.  In other words, for Dworkin the meaning of legal concepts 
and/or laws themselves is a function of interpretation, or, more specifically, a function of 
interpretive practice, which involves written or “black letter” law together with moral and 
political considerations.  This Dworkinian approach to philosophy of law has come to be known 
as analytic legal interpretivism.  For reasons that will be made clear later in this chapter, it is 
important to note that although analytic legal interpretivism overlaps with legal hermeneutics in 
its explicit focus on legal interpretation, legal interpretivism can be differentiated from legal 
hermeneutics in that legal interpretivism is based on epistemological foundationalism whereas 
legal hermeneutics understands itself as existing outside of the foundationalist/antifoundationalist 
continuum.  Primarily for this reason, legal interpretivism can be properly called an interpretive 
“method” whereas legal hermeneutics cannot.  While some might see this distinction as 
insignificant, from the perspective of legal hermeneutics, the distinction is negatively outcome 






question of what the law means, can be found by identifying an ultimate foundation for 
the law‟s legitimacy, authority, or meaning.  For the legal positivist, that source is the 




The continental tradition in philosophy of law is also multifaceted.
7
  But, while 
each continental theory of law is different, it is also the case that each continental 
approach is anti-foundationalist in the sense that for all continental approaches, the goal 
of locating law‟s ultimate legitimacy, authority, or meaning anywhere at all is understood 
as an exercise in futility.
8
 
The approach to continental jurisprudence known as critical legal studies is an 
example.  The critical legal studies movement was an intellectual movement in the late 
1970s and early 1980s which stood for the proposition that there is radical indeterminacy 
in the law.  Conceptually based in critical Marxism and the critical theory of the 
Frankfurt School , critical legal studies stands for the proposition that  legal doctrine is an 
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Similarly, for the legal interpretivist, that source is legal “principles.” 
 
7
 Some of the many approaches to continental jurisprudence, many of which overlap, 
include critical legal studies, Marxist legal theory, deconstruction, postmodernism, critical race 
theory, and feminist jurisprudence. 
 
8
 It is important here to point out that the line being drawn here between analytic and 
continental jurisprudence, while helpful in explaining the overall project (specifically the 
rationale for selecting legal hermeneutics as the method of legal interpretation) is in fact fuzzy 
and somewhat artificial, particularly on the question of in which category postmodern 
jurisprudence, critical race theory, and feminist jurisprudence fit.  Although these three 
approaches are not directly or explicitly theorized in terms of continental themes, postmodernist 
legal theory is indirectly and implicitly informed by post-structuralism and deconstruction; and 
critical race theory and feminist jurisprudence are implicitly and indirectly informed by both the 
critical legal studies movement and Marxist legal theory.  In addition, what all theories of law in 
the section on continental jurisprudence have in common is a rejection of epistemological 






empty shell.   There is no such thing as “the law,” for the critical legal theorist, 
understood as an entity that exists out of context (Binder 1996, 1999: 282).  Instead, law 
is produced by power differentials having their origins in differences in levels of property 
ownership.  The liberal ideal of the “rule of law” devoid of influence from power 
differentials (contained in all analytic approaches to jurisprudence) is an illusion.  For this 
reason, law is inherently self-contradictory and self-defeating and can never be a mere 
formality as liberal theory and analytic jurisprudence would have us believe.  This way of 
understanding the law is known as the “indeterminacy thesis.” 
Marxist legal theory begins with the work of Evgeny Pashukanis and takes place 
in contemporary form in the work of Alan Hunt, among others.  For Pashukanis, law is 
inextricably linked to capitalism and hopelessly bourgeois. Outside of capitalism, things 
like legal rights are unnecessary since outside of capitalism there are no conflicting 
interests or conflicting “rights” to be meted out or over which it is necessary for persons 
to fight.  In the socialist society that Pashukanis envisions on the other side of capitalism, 
what would take the place of law and all talk of individual rights would be a sort of quasi-
utilitarianism which values collective satisfaction over the perceived need to protect the 
individual interests of individual legal subjects (Pashukanis 1924).   What  contemporary 
Marxist legal theory retains from Pashukanis is the view that law is inescapably political, 
even merely one form of politics.  In this way, law is always potentially coercive and 
expressive of prevailing economic relations, and the content of law always manifests the 
interests of the dominant class (Hunt 1996, 1999: 355).  So described, the content of law 
for Marxist legal theorists has no basis, theoretical or practical, in anything 





Deconstructionist legal theories can be considered post-structuralist like critical 
legal studies but are unique in that they center around conceptual oppositions or “binary 
concepts”, also known as “binaries”.  According to the deconstructionist approach, within 
a given conceptual opposition, one term in the opposition has been traditionally 
“privileged” over the other in a particular context or “text.”  A “text” can be a written 
text, an argument, an historical tradition, or a social practice.  Jacques Derrida, 
considered the forerunner of deconstruction as a philosophy of language and  meaning, 
famously identified a conceptual opposition between writing and speech, for example, 
with writing being the privileged form  (Derrida 1976).   “Privileged” in deconstruction 
means more true, more valuable, more important, or more universal than the opposing 
term.  (Balkin, 1996, 1999: 368).  According to deconstructionist theories of law, legal 
distinctions are often masked conceptual oppositions which privilege one term over 
another.  For example, individualism is privileged over altruism, and universalizability is 
privileged over the attention to the particular that is an inherent part of equitable 
distribution.  These binary concepts and the privileging of one term in each binary lends 
an instability to the law, on deconstructionist terms, that is decidedly anti-foundationalist. 
Postmodernist legal theories are grounded in a 20
th
 century movement in aesthetic 
and intellectual thought which departed from interpretation based in universal truths, 
essences, and foundations.  Postmodern legal theory departs from a belief in the “rule of 
law” or any generalized or universalizable Grand Theory of Jurisprudence in favor of 
using “local, small-scale problem-solving strategies to raise new questions about the 
relation of law, politics, and culture.”  (Minda 1995: 3).  Other than this statement, it is 





of postmodernist legal theory is that generalized theories are vacuous, even impossible; 
that instead there are only individual theories, individual authors of theories, and 
individual texts/laws.  It is fair to say, however, that postmodern legal theorists generally 
resist the sort of conceptual theorization routinely practiced by more mainstream legal 
academics and analytic philosophers for the reason that more mainstream approaches 
unduly emphasize abstract theory at the expense of pragmatic concerns. (Ibid.)  The 
postmodern rejection of ultimate theories can be construed as a form of anti-
foundationalism. 
Critical race theorists are concerned with the particularized experiences of African 
Americans in American jurisprudence.  They share with the postmodernists a rejection of 
the idea of the existence of one grand and universally applicable theory of law that 
applies equally to everyone.  There is a hidden category of persons to whom the laws do 
not equally and universally apply, for the critical race theorists, and that category of 
persons is African Americans  (Minda 1995: 167).   Key themes in critical race theory are 
a call to contextualized theorizing about the law which acknowledges that the lives and 
experiences of African Americans in America have a very different juridical tenor than 
the lives and experiences of other Americans, a critique of political liberalism (which 
bases its apportionment of rights on what critical race theorists understand as the fiction 
that African Americans as a group are as capable in American society of accessing and 
vindicating those rights as other Americans), and a call for juridical acknowledgment of 
the persistence of racism in American society (Delgado 1995,: xv).  The critical race 
theorist‟s rejection of the existence of universally applicable law can also be construed as 





Feminist jurisprudence “[goes] beyond rules and precedents to explore the deeper 
structures of the law”  (Chamallas 2003: xix).  It operates under the belief that gender is a 
significant factor in American life and explores the ways in which gender, and related 
power dynamics between men and women throughout American legal history, have 
affected how American law has developed  (Ibid.)  Feminist jurisprudence concerns itself 
with legal issues of particular significance to women such as sexual harassment, domestic 
violence, and pay equity.  It also approaches legal theory in a way that comports with 
many women‟s lived experiences, i.e., without pretending, as mainstream jurisprudence 
tends to do, that gender is irrelevant to the outcome of legal disputes. (Ibid.)  Of primary 
concern to feminist legal scholars is the systemic nature of women‟s inequality and the 
pervasiveness of female subordination through law in America.  The methodology of 
feminist jurisprudence is the excavation and examination of hidden legalized mechanisms 
of discrimination to uncover hierarchies in law that operate to the detriment of the ideal 
of equal rights for women.  (Ibid.)  The feminist legal scholar‟s identification of hidden 
power dynamics at work in American law can be construed as yet another anti-
foundationalist perspective on law. 
Conclusion 
Within mainstream scholarship in philosophy of law, then, there is tension as to 
how best to find meaning in the law.  Whereas analytic jurisprudence grounds meaning in 
ultimate foundations, continental jurisprudence rejects the concept of ultimate, 
foundational, and universally applicable meaning outright.  Legal hermeneutics, by 
contrast, rejects the theoretical continuum in which this tension is thought to arise in 





same time foundationless and the closest thing possible to objective meaning.  As will be 
explained below, according to legal hermeneutics, this anti-method is grounded in what 
philosophical hermeneutics reveals as a set of facts about how the interpretive process 
necessarily takes place that lends a credibility to interpretations formulated through the 
hermeneutical process that no self-proclaimed method of legal interpretation can possibly 
achieve. 
Theoretical Foundations of Legal Hermeneutics in Philosophical Hermeneutics 
Introduction 
The question of how best to determine the meaning of a given text (not just a legal 
text) has always been the chief concern of the general field of inquiry known 
hermeneutics.  In this way, all of traditional philosophy of law, including both analytic 
and continental approaches, can be understood hermeneutic inquiry.  The term 
“hermeneutics” can be traced back at least as far as Ancient Greece.  David Hoy traces 
the origin of term “hermeneutics” to the Greek god, Hermes, who was, among other 
things, the inventor of language and an interpreter between the gods and humanity (Hoy 
1982).  In addition, the Greek term ἑρμηνεύω or “hermeneutice” is found in Aristotle‟s 
On Interpretation (Περὶ Ἑρμηνείαςas), which concerns the relationship between language 
and logic and meaning.
9
 Hermeneutics, broadly construed, concerns itself with the nature 
of understanding and is often equated with the art or science of interpretation. 
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 In On Interpretation, Aristotle wrote that spoken words are the symbols or signs 
(symbola) of impressions (pathemata) of the soul (psyche); and written words are the symbols of 
spoken words.   Although all people do not write or speak in the same way, Aristotle continued, 
the impressions of the soul themselves are the same for everyone. (Aristotle, approximately 350 
B.C.E., On Interpretation, 1.16
a
4; translated by E.M. Edghill). Paul Ricoeur has characterized On 





The specific subfield of hermeneutics known as philosophical hermeneutics, 
however, asks not only the question of how best to interpret a given text, but also the 
deeper question of what it means to interpret a text at all.  In other words, specifically 
philosophical hermeneutics takes as its object of inquiry the interpretive process itself and 
seeks interpretive practices designed to respect that process.
10
  Philosophical 
hermeneutics, then, can be alternately described as the philosophy of interpretation, the 
philosophy of understanding, or the philosophy of meaning.   The central problem of 
philosophical hermeneutics is how to successfully ascertain anything on the order of an 
objective interpretation/understanding/meaning of a given phenomenon or text in light of 
the apparent fact that all interpretation/understanding/meaning is ascertained through the 
filter of at least one interpreter‟s subjectivity.  (Bleicher 1980: 1).  Hermeneutics seeks a 
theory of interpretation that recognizes each act of understanding as an interpretation, 
captures the high degree of complexity and subtlety that is integral to the interpretive 
process, and at the same time accomplishes what is arguably the closest thing possible to 
an objective interpretation, understanding, or meaning.   
Origins:  Ast and Wolf 
Philosophical hermeneutics can be said to have its theoretical origins in the work 
of 19
th
 century German philologist Friedrich Ast.  Ast‟s Basic Elements of Grammar, 
Hermeneutics, and Criticism (Grundlinien der Grammatik, Hermeneutik und Kritik) of 
1808 contains an early articulation of the main components of what later became known 
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 The  philosophical hermeneuticist, then, is not committed, at least theoretically, to any 
particular interpretive method except to the extent that that method respects what the 
hermeneuticist sees as the incontrovertible reality of what takes place when anyone sets out to 





as the “hermeneutic circle.”
11
   There, Ast writes that the basic principle of all 
understanding is a cyclical process of coming to understand the parts through the whole 
and the whole through the parts.   This basic principle derives, for Ast, from the “original 
unity of all being” (Ast 1808: Section 72) or what Ast called “spirit” or Geist.
12
  To 
understand a text, for Ast, is to determine its inner meaning or spirit, its own internal 
development, through a circularity of reason, a dialectical relation between the parts of a 
given work and the whole  (Ast 1808: Section 76).   What Ast called the hermeneutic of 
the spirit involves, in turn, developing an understanding of the spirit of the writer and his 
or her era, and seeks to identify the “one idea”, or Grundidee, that unifies a given text, 
and that provides clarification regarding the relationship of the whole to the parts and the 
parts to the whole, with the interpreter always being cognizant of the historical period in 
which the text is situated. 
Friedrich August Wolf was a contemporary of Ast‟s and a fellow philologist.  His 
Lecture on the Encyclopedia of Classical Studies (Vorlesung über die Enzyklopädie der 
Altertumswissenschaft) of 1831 defined hermeneutics as the science of the rules by which 
the meaning of signs is determined.  These rules pointed, for Wolf, to a knowledge of 
human nature.  Both historical and linguistic facts have a proper role in the interpretive 
process, for Wolf, and help us to understand the organic whole that is the text.  For Wolf, 
however, the primary task of hermeneutics was not the identification of the Grundidee or 
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 Generally speaking, the phrase “hermeneutic circle” is meant to convey the view that 
an understanding of the whole cannot be had without an understanding of the parts, and an 
understanding of the parts cannot be had without an understanding of the whole.   
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focal point of the text à la Ast, but the much more practical goal of the achievement of a 
high level of communication or dialogue between the interpreter of the text and the 
author, as well as between the interpreter and those to whom the text was to be explained.   
Toward a General Hermeneutics:  Schleiermacher and Dilthey 
As mentioned above, although aspects of the hermeneutics of both Ast and Wolf 
have survived into contemporary philosophical hermeneutics, the hermeneutics of both 
are also generally understood to be concerned with what later became known as “regional 
hermeneutics”, or hermeneutics applicable to specific fields of study. Friedrich D. E. 
Schleiermacher, by contrast, was the first to define hermeneutics as the art of 
understanding itself, irrespective of field of study.  (Palmer 1969: 84).    Underlying and 
grounding the specific rules of interpretation of the various fields of study, for 
Schleiermacher, was a unity grounded in the fact that all interpretation takes place in 
language (Ibid.).  Schleirmacher thought that a general, rather than regional, 
hermeneutics was possible and that such a general hermeneutics would consist of the 
principles for understanding of language.  (Ibid.)  Specifically, for Schleiermacher, 
proper interpretation (understanding) was not merely a function of grasping the thoughts 
of the author, but of coming to grips with the extent to which the language in which the 
thoughts took place affected, constrained, and informed those thoughts.  Schleiermacher, 
then, is calling our philosophical attention to the fact that when we say we understand 
something, we are essentially just comparing it to something we already we know, most 
basically a given language.  To “understand” is to place something within a pre-existing 
context of intelligibility.  Understanding is therefore decidedly circular, for 





impossible.  Instead, circularity is how understanding is defined.   Understanding 
necessarily and structurally entails that the text and the interpreter share the same 
language and the same context of intelligibility. 
Wilhelm Dilthey continued Schleiermacher‟s pursuit of understanding qua 
understanding, but he sought to do so within the specific context of what he called the 
human sciences, or the Geisteswissenschaften  (Dilthey 1883). The methods of scientific 
knowledge, for Dilthey, were too “reductionist and mechanistic” to capture the fullness of 
human-created phenomena (Palmer 1969, 100).  The human sciences (or humanities) 
required instead two particular processes:  (1) the development of an appreciation for the 
role of historical consciousness in our conceptions of meaning, and (2) a recognition that 
human-created phenomena are generated from “life itself” rather than through theory or 
concepts (Ibid.).  In contemporary hermeneutic theory, the first process is often referred 
to as the “historicality” (Geschichtlichkeit) of meaning and the second as “life-
philosophy” (Lebensphilosophie), or the phenomenological view that 
meaning/understanding can only be had through lived experience (Erlebnis), through life 
itself; and not through the examination of concepts, theories, or other purely idealistic or 
rational methods (Nenon 1995). 
Language, Being, and Understanding:  Heidegger  
While Dilthey observed that the categorical methods of understanding useful in 
science were inappropriate for use in the human sciences, Martin Heidegger switched the 
entire hermeneutic enterprise from an epistemological focus to an ontological one.  This 
switch is customarily referred to as the “ontological turn” in hermeneutics.  For 





(Verstehen) can only be answered by first answering the question of the nature of what it 
means to be.   Accordingly, Heidegger sets out in Being and Time (2008/1962) to 
discover the nature of being qua being.  To do so Heidegger goes to the “things 
themselves” (die Sachen selbst), in keeping with the phenomenological methodology he 
learned from his teacher, Edmund Husserl.   Heidegger calls this phenomenological 
inquiry into the nature of being qua being “fundamental ontology.”  He also calls it 
“hermeneutic ontology,” which highlights that for Heidegger being and interpretation are 
inextricably linked almost to the point of identity. 
This concept is arguably best captured in two of Heidegger‟s key concepts:  
Dasein  and being-in-the-world.  Dasein  can be roughly translated as the human way of 
being but its literal translation is “being there” or “being here.”  With these concepts, 
Heidegger is attempting to stress that the human way of being is interactive both with 
one‟s environment and with others in the world.  To be human is to be active and 
involved in one‟s world and with other people, rather than to be in a particular static state.  
There are no isolated human subjects separate from the world, for Heidegger, and the 
human way of being is not adequately characterized by the traditional philosophical 
distinction between subject and object, or between subject and other subjects that 
originates for Heidegger in Descartes‟s Meditations.  Instead, being, for humans, is 
“being-in-the-world”, a term meant to highlight the lack of clear barriers between human 
beings and the contexts, or schemas of intelligibility, in which they find themselves. 
According to Heidegger, what this means for the phenomenon of understanding is 
that it is always a function of how a given human being is in the world.  The relationship 





to us what it means to be, and who we are affects how we understand things.  In other 
words, understanding for Heidegger is not a sort of apprehension of the “way things 
really are,” as the canonical modern philosophical tradition might think of it, but rather it 
is the process of appreciating the manner in which things are there for a particular person, 
or group of persons, in the world.  Further, the manner in which things are there for us in 
the world is a function primarily of shared social and cultural practices.  To “understand” 
something, then, is to be able to place it within a schema of intelligibility which is 
generated by the shared social and cultural practices in which one finds oneself. 
Dialogue:  Gadamer 
In his Truth and Method (1975), Hans-George Gadamer picks up on Heidegger‟s 
concept of the hermeneutic circle of understanding that is at the core of what it means to 
be human in the world (to being what Heidegger called Dasein), but while it is true that 
Gadamer works within the Heideggerian paradigm to the extent that he fully accepts the 
ontological turn in hermeneutics (Ramberg and Gjesdal 2009), Gadamer‟s own stated 
project in Truth and Method is to get at the question of understanding qua understanding.  
Specifically, Gadamer observes that the traditional paths to truth are wrong-headed and 
run antithetical to the reality that being and interpretive understanding are intertwined.  In 
the traditional paths to truth, truth and method are at odds.  The methods used in the 
tradition will not get us to truth.  These methods are critical interpretation (traditional 
hermeneutics) and the Enlightenment focus on reason as the path to truth.  Both of these 
methods have what Gadamer calls a “prejudice against prejudice.”  That is, they both fail 
to acknowledge the role of the interpreter in determining truth.  Traditional critical 





holds on to the fiction that the meaning of the text can be found in the original intent of 
the author or in the words of the text themselves.  The Enlightenment focus on reason is 
an equally inadequate path to truth because it retains the subject/object distinction and 
thinks the path to truth is through the scientific method, both of which are wrong-headed.   
For Gadamer, the word “prejudice” (Vorurteile) means the same thing as 
Heidegger‟s fore-structure of understanding.  Gadamer claims that today‟s negative 
connotation of prejudice only develops with the Enlightenment (Schmidt 2006: 100).  
The original meaning of “prejudice,” according to Gadamer was simply “prejudgment,” 
something that is neither positive nor negative.  A prejudice is simply a view we hold, 
either consciously or unconsciously.  All understanding necessarily starts with prejudices. 
The prejudices of the interpreter, for Gadamer, rather than being a barrier to truth, 
actually facilitate its generation; for the prejudices of the interpreter – or the pre-
judgments of the interpreter held as a result of the interpreter‟s personal facticity – not 
only contribute to the generation of the question being raised in the first instance, but if 
taken into account on the path to truth, are then capable of being critically evaluated and 
revised, with the result that the quality of the interpretation is improved.  Additionally, 
prejudices are either legitimate or illegitimate.  Legitimate prejudices lead to 
understanding.  Illegitimate prejudices do not.  One of the goals of Truth and Method is 
to provide a theoretically sound basis upon which to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate prejudices (Schmidt 2006: 102).  Understanding or meaning, for Gadamer, is 
a function of legitimate prejudices.  
The model for how understanding operates, for Gadamer, is the conversation or 





that occurs, and occurs inside of a tradition. Tradition operates as a sort of 
Weltanschauung, or  worldview,  a framework of ideas and beliefs through which a given 
culture experiences and interprets the world.  Tradition in this Gadamerian sense is a 
theoretical grandchild of what Ast called a given text‟s Grundidee or one idea that unified 
it.  For Gadamer, a legitimate prejudice is a prejudice that survives throughout time, 
eventually becoming  a central part of a given culture, part of its tradition.  Understanding 
or meaning is an event, a happening, the substance of which is a fusion of this narrowly 
defined concept of tradition and the prejudices of the interpreter.  In this sense, 
understanding is not willed by the participants.  If it were, the dialogue would not be 
authentic and understanding/meaning could never be achieved.  Instead, the conversation 
itself wills the path to understanding.  The thing itself reveals the truth. What happens is 
that in the course of a given conversation, and as a direct and organic result of the things 
themselves being discussed by the particular participants to the conversation, a question 
arises.  This question becomes the matter at hand, the topic of the conversation.  As the 
conversation proceeds, the answer will show up as well, and it will be a function of the 
“fusion of horizons” between the perspectives  or “prejudices” of the participants in the 
conversation (Gadamer 1975).  This fusion is understanding/meaning.  It is the answer to 
the question and the closest thing there is to truth.  In this way, both the things themselves 
and the participants in the conversation themselves together generate both the topic at 
hand (the question) and the answer; both the things themselves and the participants in the 
conversation together generate the “truth” of the matter, and all of this takes place within 





It is important that for  Gadamer the path to truth is phenomenological, i.e., we 
must go to the things themselves, and the path is also hermeneutic in that it appreciates 
that the prejudice against prejudice is unavoidable.  Every interpreter arrives at a text 
with what Gadamer calls a given “horizon” (or conglomeration of prejudices) which is 
analogous to a Heideggerian “world” or “fore-structure of understanding” and which I 
have described as a given schema of intelligibility in which an interpreter finds himself or 
herself.  A Gadamerian horizon is a shared system of social and cultural practices that 
provide the scope of what shows up as meaningful for an interpreter and for how things 
show up as well.  Picking up on the hermeneutic circle, Gadamer holds that an act of 
understanding is always interpretive.   
Another key element of Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics – one that is 
related to his insistence that we cannot ignore the role of the interpreter and the 
interpreter‟s prejudices in any interpretation --  is Gadamer‟s insistence that 
interpretation/understanding/meaning cannot take place outside of practical application.  
Interpretation is more than mere explication for Gadamer.  It is more than mere exegesis.   
Beyond these things, interpretation of a given text – and it is important that everything is 
a text – always and necessarily takes place through the lens of present concerns and 
interests.  The interpreter always and necessarily¸ in other words, comes to the table of 
the interpretive conversation or dialogue with a present concern that is grounded in the 
epistemological/metaphysical horizon  in which the interpreter dwells.  In this way, for 
Gadamer, Aristotle got it right that understanding necessarily occurs through practical 





given universal in itself and then afterward applying it to a concrete case.  It is the very 
understanding of the universal….itself” (Gadamer 1975).   
But, even more important than this, for Gadamer, the distance in time between the 
interpreter and the text is not a barrier to understanding but that which enables it.  
Temporal distance between text and interpretation is a “positive and productive condition 
enabling understanding”  (Gadamer 1975).   When we seek to interpret a text, we are 
trying to figure out not the author’s original intent but “what the text has to say to us” 
(Schmidt 2006: 104)
13
  and this is a function of the extent to which the author‟s original 
intent and the meaning generated by the contemporary context and the contemporary 
interpreter agree, i.e., the extent to which the “horizons” of the author and the instant 
interpreter fuse or blend. 
Post-Gadamerian Philosophical Hermeneutics 
Post-Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics takes many forms.  I have selected 
five particular versions which I think fairly outline the main themes and ideas at work on 
the contemporary scene, and which, together with the more classic hermeneutical 
theorists already discussed, provide the theoretical basis for the kind of legal 
hermeneutics I have selected for the instant project. 
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 Gadamer specifically discusses legal hermeneutics in Truth and Method.  He writes 
that there are two commonly understood ways of determining meaning in the law.  The first is 
when a judge decides a case.  In such a scenario, the judge must necessarily factor the present 
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 Post-Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics begins with Emilio Betti. Finding 
what he saw as an epistemological relativism in the philosophical hermeneutics of 
Gadamer, Betti returns to the general hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey and 
resists the tide of the ontological turn (Pinton 1972, 1973).  Betti was a legal theorist who 
tried to bring the hermeneutic project back to one of interpretation without reference to 
the human way of being.  Betti believed in and sought objective understanding or 
objective interpretation (Auslegung), while at the same time stressing that texts reflected 
human intentions.  Accordingly, he thought it was possible to ascertain “the meaning” of 
the text through replicating the original creative process, the train of thought, so to speak, 
of the text‟s author.  Betti believed in the “autonomy” of the text (Bleicher 1980: 58) and 
the autonomy values.  Objective interpretation was possible, for him, but this objectivity 
was based both in terms of a priori epistemological existence à la Plato‟s forms, and in 
terms of historical and cultural coherence.  (Bleicher 1980: 28-29). 
 Habermas 
 Jürgen Habermas, like Emilio Betti, seeks objective understanding 
(Habermas1971), but, unlike Betti and in agreement with  Gadamer, Habermas believes 
that hermeneutics is not and cannot be merely a matter of trying to find the best method 
of interpretation.  Instead, objectivity of interpretation is grounded in something 
Habermas called “communicative action,”
14
  a sort of Gadamerian dialogue modified by 
the recognition that power imbalances often distort what passes for collective 
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understanding, and that real consensus – the closest thing available to truth and/or 
objective understanding– can only be had where that consensus has been generated 
impartially and in circumstances where agreement has been unconstrained, and where 
everyone affected by a given disputed issue has been included in the conversation.  While 
Gadamer‟s philosophical hermeneutics grounded a kind of quasi-objectivity in the 
authority of tradition, however, Habermas found this approach insufficiently able to 
guide social liberation and progress.  The task of hermeneutics is not merely to 
deconstruct the process of understanding and/or to somehow ground that understanding 
in either method à la Betti or tradition à la Habermas, but to determine rules of 
ascertaining universal validity in the social sciences en route to social change.  In this 
way, Habermas‟s hermeneutics claims that hermeneutics can and does permit the kind of 
value judgments of which some critics say hermeneutics is incapable. 
 Ricoeur 
 Paul Ricoeur was a contemporary philosophical hermeneuticist who is known for 
creating what is often described as a “critical hermeneutics.”  For Ricoeur, meaning and 
understanding are to be obtained through culture and narrative, as these take place in 
time.  Influenced by Freud, Ricoeur thought all ideology required a critique to uncover 
repressed and hidden meanings that exist behind surface meanings which pass for truth.    
In The Conflict of Interpretations (1974), Ricoeur argued that there were many and 
various paths to understanding and that each uniquely adds to meaning.   
 Derrida 
 The work of Jacques Derrida (Derrida 1976, 1978) is more commonly associated 
with a 20
th





philosophical hermeneutics per se.  However, there are important similarities between the 
two movements.  First, deconstruction on its own terms, like hermeneutics, is not a 
method.  Instead, deconstruction is a critique of authoritative systems of intelligibility or 
meaning that exposes the hierarchies of power within those systems.  In understanding 
itself as outside of existing theoretical schemas, in other words, Derrida‟s deconstruction 
is within the hermeneutic tradition.  Second, deconstruction is based on Heidegger‟s 
concept of Destruktion, a central concept in his hermeneutic ontology.  But, while 
Heidegger‟s Destrucktion (meaning a project of critiquing authoritative systems of 
meaning that are based on structures of foundationalist metaphysics or epistemology) 
concludes that every act of understanding is an act of interpretation (Heidegger, 
2008/1962), Derrida‟s deconstruction involves identifying that language (“text”) contains 
conceptual oppositions that involve the prioritizing of one side of a given conceptual 
opposition over the other (e.g. writing over speech).  Still, Derrida‟s deconstruction is 
clearly in the hermeneutic tradition in that it is designed to highlight the elliptical and 
enigmatic nature of language and meaning.  This is particularly evident in Derrida‟s 
concept of différance, according to which every word in a given language implicates 
other words, which implicate other words, in a process of infinite reference and therefore 
what Derrida calls “absence” (meaning an absence of definitive meaning). 
 Hoffman 
 Susan-Judith Hoffman argues that Gadamerian hermeneutics furthers feminist 
objectives, and can be understood as a form of feminist theorizing.  Highlighting 
Gadamer‟s account of the importance of difference, his notion of understanding as an 





that must always remain provisional, his account of tradition as that which is transformed 
by our reflection, and its account of language (Hoffman, 2003: 103), Hoffman argues that 
Gadamer‟s philosophical hermeneutics is in line with feminist theorizing in that it 
“overthrows the false universalism of the natural sciences as the privileged model of 
human understanding….” (Ibid.: 81).   In the process, Gadamer‟s hermeneutics amounts 
to feminist theorizing in two important ways.  First, it contains a sensitivity to the 
historical and cultural situatedness of knowledge and knowledge seekers, and second, it 
contains the “critical power” to challenge reductive universalizing tendencies in 
traditional canons of thought (Ibid.: 82).  That Gadamer‟s philosophical hermeneutics 
contained these last two elements was insisted upon by Gadamer himself, who saw his 
philosophical hermeneutics as a critique the Enlightenment view that truth could be had 
through abstract reasoning, divorced from historical considerations; as well as a call for 
the acknowledgment that the path to truth was through the particular rather than through 
the universal  (Gadamer 1975). 
Conclusion 
In summary, the following themes emerge from a bird‟s eye view of philosophical 
hermeneutics.  First, ever since Aristotle, hermeneutics has been the study of the nature 
of understanding and the relationship between understanding and interpretation.  Aristotle 
saw, and the later hermeneuticists have all agreed, that there is no act of understanding 
that is not also an act of interpretation. Friedrich Ast showed that the basic dynamic of all 
acts of understanding is a cyclical process of coming to understand the parts through the 
whole and the whole through the parts, or what is known as the hermeneutic circle.  Ast 





force, main theme or idea, or Grundidee.  Schleiermacher added that interpretation was 
not something that one did in specific ways within specific fields, but something that 
necessarily takes place in every single attempt at understanding all the time and in every 
field of inquiry.  Schleirmacher also showed that this was the case by pointing out that 
every act of understanding/interpretation takes place within a given language.  To find 
“meaning,” we compare the text to things we already know, or to understandings we 
already accept as legitimate. Dilthey added the necessary historicality of all meaning or 
understanding, that understanding can only take place through lived experience, and that 
central to the relationship between lived experience and understanding or meaning is 
temporality.  
 Through his “fundamental ontology,” Heidegger brilliantly identified the 
fundamental relationship between (human) existence and interpretation.  Meaning, 
Heidegger showed, was not ascertained, but created by the manner in which human 
beings interact with the world and with each other.  Gadamer added to philosophical 
hermeneutics the idea that authentic meaning is ascertained through dialogue, that both 
the question and the answer emerge as a consequence of the interacting schemas of 
intelligibility (“horizons”) of the participants to a given conversation.  Betti reminds us 
that the hermeneutic goal is not relative meaning but objective meaning.  Habermas adds 
to the concept of Gadamerian dialogue that we need to be cognizant of any power 
imbalances within a given dialogue or conversation, and calls us to use the tools of 
hermeneutics to generate social change.  Ricoeur reinforces the roles of culture, narrative 
and time in meaning, and calls us to be on the lookout for hidden and repressed 





by a given culture, language or time period, but no less legitimate.  Finally, Susan-Judith 
Hoffman calls our attention to the fact that hermeneutics is in line with feminist 
theorizing and may be very helpful at achieving feminist objectives. 
The Main Goals and Processes of Legal Hermeneutics 
Legal hermeneutics provides an alternative to traditional philosophy of law in that 
its approach to legal meaning can be understood to avoid engagement with the question 
of foundationalism that is characteristic of the traditional approaches.  Indeed, legal 
hermeneutics can be understood as capturing the strengths of both the foundationalist and 
anti-foundationalist approaches while avoiding the weaknesses of situating the question 
of meaning along the antifoundationalist/foundationalist continuum.   
Legal hermeneutics applies the themes and approaches of philosophical 
hermeneutics to the specific question of how best to ascertain the meaning of legal texts.  
Rather than offering up a new theory of law, legal hermeneutics “provides us with the 
necessary protocols for determining meaning” (Douzinas, Warrington, and McVeigh 
1992: 30).  Legal hermeneutics provides no specific protocol or theory of law, privileges 
no particular methodology or ideology.  Instead, legal hermeneutics calls the interpreter 
of legal texts first and foremost to the fact that every act of understanding a law is an act 
of interpretation; and at the same time highlights that the best interpretation is necessarily 
the interpretation that takes conscious and proactive account of what philosophical 
hermeneutics reveals as the necessary structures and components of the interpretive 
process itself. 
Legal hermeneutics, then, is more a way of clarifying the nature of legal 





acts not only as a middle ground, but as a refreshing alternative to the stand-off between 
the foundationalism of the analytic tradition and the anti-foundationalism of the 
continental tradition in the philosophy of law.  It incorporates both the strengths of the 
analytic tradition (a search for “objective” meaning) and the strengths of the continental 
tradition (a call to context, language, history, time, power, and particularity) in an attempt 
to find meaning in the law that takes sober account – unlike any of the formal interpretive 
“methods” -- of the necessary structure of the interpretive process itself. 
Contemporary Approaches to Legal Hermeneutics in Constitutional Theory 
Introduction 
Legal hermeneutics as a theory of constitutional interpretation can be traced back 
to the publication of Francis Lieber‟s 19
th
 century work, Legal and Political 
Hermeneutics  (Lieber 1880).  There, Lieber tried to identify principles of legal 
interpretation that would bring consistency and objectivity to the interpretation of the 
U.S. Constitution (Mootz 1992: 117)  while at the same time exposing strict intentionalist 
interpretative methods as incoherent (Binder and Weisberg 2000: 48).
 15
  Over a hundred 
and twenty-five years after Lieber‟s landmark text, contemporary legal hermeneutics in 
constitutional theory retains Lieber‟s goal of objectivity of interpretation, as well as his 
attention to the roles of history, temporality, politics, and socio-historical context in any 
attempt to “understand” a legal text.   
The question of the nature of legal interpretation is central to constitutional 
theory.  As many jurists have observed, before we can decide what the constitution 
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means, we must first decide the best interpretive method.  The choice of method is 
constrained to a large extent for a given theorist by where that theorist fits on a 
methodological continuum between two loosely defined but fundamentally opposed 
approaches to constitutional interpretation that can be called for purposes of the present 
discussion “originalism” and “non-originalism.”
16
  Originalism is the view, generally, 
that the meaning of the constitution is to be found by determining the original intent of 
the Framers, understood to be most prudently found in the text of the constitution itself.
17
  
By contrast, non-originalism is the view, generally, that the constitution is a “living, 
breathing document” meant more as a set of guidelines for future lawmakers than as a 
strict rulebook demanding literal compliance.  
 In the realm of constitutional theory, legal hermeneutics is unique and somewhat 
revolutionary in that it not only refuses to align itself with either pole on the 
methodological continuum between originalism and non-originalism, it goes one step 
further and rejects the continuum itself as wrong-headed.
18
  Indeed, legal hermeneutics 
rejects interpretive method altogether in favor instead of a call to an increased level of 
self-reflexivity on the part of the interpreter meant to actively and consciously engage her 
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 This approach has recently been called “textualism” by Supreme Court Justice Antonin 
Scalia and others (Scalia 1997). 
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 A legal hermeneutical approach to constitutional theory, then, calls the interpreter 
of the constitution to consciously recognize the roles of the identity of the interpreter, the 
identity of previous interpreters, the identity of the original author, the socio-historical 
context in which the text was written, the socio-historical context in which the 
interpretation is taking place,  the political climate at the time the text was written, the 
political climate in which the interpretation is taking place, the extent to which the 
meaning of words and concepts relevant to the interpretation have changed or have not 
changed over time, the particularity of experience of those affected by a given law, the 
extent to which that experience is acknowledged or unacknowledged by previous 
interpretations, the relationship between who one is and who one takes oneself to be and 
the kinds of interpretive choices one makes, and various other factors which legal 
hermeneutics takes to necessarily affect the quality of the communicative enterprise 
between the interpreter and the legal text in any attempt to understand or determine the 
“meaning” of the constitution.  In addition, legal hermeneutics asks the interpreter to 
acknowledge up front what it sees as the necessary truth that original meaning is an 
illusion and cannot be ascertained.  With that acknowledged, the interpreter is then free to 
self-consciously examine the extent to which her own prejudices enter into her attempt at 
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ascertaining meaning, to add a level of self-reflexivity to the interpretive enterprise that 
can only improve the quality of the interpretation. 
Political Theory 
For Gregory Leyh, legal hermeneutics reveals to us the political nature of every 
act of constitutional interpretation. This includes both originalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation as well as nonoriginalist approaches.  However, for Leyh, 
legal hermeneutics also provides us with some constructive lessons for improving the 
quality of our necessarily political acts of interpretation.  Specifically, in “Toward a 
Constitutional Hermeneutics,” Leyh makes the case for a legal hermeneutics based in the 
philosophical hermeneutics of Hans- George Gadamer (Gadamer 1975) in which, as the 
self-understanding of the interpreters of legal texts is increased, so is the quality of the 
interpretation produced by those interpreters (Leyh 1992). This self-understanding would 
include primarily an explicit acknowledgment of the role that history plays in the 
development of both understanding and meaning (Ibid.: 370), an explicit 
acknowledgment of the “irreducible conditions of all human knowing” (Ibid.: 371), and 
attentiveness to the kinds of issues characteristically associated with the interpretation of 
all texts, including legal texts. (Ibid.)  For Leyh, a call to the constitution‟s “original 
meaning”, á la a standard originalist approach, for example, entails certain assumptions 
about historical understanding (e.g. that it is fixed and identifiable by subsequent 
interpreters) which legal hermeneutics exposes as impossible.  What constitutional 
theorists need, for Leyh, is not greater insight into the intent of the framers, for this is not 
obtainable, but deeper reflection on the issue of the conditions that make historical 





ontological task, namely, that of identifying the ineluctable relationships between text 
and reader, past and present, that allow for understanding to occur in the first place.” 
(Ibid.)  
There are two key aspects to Leyh‟s legal hermeneutics: (1) an appreciation for 
the role of language in understanding, which sharpens our awareness of the “historical 
structures constitutive of all knowledge,” and (2) a recognition of the “enabling character 
of our prejudgments and preconceptions as windows to the past” (Ibid.: 372).  Taking 
these things into consideration, it is impossible, according to Leyh, for us to obtain an 
understanding of historical texts such as the constitution without going through the 
language we use today, as well as our present day prejudgments and preconceptions, or 
what Hans-George Gadamer called our “prejudices.”  For Leyh, all reason is historical 
and there is a historicity to all inquiry (Ibid.: 375).
20
  Rather than understanding the 
historicity of all inquiry as an impediment between the contemporary interpreter and the 
text, however, Leyh suggests that this information should aid us in recognizing that 
reason “finds its expression only as it is applied concretely” (Ibid.).  In other words, 
interpretation is always practical, it always occurs in a particular set of circumstances, at 
a particular time and place, and applies itself to a particular set of facts.  An 
acknowledgement of this reality on the part of the interpreter, for Leyh, adds a level of 
awareness vis-à-vis the interpretive process that can only aid in making sound judgments 
of constitutional interpretation. 
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The Law and Literature Movement 
Legal hermeneutics is sometimes understood as a branch of what is known as the 
“law and literature” movement which began in the late 1980s and continues today in the 
work of Stanley Fish, Richard Rorty, Gerald Bruns, and Owen Fiss, to name a few 
representative theorists. While legal hermeneutics based in political theory is primarily 
influenced by the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, legal hermeneutics based in literary 
theory is primarily influenced by the deconstructionist philosophy of Jacques Derrida 
(Derrida 1990, 1992).  The literary legal hermeneuticist, in other words, has developed an 
appreciation for the costs of excluding certain types of questions from the process of 
ascertaining meaning in the law (Sanford and Levinson, 1988: xi), and there is an active 
attempt on the part of the literary legal hermeneuticist to dismantle or undo the 
conventional illusion that the structures that support claims to authentic, legitimate or 
official meaning are built on solid ground.  The role of the interpreter is also highlighted 
in these approaches, as is the inextricability of determinations of meaning from the power 
dynamics in which they take place. 
Jurisprudence Proper 
The work of George H. Taylor, Francis J. Mootz, III, William Poteat, and John T. 
Valauri is at the vanguard of contemporary legal hermeneutics within the realm of 
jurisprudence proper.  George Taylor‟s work in legal hermeneutics follows Ricoeur‟s in 
philosophical hermeneutics.  In his, “Hermeneutics and Critique in Legal Practice,” 
Taylor argues that Ricoeur‟s approach to hermeneutics gets it right when it attempts to 







   Understanding, on this view, is obtained through hermeneutic methods but 
explanation is obtained through science.   Ricoeur, according to Taylor, sees the 
interpretive enterprise as containing both elements.  The way Taylor sees it, Ricoeur‟s 
emphasis on the narrative nature of meaning acknowledges the roles of both 
understanding and explanation in a successful interpretation (Taylor 2000,: 1123). The 
usefulness of legal hermeneutics, for Taylor, is that it correctly identifies and brings to 
the forefront that there is explanation/fact in understanding/interpretation and there is 
understanding/interpretation in explanation/fact; shedding a kind of glaring light on all 
“understandings” that might deny this reality.  The goals of originalism, on this view, are 
simply impossible to reach. 
Francis J. Mootz, III agrees with Taylor about the impossibility of our ability to 
ascertain the “original” meaning.  Accordingly, instead of engaging in what he 
understands as the necessarily fruitless exercise of attempting to ascertain original 
meaning, Mootz argues, we should instead attempt to find the interpretation that “allows 
the text to be most fully realized in the present situation”  (Mootz 1988: 605).   
David Hoy‟s take on legal hermeneutics involves a focused critique of the 
“intentionalist” position in constitutional theory, according to which the so-called “intent 
of the framers” is the ultimate authority on constitutional meaning (Hoy 1992).  For Hoy, 
while the intentionalist believes that no interpretation is needed to locate the intent of the 
framers, the hermeneuticist understands that the concept of intended meaning 
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presupposes a prior understanding of “meaning” in a different sense of the word.  The 
concept of an ambiguous sentence highlights this prior understanding of “meaning.”  A 
given sentence can have two different “meanings” in this prior sense, Hoy explains, 
whether either or both of them were “intended” or not (Hoy 1992: 175).  The 
hermeneuticist acknowledges, in other words, according to Hoy, a difference between 
sentence meaning and speaker‟s meaning.  However, while the intentionalist incorrectly 
presumes that there are only two possible bases for a theory of meaning, intention and 
convention (Ibid.), the hermeneuticist understands that there can be no fact of the matter 
vis-à-vis sentence meaning.  Hoy writes,   
 
“[Hermeneutics] acknowledges semantic complexity.  It does not exclude 
questions about intention when these are relevant to interpretation, but it 
believes that since textual meaning is not reducible to intended meaning, 
there are many other kinds of questions that can be asked about texts”  
 
(Hoy 1992: 178).  At the same time, Hoy‟s hermeneutics stands for the proposition that 
the traditional way that law is practiced operates as a constraint on judicial discretion, it 
provides a schema of intelligibility in which a judge must necessarily decide a case.  As 
Hoy indicates, using discretion to decide what the law means within the tradition of the 
practice of law is what judges do all the time.  “Only when the judges know that the law 
entails one decision and they nevertheless decide something else could they be said to be 
rewriting,” writes Hoy (Hoy 1992: 183), and the hermeneutic claim is that this is almost 
never the case.
22
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If Hoy is right, then, as Leyh points out as well, there is no act of judicial 
interpretation that takes place without interpretation.  Such a possibility is an 
illusion.  Instead, all acts of “understanding” are acts of interpretation including 
originalist and/or intentionalist acts of understanding. 
 
Conclusion:  Anti-Method  
 Legal hermeneutics, then, is an approach to legal texts (and legal issues) which 
understands that the legal text is always historically embedded and contextually 
informed, so that it is not possible to understand the law simply as a product of reason 
and argument.  Instead, meaning in the law takes place according practical, material, and 
context-dependent factors such as power, social relations, racial and sexual differences 
and other contingent considerations.  As Gerald Bruns has put it: 
“Legal hermeneutics is what occurs in the give-and-take – the dialogue – 
between meaning and history.  The historicality of the law means that its 
meaning is always supplemented whenever the law is understood.  This 
understanding is always situated, always an answer to some unique 
question that needs deciding, and so is different from the understanding 
of the law in its original meaning, say, the understanding a legal historian 
would have in figuring the law in terms of the situation in which it was 
originally handed down.  The historicality of the law means that its 
meaning is always supplemented whenever it is understood or 
interpreted.  Supplementation always takes the form of self-
understanding; that is, it is generated by the way we understand ourselves 
– how we see and judge ourselves – in light of the law.  But, this self-
understanding throws its light on the law in turn, allowing us to grasp the 
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This seems to mean, at a minimum, that every Supreme Court decision is indeed an 
interpretation, which directly undermines all originalist approaches to constitutional 
theory. 
The claim that every Supreme Court decision is an act of interpretation, however, 
is not a claim about the indeterminacy of meaning itself, but a more modest claim about 
the impossibility of ascertaining original meaning.  The difference between these two 
positions is subtle but important.  While for the non-originalist, the possibility of 
authoritative meaning is an illusion, for the legal hermeneuticist authoritative meaning 
exists and is a function of the interpreter‟s taking conscious account of several key factors 
which inform and shape the interpretive process.  Taking conscious account of each of 
these factors when attempting to interpret a given legal text lends to the interpretative 
process a sort of legitimacy and authority the possibility of which most non-originalist 
positions deny, together with a level of objectivity (or quasi-objectivity) not achievable or 
even possible through mainstream interpretive methods. 
 Legal hermeneutics, then, can be understood as an anti-method in constitutional 
theory.  As Gregory Leyh has, I think correctly, identified, “[h]ermeneutics neither 
supplies a method for correctly reading texts nor underwrites an authoritative 
interpretation of any given text, legal or otherwise…..”  (Leyh 1992: xvii).  Instead, “the 
activity of questioning and adopting a suspicious attitude toward authority is at the heart 
of hermeneutical discourse.  Hermeneutics involves confronting the aporias that face us, 
and it attempts to undermine, at least in partial ways, the calm assurances transmitted by 





In the next chapter, I will use legal hermeneutics to “lay bare” or untangle the 
morass of contradictions that is Suspect Classification Doctrine.  The goal of Chapter 4 
will be to “understand” the Equal Protection Clause (to ascertain what legal hermeneutics 
might reveal as the closest thing to anything on the order of an objective “meaning” of 
the Clause) in a way that is more in keeping with what actually takes place when a given 
interpreter sits down to determine a given law‟s meaning than Suspect Classification 
Doctrine accomplishes.  As will be outlined in more detail in the introduction to Chapter 
4, this means that in the next chapter, I will attempt to develop two specific 
hermeneutical dialogues on the question of what the Equal Protection Clause means using 
the hermeneutical tools outlined in this chapter.  Each of the dialogues is an outgrowth of 
philosophical hermeneutics and each of the tools has been identified by philosophical 
hermeneutics as a necessary structural component of the interpretive process.  Although 
the reader will be able to discern a particular pattern in the way I approach the dialogues, 
it is important that the approach taken should not be understood to be the only approach 
to legal interpretation consistent with the principles of legal hermeneutics.  Instead, the 
approach should be understood to be one of many possible  hermeneutically credible 
approaches.  For, one of the key features of legal hermeneutics is that it does not and 
cannot advocate any particular method.  Instead, legal hermeneutics is integrally and 
therefore always open to new interpretive paths and avenues, always exploratory.  Legal 





“What does it mean to be a philosopher of African descent in the American 
empire?...We begin with a historicist sensibility, by which I mean that we 
do something our colleagues often find very difficult to do:  we read history 




Chapter 4: Application:  A Legal Hermeneutical Investigation into the Meaning 
of the Equal Protection Clause 
Introduction 
 
Rather than just another formal method of legal interpretation, legal hermeneutics 
was revealed instead, in Chapter 3, to be a set of interpretive tools based in philosophical 
hermeneutics and implemented for the purpose of generating meaning in the law that 
recognizes and lays bare many of the key features influencing credible meaning that other 
approaches to legal interpretation ignore.   Specifically, a legal hermeneutical approach to 
meaning in the law adds to what I have placed under the general category of analytic 
approaches a recognition that the ascertainment of value-neutral meaning is impossible.  
Similarly, a legal hermeneutical approach to meaning in the law adds to what I have 
placed under the general category of continental approaches a recognition that there is 
something called the spirit of the text that constrains that which can properly called a 
credible interpretation of a given law.  Together, these two recognitions mean that neither 
originalism nor non-originalism is an approach to constitutional meaning that respects the 
nature of the interpretative process as much as legal hermeneutics does, with the 
implication that neither originalism nor non-originalism provides as credible an 
interpretation of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause as legal hermeneutics does.   
This is particularly so because the power of legal hermeneutics, arguably, is 
twofold.  First, legal hermeneutics exposes originalism not just as wrong-headed but as 
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based in fantasy, specifically, the fantasy that original meaning (or “original intent” in the 
parlance of constitutional theory) is obtainable.  What this means it that all Supreme 
Court decisions that claim to generate their authority from being based on the original 
intent of the Framers are revealed to be as value-laden as any other Supreme Court 
decision.
2
  It follows, then, that decisions based in “original intent” are as subject to 
hermeneutical deconstruction as any other Supreme Court decision – perhaps more -- 
owing to originalism‟s hubristic failure to acknowledge the role (however large or small 
in a given case) of the interpretive predispositions
3
 of the Supreme Court justices.
4
  
Second, legal hermeneutics provides us with tools for prioritizing previous or existing 
interpretations of a given legal text (in this case the Equal Protection Clause), providing a 
basis that non-originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation do not provide for 
deciding what something on the order of an objective (i.e., non-subjective) assessment of 
meaning might be within what I have called a given interpretive moment.  Chief among 
these tools is the concept of the spirit of the text, a concept that legal hermeneutics tell us 
is flexible enough to accommodate change over time but stable enough to be helpful for 
the purpose of operating as an interpretive guide in a given interpretive moment.   
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 i.e., just as value-laden as those decisions originalists would label “judicial activism.” 
 
3
a/k/a Husserlian “life-worlds”, Heideggarian “worlds” and “forestructures of 
understanding,” Gadamerian “prejudices” and “horizons”, etc. 
 
4
 Recall from Chapter 2 that deconstructionist legal hermeneuticists (those involved in the 
Law and Literature Movement) have highlighted the costs of excluding certain types of questions 
from the search for meaning in the law.  The primary type of question, arguably, that an advocate 
of original intent fails to ask, on this view, is How are my own prejudices factoring into the 
determination of meaning (the assessment of what “the Framers intended”) I am at present 





In Chapter 4, then, I will apply legal hermeneutical tools to the question of what 
the Equal Protection Clause means in a way meant to account for the spirit of the text, the 
contemporary context, and the various schemas of intelligibility (Gadamerian prejudices, 
Heideggarian fore-structures of understanding, existentialist facticities) of the Supreme 
Court Justices generating previous interpretations. 
Toward that end, I have generated two hermeneutical dialogues, each designed to 
add a crucial element to the answer to the question of what the Equal Protection Clause 
means that is lacking in the more traditional approaches.  The first is a dialogue with the 
text of the Clause itself, designed to generate the spirit of the text.  The second is a 
dialogue with previous interpretations of the text, designed provide a theoretical basis 
upon which to prioritize the existing major interpretations of the meaning of the Clause in 
terms of degrees of hermeneutical credibility.  Both dialogues will include what legal 
hermeneutics sees as a necessary link between theory and practice in hermeneutically 
credible meaning through inclusion in the interpretive process consideration of the 
contemporary context in which the present interpretation is taking place. 
The dialogues will be presented in the order indicated for the reason that the 
outcome of the first dialogue -- an assessment as to what might be the spirit of the Equal 
Protection Clause -- is understood to be helpful information toward achieving the goal of 
the second dialogue – prioritization of existing interpretations.  In other words, in the 
second dialogue the extent to which each major, existing interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause is consistent with the spirit of the text derived in the first dialogue will 







  Together, the two dialogues are meant to hermeneutically derive the most 
credible of the existing interpretations of the Clause.     
 Before we begin, however, it is important to explain what I mean by generating a 
dialogue.  By generating a dialogue, I simply mean that I, as the present interpreter of the 
text, will attempt to evaluate the topic of each dialogue (in the case of the first dialogue, 
the topic is the spirit of the text; in the case of the second dialogue, the topic is an 
assessment of the most hermeneutically credible of the existing interpretation of the text) 
while being sensitized to the perspectives, or the Gadamerian “prejudices” and horizons, 
of the drafters of the text and the prior interpreters of the text, while also being sensitized 
to the spirit of the text.  The desired end-product of each dialogue is an assessment as to 
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause that is a fusion of the horizons, in the 
Gadamerian sense, of both myself and the other parties to each dialogue.  The other 
parties to the first dialogue are the drafters of the Equal Protection Clause.  The other 
parties to the second dialogue are the prior interpreters of the Clause, i.e., the Supreme 
Court Justices who have developed the various prior interpretations over the years 
resulting in what is now known as Suspect Classification Doctrine.   
Additionally, and as part of the legal hermeneutical approach to meaning that I am 
advocating, please let me be candid at the outset about what I see as my own 
“prejudices,” i.e., about what I see as the defining features of my own Heideggarian 
“fore-structure of understanding.”  I am a woman of mixed racio-cultural heritage 
(European, African, Caribbean, and Native American) who believes that sexuality is 
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something not definable in terms of labels such as homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual, or 
the like.  I believe that all categorization, including human categorization, is a product of 
social forces such as oppression, power, and economics.  I have an upper middle class 
background and am married with two children.   I have a bachelor‟s degree in philosophy 
from a large, mid-Atlantic state university, a law degree from an east coast law school, 
and am about to receive a doctorate in philosophy from a department which prides itself 
in what it calls “pluralism,” or training in both the analytic and continental traditions.  In 
keeping with the structures and goals of legal hermeneutics as I have developed them, I 
ask the reader to take my “prejudices” into account when assessing the credibility of the 
conclusion reached in this chapter.  I leave it to the reader (the future interpreter of the 
Equal Protection Clause) to decide, in other words, whether my “prejudices” are 
legitimate or illegitimate -- in the Gadamerian sense -- toward the end of contributing to a 
hermeneutically credible meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. 
I will now proceed through the two dialogues. 
Dialogue #1:  What is the spirit of the text? 
 
Recall from Chapter 3 that the concept of the spirit of the text in philosophical 
hermeneutics has its origins in 19
th
 century philologist Friedrich Ast‟s concept of the 
text‟s inner meaning, its own internal development, through a circularity of reason, a 
dialectical relation between the parts of a given work and the whole (Ast 1808: Section 
76).   To find this inner meaning, the interpreter must engage in what Ast called the 
hermeneutic of the spirit, which involves developing an understanding of the spirit of the 
writer and his or her era, and seeks to identify the “one idea,” or Grundidee, that unifies a 





parts and the parts to the whole, with the interpreter always being cognizant of the 
historical period in which the text is situated.   
But, as Schleirmacher showed, there is more to a quality understanding of a given 
text than an understanding of the writer‟s intentions and historical era.  In addition, 
quality understanding also requires that the interpreter somehow grapple with the extent 
to which the language (and therefore the socio-historical context) in which the thoughts 
of the author took place affected, constrained, and informed those thoughts.  In other 
words, Schleiermacher showed that after the interpreter has determined the author‟s 
intended meaning (i.e., what the originalist would call the author‟s original intent),  it is 
then incumbent upon the interpreter to extrapolate from that meaning a kind of a core 
meaning that transcends the tools available to the original author to express that meaning.  
The spirit of the text, then, can be understood to be a product of both the original intent of 
the writer (understood to encompass as well the writer‟s historical era) and the particular 
circumstances in which the text is currently being examined.  Dilthey captured this view 
with his idea that meaning in the human sciences (of which the study of law is surely 
one) always occurs within the lived experience (contemporary social context) of the 
person or persons attempting to find that meaning.  Heidegger and Gadamer both 
reinforced this view in their work and every hermeneutical thinker since has agreed.   
Recall also from Chapter 3 that in contemporary legal hermeneutical theory, 
Gregory Leyh applies this key hermeneutical insight by noting that reason can only find 
its expression as applied concretely (Leyh 1992: 375).  Francis J. Mootz, III applies the 
same insight by noting that the most hermeneutically legitimate interpretation “allows the 





David Hoy applies this hermeneutical insight by highlighting the necessary link between 
the text and the practical application of the text (Hoy 1992).  This key legal 
hermeneutical insight arguably calls the interpreter to reserve judgment about the spirit of 
the text (from a purely historical standpoint) until that judgment is explicitly tested 
against the contemporary practical context in which the text is being interpreted.   
Taking this hermeneutical approach, then, in this first dialogue an attempt will be 
made to identify the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause, the “one idea” that unifies the 
Clause and provides insight into how the Clause relates both to the Fourteenth 
Amendment in which it is contained, but also into how it relates to the entire U.S. 
Constitution, and even more broadly, how the Clause relates to what Philip Bobbit has 
called the American “ethos” (Bobbit 1992: 127), understood  as the conceptual 
framework behind not only the U.S. Constitution  but behind the companion cornerstone 
documents of the United States as well. 
We will next look at the legislative history surrounding the Clause to get an idea 
of what the drafters thought was its purpose; and after that, we will examine the identity 
of the writer of the text, as best we can determine it, as well as the socio-historical 
context in which the Clause was written, to try to get a sense of the writer‟s value system, 
“prejudices,” “horizon,” or “fore-structure of understanding.”   But, if we stopped there, 
we would neglect to factor in that the spirit of the text as defined by legal hermeneutics is 
more than just an attempt to get at the “original intent” of the writer or the historical or 
original meaning.  To find the spirit of the text, or the “one idea” that unifies it, we have 
to also examine the contemporary context in which we are attempting to find that spirit, a 





we will outline the contemporary context relevant for the present inquiry, i.e., the 
equality statuses of the three groups being studied.
6
 
And so,  Dialogue #1 will begin with an examination of the text itself. 
The Text 
The text at issue is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution enacted in 1868 which reads as follows:  “No State shall …deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  On its face, this 
clause seems to me to mean that no state government (as opposed to federal government) 
has the right to protect some people less than other people through its laws.  Another 
possible meaning seems to me to be that the laws of a given state must apply to everyone 
equally.
7
   
The Structure of the Text 
The issues to be investigated here are how the Equal Protection Clause relates to 
other, individual parts of the Constitution, how the Clause relates to the whole 
Constitution, and how the Clause relates to the American ethos as found in not only in the 
Constitution itself but in the companion cornerstone documents of the United States.  
Starting from the parts of the Constitution physically and temporally closest to the Clause 
and working our way out, the first thing to notice is that the Equal Protection Clause is 
                                                          
6
 The equality statuses of the three groups being studied in this project has been chosen as 
the relevant contemporary context because the question of the meaning of the Equal Protection 
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interpreted works for these groups.  It is conceded that there are other ways to understand what 
the relevant contemporary context is.  
7
 The question of what is meant (or should be meant) by the term “equally” – or the 
related terms “equal” and  “equality” – particularly as the meaning of these terms affects how the 





part of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
contains four separate concepts or sentences and reads: 
“All persons born or naturalized within the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws” (Emphasis added). 
 
The words of the first sentence are very clear:  Anyone born or naturalized in the United 
States is a citizen of the United States.
8
   The second sentence of Section 1, known as the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States…”) is very similar to 
language found in Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution (“The Citizens of each State 
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
9
  The 
plain meaning of this sentence is that federal “privileges and immunities” cannot be 
abridged by state governments.  The third sentence of Section 1, known as the Due 
Process Clause (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law”), is very similar to language in the Fifth Amendment (“[No 
person shall be] deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).  
While the Fifth Amendment applied only to the federal government, the Due Process 
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about the fact that the first sentence of Section 1of the Fourteenth Amendment was written for the 
purpose of making the citizenship of African Americans permanent and secure after the end of 
the Civil War and the abolition of slavery.  See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk (1967).  There is also no 
virtually dispute at all about the fact that this same sentence was added to overturn the decision of 
Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) which held that blacks could not be citizens of the United States.  
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment specifically applied this law to state governments.  
The plain meaning of this sentence is that state governments may not infringe upon the 
due process rights of American citizens.  The fourth sentence is the one containing the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
 A plain, bare bones sort of reading – that is, a purely textual reading (to the extent 
that such a reading is possible) -- of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment seems to me 
to be as follows.  First, the very first sentence identifies the group of persons to whom the 
rest of Section 1 applies, i.e., citizens of the United States, whom it defines as anyone 
born or naturalized there.  Second, since the thrust of the language of Sections 2 and 3 is 
contained in other parts of the Constitution -- the only difference being that the 
Fourteenth Amendment reinforces that state governments may not abridge federal rights  
--  the plain meaning of Sections 1 through 3 is that anyone born or naturalized in the 
United States is entitled to be protected by federal law from state laws that might 
otherwise infringe on basic federal rights (privileges and immunities and due process).   
If we add to this meaning the plain meaning of the Equal Protection Clause derived above 
(i.e., that no state government has the right to protect some people less than other people 
through its laws, or that the laws of a given state must apply to everyone equally), we can 
arguably see that the plain (textual) meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is that anyone born or naturalized in the United States has certain basic federal rights 
(certain privileges and immunities, certain due process rights, and certain rights to be 
treated equally under law) that cannot be abridged by state governments.
10
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 If this is indeed the meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a question 
arises as to why Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was added at all.  In other words, what 






 Again, working our way out from Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
next thing to notice is that there are four additional sections to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  According to the terms of Section 2, “…[W]hen the right to vote in any 
election… is denied to [any male inhabitant over age 21],” there will be a penalty.
11
    
Section 3 says that no one who has engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States can hold political office.
12
   Section 4 says that debts incurred to finance 
insurrection or rebellion will not be paid by the United States,
13
  and Section 5 simply 
gives Congress the power to enforce any part of the Amendment.  All five sections taken 
together, then, create a picture of an amendment to the Constitution designed, at a 
minimum, to make clear to the states that federal laws trumped state laws on certain 
issues.  These issues were basic federal rights (privileges and immunities and due 
process), equal treatment under the law, the right to vote, the loss of any right to hold 
federal office after having engaged in “insurrection or rebellion” against the United 
States, and the issue of who was responsible for the reconciliation of any state debts 
incurred as a result of any said “insurrection or rebellion.”  And just in case there was any 
question about the fact that federal law trumped state law on these matters, Section 5 was 
                                                                                                                                                                             
by an American citizen, and second, to simply repeat what was already written elsewhere in the 
constitution, and third, to add a specific, new clause about every citizen‟s federal right to be 
treated equally by state governments. 
 
11
 According to Justice Marshall‟s dissenting opinion in Richardson v. Ramirez (1974), 
the purpose of Section 2 was to give the Southern States a choice, enfranchise former slaves and 
their (male) progeny or lose congressional representation. If Justice Marshall is correct, then the 
purpose of Section 2 was to cure electoral abuse in the Southern States against African American 
voters after the Civil War.   
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 Section 3 was designed to prevent former members of the Confederacy from holding 
state or federal office in the United States. 
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 Section 4 ensured that no loss or debt sustained by the Confederacy would be paid by 





added to give Congress the power to enforce the Amendment through appropriate 
legislation.   
 The next thing to notice is that the Fourteenth Amendment is one of a set of 
Amendments known as the Civil War Amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments).   The timeline for ratification of these Amendments in relation to 
the start and end of the Civil War can be found in Table 1, below: 
 
Table 1. Timeline of Civil War Amendments 
 
Date Amendment/Event 
April 12, 1861 Civil War hostilities begin when the 
Confederacy attacks Fort Sumter in South 
Carolina.  
April 9, 1965 The Civil War ends when Confederate 
General Robert E. Lee surrenders at 
Appomottax Court House in Virginia.  
December 6, 1865 The Thirteenth Amendment is ratified.  
July 13, 1868 The Fourteenth Amendment is ratified.  
March 30, 1870 The Fifteenth Amendment is ratified. 
 Note: All dates taken from Finkelman (2006). 
 
A bit of background about the historical time period is helpful.  In early 1863, during the 
Civil War, President Lincoln, using his authority as commander in chief of the army, 







   Later that year, Lincoln delivered the Gettysburg 
Address, a speech offered in dedication of the Soldiers‟ National Cemetery just four 
months after the Battle of Gettysburg where there had been a decisive, but bloody, Union 
victory (Sears 2003).  Lincoln began the Gettysburg Address by reminding the crowd 
then present that just eighty-four years prior, in 1776, the United States had begun in 
dedication to the proposition that all men are created equal.
15
 The Civil War ended in 
April of 1865 with the surrender of Confederate General Robert E. Lee (Rawley 1966).  
In December of that year, the Thirteenth Amendment, which banned slavery everywhere 
in the United States, was ratified.  The Fourteenth Amendment (containing the Equal 
Protection Clause) was ratified in July 1868, and then the Fifteenth Amendment was 
ratified in March of 1870.  The Fifteenth Amendment prohibited discrimination in voting 
“on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” 
 Taken together, these various Civil War Amendments (plus a brief recap of the 
historical events surrounding them) suggest that the “one idea” that unifies the Equal 
Protection Clause and that provides insight into how the Clause relates both to the 
Fourteenth Amendment in which it is contained, but also into how the Clause relates to 
the other Civil War Amendments, as well as to the entire U.S. Constitution in which they 
are all contained, is that equal protection under the law for black Americans could and 
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 The Emancipation Proclamation did not free slaves living in the loyal slave states of 
Maryland, Kentucky, Delaware, and Missouri, nor slaves living in certain parts of Virginia and 
Louisiana that were controlled by the United States.  Lincoln had used his authority as 
commander in chief of the army to free slaves through the Emancipation Proclamation, and so 
could only free the slaves held by those in rebellion against the United States (Franklin 1963). 
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would be federally enforced.
 16
  What is even more clear from this structural analysis, I 
think, is that the reason the awesome power of the federal government of the United 
States was being used to literally force the Southern States to treat black Americans 
equally was because the reality was that black Americans were clearly not being treated 
equally.  Quite the contrary.  In other words, the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause, 
based on this structural analysis, is that the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause are 
remedial in nature.  The Equal Protection Clause was placed in the Fourteenth 
Amendment (and appended to the broader United States Constitution) to solve the 
problem of the widespread unequal treatment (or subjugation) of black people that had 
begun with the institution of slavery and was being perpetuated thereafter in the form, for 
example, of state laws enacted after the Civil War that prevented black people from 
exercising various basic civil rights and privileges and immunities of United States‟ 
citizenship like voting in public elections.  It was in the face of this manifest and 
widespread, unequal treatment (to say the least) of black people that the Equal Protection 
Clause was placed in the Fourteenth Amendment.  This was the origin of the Clause and 
the purpose of the Clause, and in my humble opinion it is the spirit of the Clause based 
on this structural analysis.  That the Equal Protection Clause was a remedial measure 
designed to correct the widespread subjugation of black people (former slaves and their 
progeny) is the “one idea”, in my opinion, the hermeneutical Grunidee, that unifies the 
Clause and provides insight into how the Clause relates to the Fourteenth Amendment in 
                                                          
16
 Citing The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), historian Howard Jay Graham has stated that 
the Civil War Amendments were all framed on behalf of black people (“the slave race”). “This, of 
course, is especially true of the Fourteenth Amendment” (Graham 1968: 157).  In fact, for 
Graham, it is “patently absurd” to deny  the antislavery origins of the [Fourteenth 






which it is contained, and to the grander U.S. Constitution of which the Fourteenth 
Amendment is a part.
17
 
 And so, based on this structural analysis, Justice Miller‟s famous statement in The 
Slaughterhouse Cases (1873)  -- the first Supreme Court case in time to interpret the 
Fourteenth Amendment after its ratification -- to the effect that the Amendment (like the 
other Civil War Amendments) had “one pervading purpose,” i.e., “the protection of the 
newly made freeman and citizen from…oppression,” seems very well justified. 
The Legislative History of the Text 
 
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment can be understood to have 
its theoretical roots in a system of constitutional protection for the rights of free “Negroes 
and mulattoes” developed by a group known as the American Anti-Slavery Society 
during the years 1834 to 1835 (Graham 1968: 185).  In the papers documenting the 
proceedings of this society, there is evidence of an “ingenious, exhaustive, and above all, 
prophetic constitutional attack on slavery” (Graham 1968: 168).  These documents show 
that what had begun as an ethical and religious attack on slavery transmuted in this time 
period into a legal and constitutional attack (Ibid.:  169).   Congressman Thaddeus 
Stevens, one of the ultimate sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment, was an early 
member of this society (Ibid., Woodburn 2007). 
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment continues with the 
Congressional debates that took place in 1866 during the 39
th
 Congress.  That history 
substantiates the conclusion that the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause is that it was 
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meant to operate as a remedial measure to correct the widespread subjugation of black 
people in America. The sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment were Congressman 
Thaddeus Stevens and Senator Benjamin Wade (Schnapper 1985: 784).  When 
Congressman Stevens introduced the Amendment in the House, he characterized its 





 Session 2459, 1866).  Congressman Stevens went on to make specific 
reference to the “all men are created equal” portion of Declaration of Independence, 
arguing that since this provision was already in the Declaration, the phraseology to this 
effect in the Fourteenth Amendment was clearly just.  All that the Equal Protection 
Clause added, Stevens argued, was “to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far 





 Session 2459, 1866, italics in original).  Congressman Stevens‟    
Additionally, proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment repeatedly emphasized in 
the Congressional debates of the time period that one of the Amendment‟s primary 
purposes was to place in the Constitution itself the principles of section 1 of the Civil 




 Session 2459, 1866), an Act 
whose entire purpose was to give citizens “without regard to race and color, without 
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude….” “full and equal  
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed 
by white citizens….”
18
  In other words, proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
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 Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 reads, “Be it enacted by the Senate and 
House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all 
persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not 
taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and 






early Congressional debates repeatedly stated that the Fourteenth Amendment‟s primary 
purpose was to address the unequal status of black people. 
That the primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to address the 
unequal status of black people is further supported by the observation that the entire 
antislavery campaign – of which the Civil War Amendments were an undeniable 
outgrowth -- was essentially a quest for enforcement of United States ideals that already 
existed but were being ignored in the slave states (Graham 1968: 169).  These ideals were 
that all U.S. citizens were entitled to the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship 
(per Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution), that all citizens were entitled to due 
process of the law (per the Fifth Amendment), and that all men were created equal (per 
the Declaration of Independence).  It is important, however, that the abolitionist 
movement was not exclusively concerned with equal protection under the law for blacks 
(Ibid.).  Many strains of the movement were also concerned with the equal protection 
rights of any and all “dissident and unpopular groups” (Ibid.). 
19
  Therefore, that aspect of 
Suspect Classification Doctrine that stands for the proposition that racial discrimination 
                                                                                                                                                                             
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, 
in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, 
and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, 
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and 
to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.”  
14 Stat. 27-30, April 9 (1866). 
 
19
 This is not to say, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment had no other purpose.  
Joseph P. James, in his The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, suggests, for example, that 
there were political reasons why the Amendment was pushed.  Specifically, according to James, it 
was thought at the time that the Amendment would provide a good platform for the Republican 






of any kind against any group that is the evil toward which the Equal Protection Clause is 
directed, “the [Congressional] debates reveal overriding concern with the status of one 
racial group [i.e., blacks]” (Baer 1983:138). 
The Writer 
 
While there were several writers of the grander Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 
– including the Equal Protection Clause – was written by Representative John Bingham 
of Ohio (Stephens and Sheb 2008: 18).  The writers of the grander Fourteenth 
Amendment consisted of two different factions of the Republican party of the day 
(Trefousse 1997/2005).  One faction were avid abolitionists, known as the Radicals, who 
were motivated to support the Civil War by a desire to end slavery and to provide blacks 
with the same federal rights, privileges and protections as other Americans (Ibid.).  The 
other faction was at best indifferent to the abolition of slavery and the rights of blacks, 
and had been motivated to support the war by a desire to preserve the union (Ibid.).   
 Representative Bingham was a Radical. The Radicals had been committed to the 
abolition of slavery and to equal treatment for former slaves since at least 1863 when 
President Lincoln had signed the Emancipation Proclamation, and many of them had 
been committed to the cause well before that (Trefousse 1997/2005).   At least since the 
Dred Scott decision of 1857 – in which the Supreme Court held that blacks were not 
citizens of the United States and could never be citizens owing to the fact that the 
Framers of the United States had considered blacks to be “beings of an inferior order” 
with “no rights which the white man was bound to respect” Dred Scott v. Sanford, (1857) 
– the Radicals had been driven to amend the Constitution to clarify that, in their view, the 





Between 1856 and 1859, Representative Bingham made three major speeches in 
Congress relevant to his views on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment (Graham 














 Session 981-985 (1859)). All three speeches focus on due process rights.  
In the second speech, he stresses that the “absolute equality of all and the equal protection 
of each” are American constitutional ideals,” noting that the Constitution makes no 
distinction on the basis of either “complexion or birth” (Graham 1968: 57).  In the third 
speech Bimgham uses the concepts of “natural and inherent rights,” “sacred rights… as 
universal and indestructible as the human race,” and “equality of natural rights” to seek 
constitutional sanction for his anti-slavery views (Graham 1968: 57).  Graham tied these 
“natural” rights to the Constitution by highlighting that the Fifth Amendment uses the 
word “person” instead of “citizen” (Ibid.).  Bingham also made sure that a guarantee of 
equal protection of the laws was included in every single draft of Section 1 (James 1965).   
 Original Intent? 
 Based on all of the above, to the extent that original intent can be ascertained 
(and, of course, per philosophical and legal hermeneutics this is a limited extent), the 
original intent of the Equal Protection Clause was not, as Justice Thomas claimed in his 
concurring opinion in Gratz, to forbid the use of race in state law, but to remedy the racial 
discrimination, oppression, and legalized subjugation being perpetrated against blacks at 






But, as has been developed above, the spirit of the text from a legal hermeneutical 
perspective is more than just original intent.  From a legal hermeneutical perspective, the 
spirit of the text in a given interpretive moment also includes consultation with the 
contemporary context in which the text is being examined.  It seems fairly indisputable 
that in the contemporary era, the legal and social equality of blacks has improved since 
1868, the year the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.  This improvement of condition 
has led some commentators to suggest that, even if it can be fairly said that the original 
intent of the Equal Protection Clause was to provide a way for recently freed blacks to 
achieve equality in America, this remedial purpose is of little contemporary significance 
in terms of how the Equal Protection Clause should be read today (See, e.g., Glazer 1975, 
Bickel 1975).
20
  Since the pressing social problem of severe inequality between blacks 
and whites in America that was attendant to the social context in which the Equal 
Protection Clause was created and enacted is no longer as acute, these commentators 
suggest, understanding the Equal Protection Clause as a remedial instrument for 
improving the equal treatment of blacks under the law is outdated, if it ever had any 
validity at all (Ibid.).  Other conservative commentators -- often the same jurists who 
advocate originalism -- argue simply that the Equal Protection Clause was never intended 
                                                          
20
 The Center for Individual Rights (“CIR”), a strong proponent of this view, is a law firm 
whose primary activity is to challenge race-based affirmative action programs on the basis that 






to specially protect blacks, usually citing the text itself (containing no specific reference 
to blacks) as evidence.
21
    
But, the vast majority of responsible scholarship on this point takes the position 
that the equality status of blacks as a group has not, in closer examination, improved as 
much as one might have hoped since 1868, particularly in the areas of income, net worth, 
and education (Lawson 1992; Waller 2001; Hilfiker 2003).  While there is little doubt 
that there has been improvement since 1868 regarding the legal and social equality of 
blacks, this is not saying much on the question of the equality status of blacks today, 
given that the point of reference for blacks as a group was that in 1868 blacks were 
widely considered  to be patently, manifestly, biologically, irrevocably, morally, 
intellectually, and physically inferior to whites (Hoffman 1896/2004; Finkelman 2003;  
Finkleman 2001; Griffin 2001; Ridley 1996; Shipman 1994; Davies 1955/1971; Stanton 
1960; Fredrickson 1971; Gould 1981;  Irvine 1955; Jordan 1974; Lovejoy 1936).  
Arguably, there was certainly no way to go but up from there.  This view of blacks was 
so prevalent in the post-Civil War era,  in fact, that widespread attempts were made – 
through, for example, the enactment of Jim Crow laws all over the South – to keep blacks 
physically separated from whites in any and all public contexts in which the two groups 
might come into social contact (Takaki 1990; Woodward 1974;   Kluger 1976; Packard 
2002; Thomas 1998).  The significance of this almost unimaginable and horrific state of 
affairs cannot be overstated; for, in effect, black people were the lepers of the mid to late 
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 This view is of course in complete disregard for the Congressional debates surrounding 
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and in complete disregard for the socio-historical 
context of the text, i.e., in the aftermath of slavery and in conjunction with two other 










So, while it is true that certainly, there was no place to go but up from a social 
status similar to that of lepers, the reality of the social condition of blacks in America 
today is that it is still dire and quite unequal to that of whites  on all frontiers  (Oliver and 
Shapiro 1995; Squires 1994; Brenner 1993;  Dedman 1988; Feagin 1990; Feagin 1994; 
Oliver 1980; Collins 2004). There are still dramatic gaps between whites and blacks in 
income, wealth, housing, education, and occupation (Ibid., Bonilla-Silva 2010, 209)
23
  
and the overwhelming majority of responsible analysts agree that the persistence of racial 
inequality today is due, to a very significant extent, to the persistence and continuing 
significance of racism and racial discrimination (Ibid., Feagin 1991, Bell 1992 ). 
24
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 The effect on the collective American psyche of the widespread and legally enforced 
mark of social inferiority placed on black people by slavery and the Jim Crow laws that followed 
after slavery is the cornerstone of what Bill Lawson and others have called the “racial 
consciousness” of contemporary American society (See, e.g., Lawson 1995; Banton 1988).   For 
“racial realists” like Derrick Bell, racism must be understood as a permanent feature of American 
society owing to the indelible effect that slavery and Jim Crow laws have had on the 
subconscious mindset of every American (Bell 1992).  For  these thinkers, no responsible analysis 
of the state of black people today and/or a suggestion of what do about it can take place unless 
this fact of  life in America is first soberly taken into account.  I compare the social stigma 
attached to being black in America to the traditional stigma against leprosy because of the 
enforced social separation experienced by both groups (by blacks during the Jim Crow era and by 




 See Rivera, Amaad, Jeannette Huezo, Christina Kasica, and Dedrick Muhammad. 
2009.  “State of the Dream 2009: The Silent Depression.”  Boston: United for a Fair Economy, 
for a detailed report on the severity of income, wealth, housing, educational, and occupation 
inequality between whites and blacks in 2009. 
 
24
 This is true despite the popularity of works like Charles Murray‟s Losing Ground 
(1984), Murray and Herrnstein‟s The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American 
Life (1994), and Abigail and Stephan Thernstrom‟s America in Black and White (1997), in which 
the continuing inequality between whites and blacks in America is attributed to the presumed 






Moreover, and from the perspective of a substantial number of contemporary, African 
American critical race theorists, the explanation for the continuing existence of racial 
discrimination in America can in turn be most responsibly traced to the unique way in 
which the concept of blackness (human “racial” blackness) became indelibly associated 
with social inferiority in America through the creation and perpetuation of the institution 
of chattel slavery, and the government‟s endorsement of that institution (however explicit 
or tacit) from the very beginning of the country‟s creation (Mills 1997; Gotanda 1995; 
Harris 1995; Bell 1995; Matsuda 1995; Williams 2000).
25
 
In summary, in the contemporary era, it is far more than fair to say that the social, 
legal, educational, and economic status of blacks in America is still quite unequal, and as 
a result, blacks as a group are still in need of the kind of special protection that the Equal 
Protection Clause was designed to provide.  This is particularly true since the ongoing 
unequal status of blacks in America can be directly traced to the American institution of 
chattel slavery (Mills 1997, Feagin 2010, Vaughan 1995). 
Another aspect of the contemporary context is that groups other than blacks who 
have also experienced widespread, pervasive, government-endorsed disenfranchisement, 
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 Several theorists have observed that the uniquely American institution of chattel 
slavery, that contained three elements that other forms of slavery have not contained, i.e., (1) the 
association of slave status with a certain set of phenotypical physical traits (i.e., what are 
commonly understood to be “black” phenotypical traits), (2) the idea that slave status was 
hereditary, and (3) the idea that the slaves themselves were a form of property associated with the 
real estate on which they worked like buildings or livestock, together created in the American 
psyche a kind of  ineradicable association between phenotypical physical traits associated with 
being from the African continent and  inferior social or legal status.  The question of the degree to 
which the American institution of chattel slavery was, in fact, endorsed by the federal government 
from the beginning is a contested question.  However, there is much scholarship supporting the 
view that the original constitution itself (the main body to the exclusion of the Amendments) 
contains several provisions meant to accommodate those among the Framers who were 
slaveholders (Mills 1997).  The constitutional provisions most often cited as supporting slavery 
are Article I, Section 2, Paragraph 3; Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 15; Article I, Section 9, 





marginalization, subjugation, and oppression often argue by analogy that the Equal 
Protection Clause should protect them in the same way that it has protected blacks.  Both 
feminists (Chamallas 2003; MacKinnon 2007; Levit and Verchick  2006) and proponents 
of gay rights (Eskridge 1999; Koppleman 2002) for example, have made this argument.  
Members of each of these groups have argued that their group should be provided the 
same level of equal protection under the law as blacks.  With the sole exception of ethnic 
minorities, the Supreme Court has disagreed.  As was shown in Chapter 2, neither women 
nor gay people are protected under the Suspect Classification Doctrine.  Additionally, 
subjugated group after subjugated group has come before the Supreme Court asking for 
strict scrutiny of laws that discriminate against them; and again, with the sole exception 
of ethnic minorities, the Supreme Court has routinely rejected these arguments, and has 
offered instead either no protection at all or limited protection.
26
   
But, as is the case with African Americans, while there is certainly no doubt that 
the legal and social status of women has dramatically improved since women were 
denied the right to vote, unable to own property, unable to work in the occupation of their 
choice, unprotected by state criminal codes from rape within marriage, etc., during the  
early years of the formation of this country (Ryan 1975; Carroll 1976; Hecker 1914), 
there is also no doubt that women as a collective in contemporary America are far from 
being treated equally under the law (MacKinnon 2007).  As recently as 2008, the U.S. 
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 See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976) (no protection for age 
discrimination);  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.  (1985) (no protection for the 
developmentally disabled); Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (1972) (illegitimate 
persons provided some measure of protection); Shapiro v. Thompson (1973) (protection for 






Department of Labor reported that women still earn about 75 percent of what men earn,
27
 
the “glass ceiling” is pervasive (da Costa 2009), women still handle over twice as much 
of the household labor as men after marriage (Stafford 2008), continue to experience 
unequal treatment in society in virtue of their status as mothers (MacKinnon 2007: Ch. 
9), and the list goes on and on.   
Similarly, gay people are also among the groups of people in contemporary 
America for whom the ideal of equality has never been a reality.  Arguably, the unequal 
treatment of gay people under the law in the contemporary era is particularly visible with 
regard to the fundamental right to marry, which is currently denied to gay people in 45 
states (all but Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont and New Hampshire).   As I 
argued at the annual meeting of the Law and Society Association in 2006, these 
restrictive state marriage laws trigger just the sort of issues that slavery and Jim Crow 
laws raised in the late nineteenth century for black people (Botts 2006).
28
    
In summary, the contemporary context of the  Equal Protection Clause, then, is 
one in which the equality status of blacks is still starkly poor.  The contemporary 
situation for women is similar.  And although there are many studies showing that gay 
people as a group fare better than blacks and women with regard to income, wealth, jobs, 
and education, the unequal status of gay people is marked by widespread, governmentally 
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 In the nineteenth century, the question was whether states had the right to enact laws 
regulating where black people could sit or drink from a water fountain in public places; in the 
contemporary era, the question is whether states have the right to enact laws regulating the choice 
of marriage partner for consenting adults.   It is my claim that in both cases, the debate is over 






endorsed, social and legal inequality in the form of the denial of basic citizenship rights 
like the right to marry. 
 What this means for our assessment of what the spirit of the Equal Protection 
Clause is in the present interpretive moment is that a hermeneutically credible spirit of 
the Equal Protection Clause is required to take into account the persistent and widespread 
unequal status of blacks, women, and gay people in the contemporary era.  In other 
words, if it were the case that the equality status of blacks, women, and gay people were 
approaching or on part with the equality statuses of whites, males, and straight people, 
respectively in the contemporary era, then, since the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause 
is that it is there to provide a remedy for unequal status, then an interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause on par with Suspect Classification  Doctrine might be in order.    
However, since it is not the case that blacks, women, and gay people‟s status in society is 
equal with whites, men, and straight people respectively, then a hermeneutically credible 
interpretation of the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause in the contemporary era, i.e., the 
present interpretive moment, is that the Clause is there to protect these groups for 
remedial purposes.  In other words, the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause is that it 
protects marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated groups of whatever kind, as long as they 
are marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated.  It is not available for use, however, by 
groups who are not marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated, i.e., it is not available for use 







The Answer:  The Spirit of the Text 
From the perspective of legal hermeneutics, then, the question of what the spirit 
of the Equal Protection Clause is today, in the interpretive moment of the early twenty-
first century America, can be understood to be a function of the text of the Clause, the 
structure of the Clause, the intent of the Clause as found through the values and political 
ideals of its writer, and the contemporary context of the Clause, i.e., “what the text says 
to us” (Schmidt 2006: 104). 
We have seen that the text, structure, and intent of the Clause all indicate that the 
Clause was designed as a remedial measure to correct the observable and existent, 
unequal treatment of blacks in America after the Civil War.  We have also seen, however, 
that the greater abolitionist movement of which the writer of the Equal Protection Clause 
was a part did not understand its quest for equal treatment under the law as exclusively 
limited to blacks.  Instead, the abolitionist movement of the late nineteenth century 
understood the ideal of equality contained in the Equal Protection Clause as designed to 
protect other groups as well, as long as those groups were marginalized.  In other words, 
the combination of the text, the structure, the intent of the Clause, and the contemporary 
context seem to indicate that the spirit of the Clause, that is, what the text “says to us,” is 
that the Clause was designed to operate as the constitutional basis for providing a remedy 
in federal court, for blacks and any other marginalized group, to use in the face of 
manifest and widespread unequal treatment under law.     
In the contemporary context, there is no question that the social groups known as 
women and gay people are just the sort of group the writer of the Clause had in mind 





excerpts from abolitionist writings of the period clearly support the analogy between 
equal treatment under the law for blacks and equal treatment under the law for women.  It 
is true that there is no evidence in the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment 
that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to protect gay people.  However, there are 
at least two responses to those who might claim that this is evidence that the Equal 
Protection Clause should not be used to protect gay people in the contemporary era.   
First, there is evidence to support the view that the social group known as gay 
people did not exist in 1868 in the way that it does today (Kinnish, Strassberg, and Turner 
2005; Foucault 1981; Halperin 1990; Weeks 1980).  If the group did not exist, it could 
hardly have been considered on the Congressional floor.  Therefore, absence of 
discussion regarding whether the Equal Protection Clause should apply to gay people 
proves nothing about whether the Clause should be available for use by gay people today.  
Second, the issues surrounding equal treatment under the law for gay people are very 
similar to the ones surrounding equal treatment under the law for blacks and women in 
the mid-nineteenth century, i.e., issues of marginalization, social stigmatization, social 
segregation (if only informal), prejudice, stereotypes, etc. Finally, now that gay people, as 
a group, are calling the unequal status of gay people vis-à-vis basic fundamental rights 
like the right to marry to the collective attention of the world,  i.e., now that this unequal 
status has become a part of the contemporary interpretive context, the time has come to 
include gay people in those explicitly protected under the Equal Protection Clause. 
In summary, what all three groups have in common, arguably, is demonstrably 
pervasive unequal treatment under law in the form of laws explicitly or implicitly 





group equal access to a series of social goods, rights, or privileges  It should be noted that 
it is also the case that the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause does not seem to admit of 
different levels of judicial review to be applied to laws affecting different subjugated 
groups.  Instead, as has been shown, the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause seems to be 
that where a given group is found to be subject to widespread unequal treatment under 
the law (i.e., where the group is marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated, a law which 
discriminates against the group should simply be subjected to strict scrutiny, i.e., it 
should be considered presumptively unconstitutional such that the burden would then 
shift to the state to demonstrate some overwhelmingly compelling state interest that 
should override the concern of the group, and that the law in question is narrowly tailored 
to achieve that interest. 
Therefore, the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause in the contemporary context 
seems to be that it operates in the present interpretive moment to protect members of any 
marginalized, oppressed, and/or subjugated group from unequal treatment under law.
29
  
And while legal hermeneutics explicitly acknowledges that the particularized experience 
of oppression of different marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated is quite different, legal 
hermeneutics also highlights that the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause seems to 
indicate, in addition, that the interpretation that different levels or kinds of equality are 
                                                          
29
 Conversely, however, the spirit of the text of the Equal Protection Clause does not 
seem to include, however, that the Clause operates, or should operate, to protect members of 
groups who are not members of marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated groups.  This is not to 
say, however, that the rights of those who are not members of marginalized, oppressed, or 
subjugated groups should not be respected or protected under the constitution.  It is just to say 
that the Equal Protection Clause is not an available mechanism for that purpose.  Rights to equal 
treatment under law, on this view, as contained in the Equal Protection Clause, were specifically 
designed and are specifically tailored to right unequal treatment under law for members of 





available for different oppressed groups – à la Suspect Classification Doctrine --  is not 
hermeneutically sound.  These two concepts combined seemed to indicate that the spirit 
of the Equal Protection Clause is that if a given group is marginalized, oppressed, or 
subjugated, then members of that group may use the Equal Protection Clause to challenge 
laws that discriminate against members of the group.  In practice, this seems to mean that 
a hermeneutically credible interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause contains, as a 
threshold inquiry, the question of whether a given group qualifies as marginalized, 
subjugated, or oppressed.   
The answer to this question, in turn, seems most credibly answered, from a 
hermeneutical perspective, by consideration of the contemporary context.  If it turns out 
that the group does qualify as marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated in the interpretive 
context at hand, then a person who is a member of the group has standing to bring a suit 
under the Equal Protection Clause.   By the same token, in order to challenge a law on 
Equal Protection Clause grounds a person who is not a member of a group that has 
already qualified as marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated would have to prove, as a 
threshold matter, that he or she is a member of an additional the marginalized, oppressed, 
or subjugated group.  Absent such a showing, the person would not be allowed to bring 
an Equal Protection challenge.   
In Dialogue #2, I will place this understanding of the spirit of the Equal Protection 
Clause in dialogue with the major, competing interpretations of the Clause in an effort to 
determine which of these competing interpretations is most hermeneutically credible 






Dialogue #2: Which of the Existing Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause 
is the most Hermeneutically Credible? 
 
In Dialogue #2 I will place the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause as derived in 
Dialogue #1 in hermeneutical conversation with the major, competing interpretations of 
the Clause of the past 143 years (i.e., since the Clause became a part of black letter 
constitutional law with the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868), as I 
understand them.   The goal of Dialogue #2 is to use legal hermeneutical tools to rank the 
existing major interpretations in terms of degrees of hermeneutical credibility, with the 
concomitant goal of selecting the most hermeneutically credible of all previous, major 
interpretations.  
 The structure of these dialogues will be to first measure a given interpretation 
against the spirit of the text as derived in Dialogue #1, and then to measure the 
interpretation in terms of the “prejudices”, or the values, political dispositions, and 
personalities, of the Supreme Court justices who were involved in the creation the major 
interpretation.  As a given Supreme Court is composed of nine Justices, in the interest of 
space and relevance, my analysis of the “prejudices” of the Supreme Court Justices on a 
given Supreme Court will be limited to, at most, two or three Justices:  the Chief Justice, 
the writer of the majority opinion of the case, and a third Justice if he or she is revealed 
through historical analysis to have had a significant hand in developing a particular 
interpretation.  Of note, although the Chief Justice of a given Supreme Court (who lends 
that Court its name, e.g., “the Marshall Court”) has one vote like all other justices and has 
extra duties that are largely administrative, rather than substantive (Rosen 2007), it is also 
the case that the style or “temperament” of the Chief Justice of a given Court can have a 





owing largely to the Chief Justice‟s diplomatic skills, but also owing to the Chief 
Justice‟s leadership skills and overall amiability (Ibid.).  As Robert J. Steamer has noted, 
since the Chief Justiceship is a “constitutional office second in national authority and 
prestige only to the president,” and since the duties of the Chief Justice are undefined in 
the Constitution, “the incumbent…has been given carte blanche to use his personal 
talents, whatever they may be, to add to the warp and woof of America‟s never quite 
completed constitutional tapestry” (Steamer 1986: xii).  Owing to this almost entirely 
unregulated “carte blanche,” special consideration will be given in the analyses that 
follow to the facticities and prejudices of the Chief Justices of the Supreme Courts that 
influenced decided the major interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause.   Similarly, 
the writer of the majority opinion is often the party who originated that opinion and/or 
who had the most influence upon developing it.  For this reason, the facticities and 
“prejudices” of the writer of a given opinion will be examined as well.  Additionally, 
where it appears from the historical evidence that a Justice other than the Chief Justice or 
the writer of the majority opinion had a significant influence on an opinion, that Justice‟s 
“prejudices” will be examined as well.   
The reader should recall that Gadamerian “prejudices” are just Heideggarian 
facticities.  On the concept of facticity, Heidegger explains, “[T[his expression means:  in 
each case „this‟ Dasein in its being-there for a while at a particular time (…) insofar as it 
is, in the character of its being, „there‟ in the manner of be-ing”  (Heidegger 1999: 5).  In 
other words, facticity merely describes how a given human being is at any given moment 
in time and Gadamerian “prejudice” is simply the starting point from which all 





does not have pejorative connotations.  Rather, “prejudice” is simply the point of entry 
through which a given interpreter enters into the hermeneutic circle.  The goal of 
hermeneutical credibility, then, does not require us to reject an interpretation that can be 
found to be a function of “prejudice.”
30
  Instead, the goal of hermeneutic credibility 
requires merely that the interpreter‟s “prejudice(s)” or “horizons” be acknowledged, 
taken into account and considered as relevant interpretive information.   
Additionally, recall that, for Gadamer, not all “prejudices” are illegitimate.  To the 
extent that a given “prejudice” is in keeping with what Gadamer called the “tradition” of 
the text at issue, that “prejudice” contributes legitimately to hermeneutically credible 
meaning.  For purposes of this dialogue, the “tradition” at issue is taken to be very similar 
to what Bobbit and others have called the  American “ethos” (Bobbit 1992: 127), 
understood  as the conceptual framework behind not only the U.S. Constitution  but 
behind the companion cornerstone documents of the United States as well, and, most 
significantly, understood to contain the ideal of equality as found in the Declaration of 
Independence. 
The reader is forewarned that the legal hermeneutic inquiry I will employ in 
Dialogue #2  into the prejudices of the Supreme Court Justices contributing to the major 
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause is inquiry into the personal lives and 
personal value systems of the Justices involved.  In mainstream constitutional 
jurisprudence, these factors would be considered irrelevant to the credibility of any 
interpretation handed down.  But, from the perspective of legal hermeneutics, to ignore 
the personal lives and personal value systems of the previous interpreters of the Equal 
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 Most notably, because from the perspective of legal hermeneutics, all 





Protection Clause would be to ignore what legal hermeneutics reveals to be a key 
component in the assignment of meaning, i.e., the identity of the interpreter(s).  Recall 
from Chapter 3 that for Heidegger, understanding (Verstehen)  and how the one doing the 
understanding is in the world  exist in a reciprocal relationship of meaning that Heidegger 
calls hermeneutic ontology.  Since the human way of being (Dasein) is to be actively 
involved in interaction with one‟s environment (being-in-the-world), the metaphysical 
distance that those in the analytic tradition take for granted as existing between 
interpreter and that which is interpreted is revealed as a fiction.  If Heidegger is right, 
then the distance in mainstream legal theory that some jurists take for granted between 
the personal lives and value systems of Supreme Court Justices and the decisions handed 
down by those Justices as to The Meaning (with a capital “T” and a capital “M”) of a 
given law – any law – is simply impossible.  Instead, every interpreter enters into the 
interpretive process with a given “fore-structure of understanding” which the interpreter 
necessarily  brings to bear on any “understanding” that arises.  In other words, to 
“understand” is always to interpret.  To interpret is always to understand.  The 
phenomenon of interpretation and the phenomenon of understanding exist in a 
tautological relationship of identity. 
Moreover, inquiry into the personal lives and personal value systems of Supreme 
Court Justices is particularly important since the Supreme Court is spoken of customarily 
as if it exists independently of the human beings who comprise it, and as if the same 
Supreme Court makes every constitutional decision.  “The Supreme Court” is spoken of 
as if it had a continuity, a stable, consistent composition supporting the (false) view that 





spring forth from it.  As Jeffrey Rosen puts it, “Everything about the Court‟s majestic 
rituals – from the white marble palace to the black robes – is designed to minimize the 
human element and to convey the impression that the Court‟s opinions are, if not the 
word of God, the impersonal pronouncements of a Delphic oracle”  (Rosen 2007: 5).  
But, legal hermeneutics reveals that to understand the Supreme Court in this way is 
simply a manifestation of what Gadamer called the “prejudice against prejudice” at work 
in mainstream methods of textual legal interpretation.   To overcome this particular 
(illegitimate) prejudice, i.e., the road to more credible textual interpretation is necessarily 
paved instead with an investigation into the Gadamerian “prejudices” and “horizons” of 
the Justices, into their Heideggarian “fore-structures of understanding”.   
Toward that effort, what follows is an attempt to lay bare the human element that 
legal hermeneutics understands is necessarily at work in every interpretation, including 
Supreme Court interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause.  There will be an attempt 
to expose, in other words, the leanings and predispositions of the human beings that have 
significantly determined the ways in which the Equal Protection Clause has been 
interpreted since its inception in 1868.   
In summary, insofar as a given major interpretation is in keeping with the spirit of 
the text and appears to have been affected more by the “legitimate” than by the 
“illegitimate” “prejudices” or value systems of the various Supreme Court justices 
influencing the interpretation, the interpretation will be understood to be hermeneutically 
credible.  Insofar as a given major interpretation is not in keeping with the spirit of the 
text and/or appears to have been influenced more by the “illegitimate” than the 





interpretation, the interpretation will be understood be lacking in hermeneutical 
credibility.  That said, I will now outline what I understand as the major Supreme Court 




The Major Interpretations of the Clause
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There seem to me to be four major interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause 
that have developed over the years, from the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
1868 to the present, each corresponding to a particular historical era.   These 
interpretations are:  (1) the interpretation that the Equal Protection Clause protects blacks 
only, prevalent from about 1873 to 1895, (2) the interpretation that “equal” in the Equal 
Protection Clause mean separate, prevalent from about 1896 to 1953,  (3) the 
interpretation that there are  “suspect classes” of people who deserve special protection 
from discriminatory laws, popular from about 1954 to about 1973, (4) Suspect 
Classification Doctrine, in which the Supreme Court seems to have lost all awareness of 
the historical context that informed the Equal Protection Clause, prevalent from about 
1978 to the present.   These interpretations and their eras, as I understand them, together 
with the relevant case law of the period in question, are gathered together for quick 
reference below in Table 2. 
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 It is conceded that what constitutes a major interpretation is a judgment call on my part.  
However, it is fair to say that there have been interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause that 
have had long careers, that have generated a good deal of “progeny” or scholarly literature over 
time,  and that have been understood by practicing lawyers as the “binding precedent” of a given 






Table 2.  Major Supreme Court Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause 




Clause Protects Blacks 
Only 
 (1868-1895) 
blacks The Slaughterhouse Cases 
(1873), Strauder v. West 
Virginia (1880), The Civil 
Rights Cases (1875) 
Clause applies to ex-slaves 
(blacks) only 
 
women Bradwell v. Illinois (1873), 
Minor v. Happersett (1875). 
Clause does not apply to 
women 




Separate But Equal  
(1896-1953) 
blacks Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada (1938), Korematsu v. 
U.S. (1944), McLaurin v. OK 
State Regents (1950), Sweatt v. 
Painter (1950). 
 
“Equal” in equal protection 
can mean separate; Separate 
usually means inferior. 
women Muller v. Oregon (1908), 
Goesaert v. Cleary (1948). 
Clause does not apply to 
women; Women must be 
“protected” from equality 






Blacks Brown v. Board of Education 
(1954), Brown II (1955), 
Loving v. Virginia  (1967), 
Alexander v. Holmes Co. Brd. 
of Ed. (1969), Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Brd. of 
Ed. (1971), San Antonio 
Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez (1973). 
 
Separate But Equal 
overturned; “all deliberate 
speed”changes to 
desegregation “at once”; anti-
miscegenation laws violate 
the  EPC; busing approved to 
overcome segregation: strict 
scrutiny appropriate where a 
“suspect class” is involved, 
but education not a 
fundamental right 
women Reed v. Reed (1971) Sex discrimination violates 
the EPC  (rational basis test 
used) no rational basis for 
sex discrim., rights of men 
protected 







Table 2. (cont.)  Major Supreme Court Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause 








blacks  Washington v. Davis (1976), 
Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke (1978), 
Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980), 
City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Company (1989), 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Peña (1995), Gratz v. 
Bollinger (2003), Grutter v. 
Bollinger (2003). 
Discriminatory impact not 
enough to invalidate law. 
Laws containing racial 
“classifications” are 
discriminatory; Dissent in 
Fullilove stresses that all 
racial classifications 
unconstitutional; Croson 
holds that a minority set-aside 
program excluding whites 
violates the EPC; Adarand 
holds that all racial 
classifications are 
unconstitutional; Michigan 
Cases together hold that 
affirmative action programs 
must be “narrowly tailored”. 
women Frontiero v. Richardson 
(1973), Kahn v. Shevin (1974), 
Geduldig v. Aiello (1974), 
Craig v. Boren (1976), 
Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), 
Orr v. Orr (1979), Kirchberg v. 
Feenstra (1981), Rokster v. 
Goldberg (1981), Mississippi 
Univ. for Women v. Hogan 
(1982), U.S. v. Virginia (1996). 
 
Frontiero plurality uses 
“immutable characteristics” as 
basis for using strict scrutiny; 
Kahn holds that gender is not 
an impermissible 
“classification”; Geduldig 




Califano protects widowers as 
much as widows. Orr holds 
that women must make 
alimony payments to men; 
Kirchberg holds that gender 
classifications not “narrowly 
tailored”; Rokster upholds 
male-only draft; Hogan holds 
that men can go to nursing 
school;Virginia holds that 
women can go to VMI. 
gay people Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 
Lawrence v. Texas (2003), 
Romer v. Evans (1996), Perry 
v. Schwarzenegger (U.S. 
District Court, 2010). 
No right to “homosexual 
sodomy” mutates into a 
fundamental right to 
consensual sexual intimacy;  
Discriminatory law struck 
down using rational basis test 
in Romer. Federal court (not 






With the major interpretations listed, I will now use legal hermeneutics in an 
attempt to prioritize these four interpretations in terms of degrees of hermeneutical 
credibility.  As  mentioned above, the procedure to be used is that for each interpretation I 
will first compare the interpretation to the spirit of the text as derived in Dialogue #1, 
after which  I will examine the Gadamerian “prejudices” of the Supreme Court Justices 
who contributed significantly to developing the interpretation (including an assessment as 
to whether these “prejudices” are “legitimate” or not in the Gadamerian sense).  At the 
end of Dialogue #2, I will then make a judgment call, based on all of this information, as 
to which of the four major interpretations is the most hermeneutically credible. 
Interpretation #1:  Clause Protects Blacks Only (1868-1895) 
The Interpretation 
The very first cases to decide the “meaning” of the Equal Protection Clause after 
the enactment of the Fourteenth
 
Amendment (and, arguably, the key doctrinal cases of 
this era) were The Slaughterhouse Cases and Bradwell v. Illinois, both decided in 1873.  
Recall that Slaughterhouse held, among other things, that the Equal Protection Clause 
applied only to blacks and Bradwell held that the Clause did not apply to women.   
Comparison to the Spirit of the Text   
Comparing this interpretation of the Clause to the spirit of the text, i.e., that the 
Clause operates to protect any marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated group from 
unequal treatment under the law,  Interpretation #1 (“blacks only”) seems to fare well in 
one sense but to not fare well in another sense.  The interpretation fares well in the sense 
that it contemplates rights under the Equal Protection Clause in terms of groups (i.e, 





protected.  Since blacks are arguably the prototypically marginalized, oppressed or 
subjugated group in the United States, and since Interpretation #1 protects blacks, 
Interpretation #1 is consistent with the spirit of the text.  Interpretation #1 does not fare 
well, however, in the sense that it specifically excludes women from protection under the 
Clause.  If it can be fairly said that women are a marginalized, oppressed, and subjugated 
group, then the fact that Interpretation #1 specifically excludes women is problematic and 
detracts from the hermeneutical credibility of the interpretation.   
Supreme Court Prejudices 
The next inquiry is into the “prejudices” of the Supreme Court Justices generating 
Interpretation #1 and whether those “prejudices” can be fairly said to be “legitimate” 
(supportive of the hermeneutic credibility of the interpretation) or “illegitimate” (i.e., 
damaging to the hermeneutic credibility of the interpretation) in the Gadamerian sense, 
i.e., whether the “prejudices” can be said to be in keeping with the Gadamerian 
“tradition” I have identified as the most relevant on the question of the meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause, i.e., the ideal of equality as found in the Declaration of 
Independence.  Recall from above that the idea is that to the extent that the prejudices 
affecting the interpretation are legitimate (i.e., in keeping with the ideal of equality), the 
prejudices add hermeneutic credibility to the interpretation affected by the prejudice; but 
to the extent that the prejudices affecting the interpretation are illegitimate (out of step 
with the ideal of equality), the prejudices detract from the hermeneutic credibility of the 
interpretation influenced by the prejudice. 
The Supreme Court deciding the earliest decisions interpreting the Equal 





Court, which was headed by Salman P. Chase.  Chief Justice Chase had replaced the 
notorious Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, who infamously wrote what is commonly 
understood as one of the most nefarious Supreme Court decisions ever handed down 
affecting the rights of blacks, Dred Scott v. Sandford (1856), mentioned above.
 32 
 While 
Taney had been stubborn, unsociable, and possessed an “inflated sense of judicial power” 
(Rosen 2007, 12), Chase was well-liked, welcomed by other members of the Court, and 
congenial (Silver 1957).  Chase was widely understood at the time of his appointment to 
have been very much on the side of the newly emancipated blacks (Ibid.: 204), and his 
Chief Justiceship was heralded in the press as ushering in a new, more humane, era of 
American jurisprudence (Ibid.).  But, although President Lincoln appointed Chase, the 
two did not always see eye to eye.
33
  In fact, as early as 1865, it seemed that Chase might 
very well oppose Lincoln Administration policies in his decisions (Ibid.: 209).  The point 
for purposes of the present inquiry is that Chase was a humanist who supported the 
emancipation of the slaves, but he can hardly be characterized as having been politically 
“in bed”, to use the term of politics, with the President who appointed him. In other 
words, Chase was known for his humanity and his independence. 
Justice Samuel F. Miller delivered the opinion of the Court in both The 
Slaughterhouse Cases and Bradwell v. Illinois.  Miller was born in Richmond, Kentucky, 
obtained a degree in medicine and practiced medicine for twelve years (Commission 
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 The Taney Court notoriously wrote in Dred Scott that in their opinion the Framers 
thought that blacks “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”    
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 This clash can arguably be attributed to the fact that it was widely known that Chase‟s 
real and abiding ambition was not to be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court but the President 





1992).  In Richmond, “nobody was rich and nobody was poor; there were very few 
slaves” (Cushman 1995). The eldest of eight children, Miller was very close to his mother 
growing up helped her a lot with the family responsibilities (Cushman 1995).  Miller then 
developed an interest in law and started studying it, after which he was admitted to the 
bar in 1847 (Commission 1992).  He had no formal legal education (Cushman 1995).  
Miller is said to have been “energetic and unpretentious” (Cushman 1995: 177).  Miller 
was married twice (Ibid.).  His first wife died (Ibid.).  His second wife, with whom he had 
two children, was “high-spirited and warm-hearted” (Ibid. 178).  Miller denounced 
slavery, calling it “the most stupendous wrong, and the most prolific source of human 
misery, both to the master and the slave” (Ibid., 178).  When the state of Kentucky 
refused to abolish slavery, he freed his slaves anyway and moved to a free state, Iowa 
(Ibid.).  Miller was concerned when asked to join the Supreme Court that had rendered 
decisions like Dred Scott v. Sanford  (Cushman 1995: 179).   He said he “hated” Chief 
Justice Rober B. Taney for delivering that decision (Ibid.).   
Chief Justice Chase, then, was an independent-minded humanitarian and Samuel 
F. Miller was a self-educated lawyer who was close to his mother and detested the 
institution of slavery.  It would seem that the “prejudices” of two such persons would 
therefore be “legitimate” vis-à-vis the decisions they informed, in the sense that these 
particular “prejudices” do not seem to be at odds, but rather seem to be in keeping with 
the ideal of equality contained in the Declaration of Independence.   
Comparing Interpretation #1 to the spirit of the text, this interpretation seems 
hermeneutically credible to the extent that it protects the rights of groups, particularly 





“prejudices” of the Chief Justice and the writer of both opinions seem “legitimate,” i.e., 
in keeping with the ideal of equality, that is, the “prejudices” do not seem to undermine 
the credibility of their decisions as to the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Interpretation #2: Separate But Equal (1896-1953)   
 The Interpretation 
 The key cases decided in this era, arguably, were Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 
Muller v. Oregon (1908), and Goesaert v. Cleary (1948).  The interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of this era is that the equality rights of blacks were satisfied by separate 
facilities for blacks, as long as those facilities were “equal” and that women have no right 
to equality vis-à-vis their choice of profession, or the right to long hours, and this state of 
affairs is for women‟s and society‟s own good.  On this view, “social inequality” is not 
redressable by appeal to the Equal Protection Clause only “legal inequality.”  
Interestingly, the difference between social and legal inequality seems to parse out in 
such a way that operates to perpetuate and support the legalized subordination of blacks 
(in the form of Jim Crow laws) and women (in the form of laws preventing women from 
adopting the career of their choice).  Somehow, on this view, the racial segregation of 
public facilities as well as the decision that the state can pass laws preventing women 
from tending bar or limiting the hours they could legally work are both examples of 
social inequality rather than legal equality.   
 Comparison to the Spirit of the Text 
 Comparing Interpretation #2  to the spirit of the text, i.e., that the Equal Protection 
Clause operates to protect any marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated group from 





interpretation that there are socially salient differences between blacks and whites, and 
between women and men – differences that warrant separate public facilities for blacks 
and for whites, and that also warrant preventing women from working at the jobs of their 
choice for whatever hours they choose – is arguably revealed as a clever mechanism 
designed to perpetuate the oppression and subjugation of these groups without doing so 
explicitly.  Interpretation #2 therefore fails when compared to the spirit of the text. 
 Supreme Court Prejudices 
 Melville Weston Fuller was the Chief Justice for both Plessy and Muller.  Fuller 
was the direct descendant of someone who came over on the Mayflower and  dropped out 
of law school without graduating in 1855 (Steamer 1986: 120).  He attended but dropped 
out Harvard Law School after only six months (Ibid.).  Muller “use[d] strong political 
rhetoric to criticize Abraham Lincoln” at one point (Ibid.: 121) and condemned Lincoln‟s 
Emancipation Proclamation, saying that it “annul[led] the constitutions and laws of 
sovereign states, [overthrew] their domestic relations, [and] depriv[ed] loyal men of their 
property….”  (Ibid.: 121).  His attitude toward abolition was similar to that of Taney (the 
Chief Justice who made the Dred Scott decision, referenced above) (Ibid.: 121).  Fuller 
supported state constitutional provisions that rejected black suffrage, barred black 
migration, and helped segregate Chicago schools (Klarman 2004: 16).   
 Justice Henry B. Brown was the writer of the Plessy (separate but equal) decision 
and Justice David J. Brewer was the writer of Muller (state law could limit the working 
hours of women).  Brown was born in New England into a Puritan family (Cushman 
1995).  Brown went to Yale College and attended both Yale and Harvard law schools 





District of Michigan (Ibid.).  When the Civil War rolled around, he hired a substitute to 
perform his military service (Cushman 1995).  He was not in favor of emancipation 
(Ibid.).  People saw him as warm and sociable (Ibid.).  During his years on the Supreme 
Court, Brown‟s decisions were generally centrist, opting to try to find a compromise and 
avoiding dissents (Ibid.).  Brewer was born in what is now Turkey into a missionary 
family (Commission 1992).    He attended Wesleyan University for two years and then 
Yale (Ibid.).  He went to Albany Law School and graduated in 1858 (Ibid.).  He was a 
District Court judge for four years and the Kansas Supreme Court for fourteen years 
(Ibid.).  While there, Brewer‟s decisions were conventional but often individualistic 
(Cushman 1995).  Brewer has traditionally been understood as conservative and 
“sympathetic to business interests and the rights of property” (Cushman 1995: 253).  
Brewer was very receptive to the argument made by the attorney for the State of Oregon 
in Muller that long working hours had terrible effects on the health, safety, and morals of 
working women (Ibid.). 
 Fred M. Vinson was the Chief Justice on Goesaert v. Cleary (upholding a 
Michigan law banning women from obtaining licenses to tend bar unless they were the 
wives or daughters of a male owner).  Vinson was born in Louisa, Kentucky and had a 
friendly, warm, relaxed demeanor and was known for his ability to “conciliate the views 
of warring factions”  (Steamer 1986: 244).  From a small town, Vinson was born into 
“modest circumstances” (his father was the county jailer) but through his own hard work 
moved into the “highest circles of national government” (Ibid).  Vinson went to public 
schools and received both a bachelor‟s degree and law degree from Center College (Ibid., 





Roosevelt‟s “chief troubleshooter” during the war years of 1943 and 1944 (Ibid).  When 
Harry Truman became president, he named Vinson as secretary of the treasury.  A strong 
bond soon developed between Vinson and Harry Truman (Ibid 246).  Then, on June 6 
President Truman nominated Vinson to as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Ibid., 
247).  Vinson had deep intellectual strength but was also arrogant (Cushman 1995: 421).   
Vinson had great success on the issues of race relations and civil rights (Ibid.).  He wrote 
the Court‟s unanimous opinions in three civil rights cases, Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (1950), and Sweatt v. Painter (1950).  Vinson‟s 
views on women are not clear from the historical record, so it is difficult to determine 
whether or how any prejudices he might have had regarding women as a group may have 
affected his decision in Goesaert.     
 Justice Felix Frankfurter delivered the opinion in Goesaert.  Frankfurter was born 
in Vienna, Austria in 1882 (Commission 1992).  He graduated from the College of the 
City of New York and Harvard Law School (Ibid).   He was first in his class in all three 
of his years at Harvard (Cushman 1995).  He worked as an Assistant United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, as a legal officer in the War 
Department‟s Bureau of Insular Affairs, and eventually the Secretary of War 
(Commission 1992).  In the 1920s, Frankfurter helped defend victims of the raids on 
alleged communists during the “red scares” (Cushman 1992).   He was a friend of the 
NAACP and had a founding membership in the ACLU (Ibid.).  He was nominated to the 
Supreme Court by Franklin D. Roosevelt on January 5, 1939 (Commission 1992).  
Frankfurter‟s wife was an “astonishingly bright woman, every bit her husband‟s 





favor of judicial restraint (Ibid.).   He is known to have said, “[I]t is not the duty of judges 
to express their personal attitudes on [„grave and complex problems…that excite the 
public interest‟], deep as their individual convictions may be.  The opposite is the truth; it 
is their duty not to act merely on personal views” (Cushman 1992).   
 It appears, then, that Chief Justice Fuller was no intellectual giant and that he was 
a  defender of the philosophy behind Jim Crow, i.e., that blacks should be kept separate 
from whites.  Such a prejudice obviously influenced the Court‟s decision in Plessy.  
Further, because this prejudice seems out of step with the ideal of equality contained in 
the American ethos, this prejudice seems to be illegitimate.  I found no data that might 
inform Chief Justice Fuller‟s “prejudices” on the concept of female equality.  The 
evidence available on the life of Justice Henry Brown, the writer of Plessy, indicates 
mostly that he was the kind of person to go along with the crowd (“avoiding dissents”), 
so it is unclear what his relevant prejudices might have been.    Brewer, who wrote 
Muller, was a conservative who likely thought, as was the conventional conservative 
wisdom of the day, that women were in need of protection.  All of this information taken 
together arguably detracts from the hermeneutic credibility of Interpretation #2. 
 Regarding Goesaert v.Cleary, Chief Justice Vinson‟s views on women‟s equality 
are unclear from the information available and Frankfurter, who wrote the opinion, 
favored judicial restraint.  Together, these facts – especially Frankfurter‟s preference for 
judicial restraint – seem to indicate that neither Justice would favor remedial measures to 
equalize the status of women in society, i.e., that neither Justice was particularly in favor 
of having a role in effectuating the ideal  of equality for women.  This information , as 





Interpretation #3:  Suspect Classes  (1954-1973) 
The Interpretation 
During the period from 1954 to 1973, the Supreme Court struck down racial 
segregation in public schools (Brown v. Board of Education), outlawed anti-
miscegenation laws across the country (Loving v. Virginia), and for the first time found 
that discrimination against women was cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause, 
albeit only using the rational basis test (Reed v. Reed).  In all of these cases, the Court 
explicitly interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as operating to provide a remedy for 
the unequal treatment suffered by blacks and the unequal treatment suffered by women 
throughout the history of the United States. The Court was consistent throughout the rest 
of this period that discrimination against blacks and discrimination on the basis of gender  
were both constitutionally impermissible.  The Court in this period used strict scrutiny as 
the level of judicial review applicable in cases of racial discrimination, and eventually 
established intermediate scrutiny as the level of review in cases of discrimination against 
women. 
 Comparison to the Spirit of the Text 
 Comparing Interpretation #3 to the spirit of the text, it seems that Interpretation #3 
fares fairly well in the sense that it ties Equal Protection to groups rather than, as later 
interpretations will do, tying Equal Protection to particular traits.  However, recall from 
Dialogue #1 that the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause also seems to require that strict 
scrutiny should be the applicable level of judicial review regardless of the type or kind of 
marginalized, subjugated, or oppressed group involved.  To the extent that Interpretation 
#3 applies different levels of judicial review to the different marginalized, oppressed, or 





Supreme Court Prejudices 
During what I am calling the Suspect Class period, Earl Warren was the Chief 
Justice from the beginning to 1969 and Warren Burger was the Chief Justice thereafter.  
During his time as Chief Justice, all Supreme Court scholars agree that Earl Warren had a 
very strong effect on how all of the cases were decided (See, e.g., Cushman 1995; 
Steamer 1986; Choper 1987; Commission 1992; Schwartz 1993).   
Earl Warren was born in 1891 in Los Angeles (Cushman 1995: 436) to parents 
who were born in Scandinavia.  Warren attended the University of California at Berkeley 
and then attended the university‟s open law school (Ibid.).  He enlisted in the army and 
became a district attorney.  A 1931 survey said Warrant was “the best district attorney in 
the United States” (Ibid.).  He married a Swedish-born woman, Nina Palmquist Meyers 
and had six children with her (Ibid.: 437).  “The importance of Nina and the family to 
Warren and his career cannot be overstated,” according to the Supreme Court Historical 
Society (Ibid.), as his home and family life “provided the foundation for his scale of 
values throughout his professional life”  (Ibid.).  Warren is not understood to have been a 
profound legal scholar, but had excellent leadership skills (Ibid.: 438).  At the first 
conference discussing Brown v. Board of Education, Warren stated that segregation could 
only be justified if blacks were inherently  inferior, placing at the center of the 
conversation not legal scholarship but the “ultimate human values involved”  (Ibid.).    
The fore-structure of understanding/horizon of Earl Warren seems to be one of a centered 
and balanced family man who was guided in his decisions more by the heart than the 






The Court that decided Reed v. Reed (finding for the first time that discrimination 
against women was cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause but using the rational 
basis test) was the Burger Court.  Chief Justice Warren Burger was born on September 
17, Constitution Day, in 1907 in St. Paul, Minnesota (Cushman 1995: 481).  He had 
many jobs as a child, including a daily newspaper route and helping make theatrical 
backdrops on the weekends (Ibid.).  He was greatly influenced by his mother and 
contributed to the family finances   (Ibid.).  Burger went to night school and worked as an 
accountant (Ibid.: 482).  He went to the St. Paul College of Law at night and graduated 
magna cum laude, after which he taught at the law school for seventeen years  as an 
adjunct professor of contracts (Ibid.).   He also joined an established law firm and 
practiced there for twenty-one years (Ibid.).   He met and married a schoolteacher and 
had two children with her (Ibid).  Burger served as assistant attorney general for the Civil 
Division of the Justice Department, and was a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit for thirteen years.  President Nixon nominated Burger to be 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on May 21, 1969 (Ibid.: 483) where he almost always 
voted on the side of the greater consensus (Ibid.: 484).  In what the Supreme Court 
Historical Society calls a “historic irony,” because Nixon had appointed Burger, Burger 
delivered the opinion in a 1974 case that led to Nixon‟s resignation (Ibid.), United States 
v. Nixon (1974).  Burger‟s decisions “generally took each case on its own merits, paid 
close attention to the facts, and were narrowly crafted to the issues at hand” (Ibid.).  
Burger‟s judicial style has been called “moderate, balanced, and pragmatic” rather than 
political influenced by any particular politics (Ibid.: 485).  The forestructure of 





in which he made decisions on a case-by-case basis, trying as much as possible to operate 
as a disinterested third party in his decisions, even to the point of being the one to have to 
fire the person who hired him when he was called upon to do so.  Burger also wrote the 
decision in Reed v. Reed. 
The three representative decisions selected to discuss Interpretation #3 were all 
written by the Chief Justice of the Court.  Whatever the prejudices of these Chief 
Justices, then, they are all over the decisions they decided.  Particularly in the case of Earl 
Warren, it is well known that he had a strong influence over every decision that came 
before his court.  While not known as a top legal scholar, Warren was well known as 
having a commitment to racial equality.  Such a prejudice is definitely in keeping with 
the tradition we are taking to operate as a guide to the legitimacy of a given 
interpretation, i.e., the ideal of equality contained in the Declaration of Independence.  
This “prejudice” therefore lends a high degree of credibility Interpretation #3.  Chief 
Justice Burger‟s prejudices, because he also wrote the decision in Reed v. Reed, heavily 
influenced the decision there, according to the legal hermeneutical approach to 
interpretation.  So, the decision in Reed, i.e., that discrimination against women violated 
the Equal Protection Clause, but also finding that neither heightened nor strict scrutiny 
was the appropriate level of judicial review for cases of alleged discrimination against 
women, seems in keeping with who Burger seems to have been, i.e., a pragmatist who 
preferred compromise to taking sides.  The question is whether such a prejudice 
(pragmatism) is in keeping with the ideal of equality, and it does not seem that the answer 






Interpretation #4:  Suspect Classification Doctrine (1973-present) 
 The Interpretation 
 Suspect Classification Doctrine has had a long reign and at bottom is the view that 
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of certain human traits 
and not others, and provides different levels of protection depending upon the trait.  The 
focus of Suspect Classification Doctrine is individual rights rather than groups rights; that 
is, Suspect Classification Doctrine prohibits discrimination on the basis of race regardless 
of the race of the petitioner and prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender regardless 
of the gender of the petitioner.  It does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  For racial discrimination, Suspect Classification Doctrine uses strict 
scrutiny, for discrimination on the basis of gender, the doctrine uses “intermediate” 
scrutiny, and uses the rational basis test for discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. 
 Comparison to the Spirit of the Text 
 Suspect Classification Doctrine does not fare well when compared with the spirit 
of the text. Most obviously, the doctrine protects individuals rather than groups.  
Additionally, it does not operate to protect the rights of marginalized, oppressed, and 
subjugated groups, but instead often operates to protect members of historically non-
marginalized, non-oppressed, and non-subjugated groups.  Additionally, instead of 
applying strict scrutiny across the board  (for example to a law that discriminates upon 
the basis of any problematic “trait,”), Suspect Classification Doctrine applies different 
levels of review, depending upon the trait. Suspect Classification Doctrine then 





Protection Clause and for that reason can safely be placed at the bottom of the list of 
hermeneutically credible existing major interpretations without regard to consideration of 
the Supreme Court prejudices affecting it.  However, for the sake of completeness, I will 
make a few brief remarks about the Rehnquist Court, which lasted almost twenty years 
and under which Suspect Classification took hold and became established as the standard 
way of thinking about the Equal Protection Clause. 
 Supreme Court Prejudices 
All of decisions comprising Suspect Classification Doctrine were made during the 
Rehnquist Court years, which had a very long reign – from 1986 to 2005 – and played a 
huge role in developing Suspect Classification Doctrine.  Chief Justice Rehnquist was 
born the son of a paper salesman on October 1, 1924 (Cushman 1995: 496).  He served in 
the Army Air Corps during World War II, after which he obtained a B.A. and M.A. in 
political science at Stanford (Ibid.).  He obtained another M.A. from Harvard and then 
went to Stanford Law school, graduating first in his class (Ibid.).  He had a reputation as a 
strong advocate of conservative political views (Ibid.: 497).  Rehnquist married Natalie 
Cornell in 1953 and had three children with her (Ibid.).   He moved to Phoenix in part 
because of its conservative politics (Ibid.).   Rehnquist often spoke of  states‟ rights and 
limited federal judicial power in his early years on the Court (Ibid.: 498).  He was in 
disagreement with the other eight members of the Court that the Equal Protection Clause 
applied to discrimination against illegitimate children, resident aliens, and women (Ibid.).  
Rehnquist “insisted that the Equal Protection Clause had only marginal application in 
cases of racial discrimination,” he “urged the Court to overturn Mapp v. Ohio (1961),” 





(1966),”  which required police to read suspects of their rights before interrogation (Ibid., 
499)  Rehnquist dissented in Roe v. Wade (1973), which granted women the right to 
choose an abortion, and dissented in United Steel Workers of America v. Weber (1979), in 
which the Court denied the Equal Protection made by a white worker who claimed that 
the company he worked for, Kaiser Aluminum, had discriminated against him  because 
he was white (Ibid.,: 499).   Rehnquist was characterized by Newsweek as “The Court‟s 
Mr. Right” (Newsweek, July 23, 1979: 68) and by the New York Times as “doctrinaire,” 
and “right-wing,” and the Court‟s “most predictable conservative member”  (New York 
Times, July 12, 1981, §4: 22).  Rehnquist stated at one time that he had joined the Court 
with a desire to counteract the Warren Court decisions (New York Times, March 3, 1985,   
Magazine: 33).   When Rehnquist was a Supreme Court clerk, he wrote a memo on 
Brown v. Board of Education explicitly urging that Separate But Equal Doctrine was 
“right and should be affirmed” (Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee 1986). 
Clearly, then, Rehnquist‟s “prejudices” were along conservative lines.  During his 
tenure as Chief Justice, there was a clear shift in Equal Protection Analysis from a focus 
on group rights to a focus on individual rights.  This was a clear shift away from the spirit 
of the Equal Protection Clause as I have developed it, rendering Interpretation #4, 
Suspect Classification Doctrine, the least hermeneutically credible of all of the major 
interpretations as I have developed them. 
The Answer 
As I hope Dialogue #2 has shown, of the four major interpretations, Interpretation 
#4, Suspect Classification, has the lowest degree of hermeneutic credibility.  This is so 





at all and instead protects individuals from discrimination on the basis of traits.  
Additionally, Interpretation #4 assigns different levels of protection to different traits, a 
concept which is antithetical to the spirit of the text which demands that all 
unconstitutional discrimination be prohibited to the same degree.  The conclusion that 
Suspect Classification Doctrine is the least hermeneutically credible of all the major is 
reinforced by the discovery that the “prejudices” of Chief Justice Rehnquist are wholly 
out of step with the ideal of equality as contained in the Declaration of Independence.   
Interpretation #2, Separate But Equal, is the next lowest in hermeneutic 
credibility.  Interpretation #2 is better than Suspect Classification  Doctrine in that it 
acknowledges that the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause is such that groups should be 
the subject of investigation rather than individuals or traits.  However, the fact that 
Separate But Equal Doctrine operates to socially stigmatize historically marginalized, 
oppressed, or subjugated groups rather than to increase their level of equality in society 
makes Interpretation #2 the next lowest in hermeneutic credibility. 
Just above Interpretation #2 is Interpretation #1, “Blacks Only.”   When compared 
to the spirit of the text, Interpretation #1 fares well in the sense that it focuses on group 
rights rather than the “traits” of individuals.  It also fares well in the sense that it allows 
for the special protection of blacks, arguably the prototypical marginalized, oppressed, 
and subjugated group in American society.  Interpretation #1 does not fare well, however, 
in that it explicitly fails to protect the rights of women, assuming it is fair to say that 
women are a marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated group. 
 Finally, Interpretation #3, Suspect Classes, has the most hermeneutic credibility 





discrimination on the basis of the “traits” of individuals.  It understands that the spirit of 
the Equal Protection Clause was that it protects marginalized, oppressed, and subjugated 
groups as well.  However, recall from Dialogue #1 that the spirit of the Equal Protection 
Clause also seems to require that strict scrutiny should be the applicable level of judicial 
review regardless of the type or kind of marginalized, subjugated, or oppressed group 
involved.  To the extent that Interpretation #3 applies different levels of judicial review to 
the different marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated groups, then, it does not seem to be 
hermeneutically credible.  Still, compared to the alternatives, Interpretation #3 seems to 
be the most consistent with the spirit of the text of all of the interpretations.  Additionally, 
Interpretation #3 was heavily influenced by Chief Justice Earl Warren who, by all 
accounts, held as a guiding principle in his tenure as Chief Justice, using the Equal 






”[Legal] hermeneutics is normative because although it implies that a text 
is always seen through the lenses of the intervening history and tradition 
of interpretations, it holds that an interpretation that is more conscious of 
this intervening history is better and less dogmatic than one that is less 




Chapter 5:  Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommendations for Future Research 
Discussion 
This project arose out of a long-standing concern I  had since law school that the 
way the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was being interpreted by 
the Supreme Court in the contemporary era (roughly since the mid to late 1980s) was 
problematic in two key ways.  First, the interpretation was out of step with what I had 
been raised to believe was the purpose of the Clause:  namely a vehicle for use by people 
of color to challenge and then have struck down laws designed to marginalize, oppress, or 
subjugate them.  Second, the various Supreme Court decisions I read in law school were 
not consistent as to the meaning of the Clause, i.e., read together the cases did not seem 
to me to admit of any sort of consistent or coherent legal doctrine.  In jurisprudence class, 
I thought I discovered the root of this inconsistency when I learned about the Critical 
Legal Studies Movement.  From the perspective of Critical Legal Studies, there was 
actually no “meaning” of the Equal Protection Clause to be found.  Instead, every 
Supreme Court decision was a function of politics.  Recall from Chapter 3 that from the 
perspective of Critical Legal Studies, it was no surprise that Equal Protection 
jurisprudence was inconsistent and self-contradictory.  All law, from the perspective of 
the Crits, is inconsistent and self-contradictory.  All law is politics and nothing more.  
The reason that there have been many interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause 
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throughout the years, on this view, is that what the Equal Protection Clause means will be 
decided by different people at different times depending on their particular political 
persuasion, and there was nothing more to the Clause‟s “meaning” than this. 
But, could that be all there was to the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, I 
asked myself?  When Thurgood Marshall stood before the Supreme Court in 1952 to 
argue in Brown v. Board of Education that the only justification for separate schools for 
children of different races was not a constitutionally sound one, but one designed to keep 
a people who were at one time slaves as near that stage as possible, was there no credible 
basis for him to have made that argument?  Was there no credible basis for the Supreme 
Court to have concluded in Brown that separate schools were “inherently unequal” under 
the Equal Protection Clause?  The word “separate” just means detached, away from, 
other than.  Surely, “separate” does not inherently mean unequal.  If we look only to the 
word “separate” itself, that is, if the “meaning” of the word is just to have its standard 
dictionary definition; if we take, in other words, a standard analytic approach to what the 
“meaning” of “separate” is in the phrase, “separate schools,”  then there is no reason why 
separate schools could not be equal.  But, the Supreme Court did not merely say in Brown 
that separate schools for black children and white children were unequal in fact, leaving 
open the possibility that separate schools could also have the possibility of being equal.  
No. Instead, the Supreme Court declared that “separate” schools were inherently unequal, 
i.e., intrinsically unequal or essentially unequal.  Leaving aside the philosophical question 
of whether anything can be inherently any particular way (i.e., leaving aside the question 
of the possibility of intrinsic value), let us the examine the question of just what the 





unequal.  It seems to me obvious that the only thing the Court could have meant is that in 
the particular socio-historical context of public school education in 1954 in the United 
States, separate schools for children of different races were inherently unequal. 
Was this an accident?  How did it happen that the link between “separate” schools 
and the fact that the schools for children of one racial group were clearly of a lower 
quality than the schools for children of another racial group?  Was it mere chance that 
caused the schools of black children under Jim Crow to be almost always of a lower 
quality than the schools for white children?  Could it have happened, in other words, that 
the schools of white children under Jim Crow had been the ones to have ended up as the 
“inherently” lower quality schools?  In other words, was the mere fact that children of 
different races were segregated from each other the root cause of the “inherent” 
difference in quality between the schools of black children and the schools of white 
children?  To state this question differently, was the “immutability” of race and the 
making of distinctions between children on the basis of that immutable trait the evil that 
had to be rooted out and eliminated as a basis upon which to make distinctions between 
groups of children in public education?  Did the mere fact of black children‟s only going 
to school with each other cause the “inherent” unequal status of their schools? 
It seems to me that the answer to all of these questions is obviously no.  But, it 
also seems to me that the Supreme Court got it right when it declared in 1954 that 
separate schools between black children and white children were at that time “inherently 
unequal,” and I arrive at that conclusion by taking a hermeneutical approach to 
determining what “inherently unequal” meant in the context of segregated public schools 





any text, from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics, is derived from looking not 
just at the words of the text (as an analytic approach to meaning would suggest) but at the 
historical context in which the text was written,  by looking as well at the grander text in 
which the text to be examined is situated, at the writer of the text and his or her 
Gadamerian “prejudices” so that those prejudices can be examined in terms of their 
legitimacy, and ultimately by looking to the spirit of the text and the “tradition” in which 
it takes place. 
From a legal hermeneutical perspective, the “inherent” inequality between schools 
set aside for black children and schools for  white children in 1954 is based in the 
historical reality that the schools for black children were set up in the first place to 
maintain social segregation between black children and white children, i.e., to maintain 
white supremacy after the  Civil War.  In other words, the phrase “inherently unequal” 
means incapable of being equal owing to the history of marginalization, subjugation, and 
oppression of black people in the United States.  The issue in Brown, in other words, was 
not whether racial segregation in the abstract was problematic, regardless of the races of 
the children involved.  Instead, the issue was that black children were not getting a 
quality education in virtue of the long history in the United States of the oppression of 
black people, and all of the socioeconomic ills that resulted from that oppression, 
including generations and generations of subpar educational opportunities. 
I raise the question of the meaning of the phrase “inherently unequal” to highlight 
what I believe to be the most attractive feature of approaching legal interpretation 
hermeneutically, i.e., the addition of substance and a kind of epistemological superiority 





hermeneutics reveals to be at the very core of what happens any time anyone sits down to 
understand any text, including a legal text.  Those factors include an examination of the 
historical context in which the text was written, a sober assessment of the intentionality 
of the interpreter(s), and a search for what Ast called the “one idea”, or Grundidee, that 
ties together the parts and the whole of a given text giving the text a kind of teleological 
content and simultaneously giving the meaning of the text a kind of normative 
dimension; and it is this normative dimension that sets legal hermeneutics, as I have 
derived it, apart from approaches that are more typically continental approaches, as I 
have described them, in the sense that legal hermeneutics provides a basis upon which to 
prioritize one interpretation over another, i.e., a basis upon which to make value 
judgments about degrees of objectivity of different interpretations. 
Conclusion 
So, it is my conclusion that, from the perspective of legal hermeneutics, in any 
given interpretive moment, there are some interpretations that are better than other 
interpretations.  It is also my conclusion that in the present interpretive moment, 
Interpretation #3, Suspect Classes, is the most hermeneutically credible of all of the four 
major interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause as I have developed them, for the 
primary reason that it understands that the spirit of Equal Protection Analysis is that it is 
there to protect groups of people who are marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated, rather 
than to protect individuals who are not members of marginalized, oppressed, or 
subjugated groups .   
It seems, however, that a fuller legal hermeneutical investigation into the meaning 





Clause than that outlined by Interpretation #3.  Specifically, while the Suspect Class 
approach links the degree of judicial review available in a given case to whether the 
petitioner is a member of a particular group , an interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause that is more consistent with the spirit of the text would provide the same level of 
judicial review to anyone who is a member of any marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated 
group, i.e., strict scrutiny.
2
   
The threshold question, then, in any Equal Protection case, on this view, would be 
whether the group to which the petitioner belongs is marginalized, oppressed, or 
subjugated.  If so, the Equal Protection Clause is available for use to challenge a 
discriminatory law and strict scrutiny would apply.  If not, the Equal Protection Clause is 
not available for use to challenge a discriminatory law at all.  In other words, once a 
given group is understood to be marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated, strict scrutiny 
would be the appropriate level of judicial review to apply to any law that discriminates 
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 It is important to make clear that I am making the strong claim that the interpretation of 
the Equal Protection Clause derived in this work is the best interpretation available in the present 
interpretive moment regarding what the Clause means.  I am not merely making the weak claim, 
in other words, that the interpretation derived here is one of many equally viable interpretations.  
If I were making the weak claim, then there would be no difference in legitimacy or objectivity 
between a legal hermeneutical interpretation and any continental/anti-foundationalist approach, 
and one of the primary motivations behind this project is to demonstrate that legal hermeneutics 
is an improvement upon these approaches in terms of the possibilities for objective, or at least 
quasi-objective interpretation.  In other words, the claim being made is that legal hermeneutics, 
properly handled, will lead to the closest thing possible to a correct interpretation at any given 
time.  An additional claim being made is that the greater the sophistication or degree of detail or 
precision of the set of hermeneutical tools used to derive a particular interpretation, the greater the 
degree of objectivity of the interpretation derived. The more we know, for example, about the life 
and values (the facticity or schema of intelligibility) of a previous interpretive agent, the better we 
are able to assess the legitimacy or illegitimacy of his or her prejudices, for example.  Still, all 
hermeneutical roads lead to Rome, so to speak, within a given interpretive moment, the idea 
being that the various interpretations derived through legal hermeneutics within a given 
interpretive moment will not differ in any substantial degree.  So, while relativity of method in 
any particular legal hermeneutical search for meaning is assumed within a given interpretive 





against a member of that group in virtue of being a member of the group, regardless of 
which particular marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated group is involved. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 The Ideal of Equality 
 In a sense this entire project hinges on the answer to the question of what is meant 
by “equality” in the Equal Protection Clause, in equal protection jurisprudence, or in the 
American ethos.  A fuller or more complete hermeneutical investigation into the meaning 
of the Equal Protection Clause would therefore include hermeneutical inquiry into the 
meaning of “equality” in these ways.  The preliminary framework for such an 
investigation would be an investigation into the meaning of equality in the Declaration of 
Independence, since although the Constitution itself makes no mention of equality, the 
Declaration of Independence does,  and as one of the companion foundational documents 
of the United States, the Declaration can be understood to be preliminarily constitutive of 
the American ethos on the topic.  Another question to investigate, then, is the relationship 
between the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, or between the 
Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection Clause.  But, even if the answer to 
this question turns out to be that the relationship between these two foundational 
American documents is a close one, the next question to investigate would be What is the 
spirit of the Declaration of Independence? The answer to this question would begin with 
any historical data available as to the intentions of the drafter(s) of the document, and 
then proceed to put those intentions in historical context.  The next question would be 
how the concept of equality is understood in American society today, as this, too, would 





 Another path to take on the question of the meaning of equality in the American 
ethos would be to trace the historical progression of the concept of equality within liberal 
political theory, arguably the theoretical context in which all of the foundational 
American documents were composed.  Such a project might begin by comparing Plato‟s 
conception of (political) equality (as found in the Republic) to Aristotle‟s (in his Politics).  
The development of these two, differing concepts of equality would then be traced into 
specific themes in classical social contract theory (Hobbes‟s conception in Leviathan, 
Locke‟s conception in The Second Treatise of Government, and Rousseau‟s conception in 
On the Social Contract) and also just beyond classical social contract theory into modern 
democratic political theory (e.g., in de Tocqueville).  I would then look to several 
contemporary renditions of the concept of equality in, for example, Marx, Rawls, Nagel, 
Nozick, and Amartya Sen for information on competing themes in the current 
understanding of equality. 
 Another way to examine the concept of equality is through challenging what is 
understood to be the theoretical difference between equality of opportunity and equality 
of outcome.  Many critical legal theorists (and critical race theorists as well) claim, for 
example, that the equality of opportunity touted by mainstream liberal theorists is 
equality of outcome in the Aristotelian sense in disguise, i.e., the idea that equals are 
entitled to equal shares of primary (and even secondary) social goods and unequals are 
entitled to unequal (inferior) shares of primary (and secondary) social goods.  The path I 
would take would likely be similar, guided by the idea that whenever equality is 
discussed, equality of outcome is always the issue at hand, forcing those with more 





equality of opportunity always ultimately and necessarily comes down to equality of 
outcome, such that liberal rights theory is undermined at its core; or they must make the 
equally disturbing confession that they accept the Aristotelian concept of equality:  
equality for equals and inequality for unequals.  Either way, the case is made for remedial 
(i.e., affirmative) action for marginalized, oppressed, and subjugated groups pursuant to 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
 Women and Sexual Minorities 
 The project would be improved as well by strengthening the case for the 
applicability of the remedial nature of the Equal Protection Clause to women and sexual 
minorities. This could be accomplished in at least four general ways.  First, a structural 
analysis of the Reconstruction Amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments), considered together, could be used to point out, for example, that of all 
three of the Reconstruction Amendments, only the Fourteenth makes no reference to 
either black people or slaves.  Instead, the language used is general, leaving open the 
possibility that groups other than blacks were meant to be specially protected by the 
Amendment.  Second, the historical record of the proceedings of the 39
th
 Congress (or 
any other Congresses between the enactment of the reconstruction Amendments and the 
19
th
 Amendment, giving women the right to vote) could be examined for explicit 
references on the part of the writers of the Equal Protection Clause and the Fourteenth 
Amendment linking the rights of women to the rights of African Americans.  Third, more 
detailed investigation into how the abolitionists who wrote the Equal Protection Clause 
defined the term “dissident and unpopular groups” would be helpful to establish the 





Finally, more facts could also be added about the present unequal status of women and 
the present unequal status of gays. 
 The Perspectives of the Groups Themselves 
Another of the areas of future research recommended is into the perspectives of 
the three groups themselves (blacks, women, and gay people) on the question of what the 
Equal Protection Clause means.  Recall from the approaches to legal hermeneutics of 
both Jürgen Habermas and Susan Judith Hoffman outlined in Chapter 3 that hermeneutic 
credibility is increased when the dialogue as to the meaning of a given text proactively 
includes consultation with the perspectives of those affected by the meaning, particularly 
when those affected are powerless.  The approach to legal hermeneutics I am advocating 
and hope to develop further in future research will always actively attempt to include in 
dialogues on the meaning of any law the perspective or perspectives of those affected by 
a given law.  That said, it is conceded that prospect of being able to ascertain anything on 
the order of a univocal voice for a given oppressed group is absurd on its face.  However, 
it seems also fair to say that vis-à-vis the experience of being oppressed as a group in 
American society, there are trends and approaches to the question of what it means to be 
a member of a given oppressed group in relation to the American ideal of equality that 
can be understood to be representative of the majority, or at least a substantial number, of 
the members of a given oppressed group.  A given interpreter (a Supreme Court Justice) 
may approach these dialogues with an idea already formed as to the nature of the 
inequality of a particular group, i.e., with a given Gadamerian “prejudice” on the topic  
(e.g., women might need equal pay for equal work), for example, but must always be 





their understanding of what equality would mean for them, rather than the interpreter‟s 
“prejudiced” view. 
Marginalized, Oppressed, or Subjugated? 
Yet another recommended area for future research is on the question of how to 
define “marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated.”  The interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause derived in this work hinges on an initial determination as to whether 
the petitioner challenging a particular law as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause is a member of a marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated group.  There seem to be 
two challenges with this aspect of the recommended interpretation.  First, on what basis 
will a determination that a group is marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated be made?  
One hermeneutically credible way seems to be to take a look at history.  Justice Thurgood 
Marshall has recommended this approach for determining whether a given group should 
qualify as a suspect class, which is almost the same question as my question of whether a 
given group qualifies as marginalized, oppressed, or subjugated.  In City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985), Justice Marshall wrote in his dissent at footnote 4, 
“No single talisman can define those groups likely to be the target of classifications 
offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore warranting heightened or strict 
scrutiny; experience, not abstract logic, must be the primary guide…..The political 
powerlessness of a group and the immutability of its defining trait are relevant….only 
insofar as they point to a social and cultural isolation that gives the majority little reason 
to respect or be concerned with that group’s interests or needs…,”(Emphasis added).  
Justice Marshall continued, “[T]he lessons of history and experience are surely the best 





individuals as members of an inferior caste or view them as not belonging to the 
community.  Because prejudice spawns prejudice, and stereotypes produce limitations 
that confirm those stereotypes on which they are based, a history of unequal treatment 
requires sensitivity to the prospect that its vestiges endure.  In separating those groups 
that [qualify for strict scrutiny, i.e., are, in my terms, marginalized, oppressed, or 
subjugated] from those that [do] not, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” 
However, it seems important to a hermeneutically credible interpretation that the 
issue of whether a given group is marginalized, oppressed or subjugated is arguably not 
properly defined solely in terms of history.  Owing to the hermeneutical call to test all 
interpretations in terms of what they “say to us” in the present moment, it would seem 
that it is more important to ask whether the group in question qualifies today, in the 
present interpretive moment, as marginalized, oppressed or subjugated.  For, according to 
our hermeneutically derived best interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, it is only 
those groups who are able to use the Equal Protection Clause to challenge laws 
discriminating against them.  History seems to be a great indicator such that if the group 
was marginalized, etc., in the past, then that lends credence to the view that the group is 
still being marginalized.  However, hermeneutically credible meaning is always informed 
by the present as much as the past, and if the stigma attached to being a member of a 
certain group is no longer socially or legally salient, then it seems part of the flexibility of 
legal hermeneutical approaches to interpretation that that group could no longer use the 
Equal Protection Clause to challenge laws which make classifications involving them as a 





or subjugated” would help to make legal hermeneutics more practically viable as an 
approach to constitutional interpretation. 
Philosophy of Race, Gender, and Sexuality 
 
Another recommended area of future research is into the philosophies of race, 
gender, and sexuality.  Arguably, the Supreme Court‟s switch from a focus on a history 
of oppression (á la the Carolene Products footnote/“discrete and insular minority” 
approach that is at the core of the Suspect Class approach) to a focus on “immutable” 
traits (i.e., the Suspect Classification Doctrine approach) has been based in ignorance of 
contemporary scholarship on the degree to which the traits in question (i.e., race and 
gender) are actually quite mutable.  It is impossible for anyone to possess the immutable 
trait of race according to this scholarship, for example, white or black or anything else, 
because race itself has absolutely no basis in biology.  In other words, most 
contemporary philosophy of race takes for granted not only that is race not immutable, 
but that it is in fact a concept having so heavy a basis in societal forces like power and 
economics that despite its absolute lack of biological content, the concept is actually 
taken to be immutable.  Very similar conclusions have been drawn by contemporary 
scholarship in the philosophy of sex and gender.   
The issue of the immutability or non-immutability of sexual orientation is 
contested in much contemporary philosophy of sexuality.  In an interesting twist, 
however, it is the fact that historically sexual orientation has been take to be non-
immutable that has formed the basis for the exclusion of gay people from qualifying as a 





sexual orientation from qualifying as a suspect classification.  It is for this reason that 
some gay rights activists argue in favor of the immutability of sexual orientation.   
But, this approach seems misguided and counterproductive for those seeking to 
use the Equal Protection Clause to protect the rights of gay people for the following 
reason:  If sexual orientation is “immutable,” then this means it is immutable for both 
homosexuals and heterosexuals and everyone in between.  But, more disturbingly, taking 
the position that sexuality is immutable could possibly result – as has been the case with 
the perceived immutability of race and gender – in people who possess the trait of 
sexuality but have no history of having been oppressed in virtue of having this trait (i.e., 
heterosexual people) bringing challenges under the Equal Protection Clause claiming that 
their rights as heterosexuals are being violated in virtue of, for example, gay people being 
given the right to marry.  A better approach for anyone interested in gay rights seems to 
me to be to focus on the marginalization, subjugation and oppression experienced by gay 
people as a group in society, and to argue in favor of bringing the focus back to group 
rights in Equal Protection Analysis rather than on immutable traits.  Further research on 
the degree to which gay people experience discrimination, marginalization, etc., would be 
helpful toward this end. 
Group Rights in a Liberal State 
The approach to Equal Protection Analysis derived in this work relies on the 
concept that certain groups have rights as groups in American society.  This has been a 
long-contested question in American political and legal theory.  An additional 
recommended area of future research, then, is cogently developing a theoretical basis for 





My inquiry is informed by the observations of Charles Mills, Carol Pateman, and others, 
for whom the traditional manner of attempting to deal with rights  – i.e., the social 
contract -- fails to account for the reality that individuals who are black, or who are 
women, or who are members of other historically subjugated and marginalized groups are 
not, and have never been autonomous in the sense required for social contract theory to 
work for them.  
The autonomy required to consent to the social contract, on this view, requires 
equality, and for these groups the ideal of equality has never been, and to this day is not, 
a reality.  Two central theses I hope to develop in future research are (1) that for blacks, 
women, and other marginalized, oppressed, and subjugated groups, the concept of group 
rights is required to achieve the ideal of equality, but more fundamentally (2) that the 
concept of equality in political and legal theory necessarily involves the concept of group 
rights. 
Robert St. Martin Westley has written an outstanding dissertation on the topic of 
group rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Westley 1993).  Westley‟s thesis there is 
that the Fourteenth Amendment (i.e., the Equal Protection Clause) should protect group 
rights rather than individual rights because the racism that necessitated antidiscrimination 
law in the first place is something that happens to groups and not to individuals.  All 
oppression, Westley argues, happens to groups and not individuals so that 
antidiscrimination laws designed under the liberal political paradigm to protect the rights 
of individuals miss the point and are therefore highly ineffective at what he sees is the 
ultimate objective of all antidiscrimination law, i.e., the elimination of the ideologies that 





that oppression (whether in the form or racism, sexism, homophobia or the like) happens 
to groups, not individuals, and I think his work in this area, if teased out a bit, would be 
helpful in supporting my thesis, which is not that the Fourteenth Amendment should 
protect group rights, but that it does.  This may seem like a minor distinction but I think it 
can have grave consequences for the likelihood of either of our suggestions being 
accepted by mainstream jurisprudence.  In other words, I am not making a normative 
claim but a descriptive claim.  I am making a claim about the nature of reality, not about 
how I wish the world would work, and I am basing that claim in philosophical insights 
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